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Abstract
Privacy management is becoming a fundamental task of everyday use of the
Web. People often disclose sheer amounts of data on the Web. In different web
services, and in particular social software, people communicate through data
disclosure. By selecting what data to disclose and to whom, people build and
manage their online identities. The disclosed data can vary in its sensitivity.
Handling sensitive data inappropriately or disseminating it in inappropriate
contexts can drastically affect users’ identities, privacy and lives. To avoid data
misappropriation, a high degree of control over data and context is required.
Through contextual privacy, users could have such control.
Contextual privacy management can be a complicated process. It requires
reasoning about data and context changes. It also requires assessing the
sensitivity of a data item and how it might change when context changes.
Due to its complexity, most technological approaches offer a simplistic and
limited degree of contextual privacy management. A fundamental step towards
addressing this complexity without limiting the degree of contextual privacy is
investigating the relationship between data, context and privacy.
The approach of this thesis is a multidimensional investigation of contextual
privacy. Firstly, the investigation is performed from an empirical point of
view. Through big data analyses and machine learning, we investigate the
effect of context on data sensitivity and users’ behaviour. The analyses show
that sensitivity cannot be defined by what is commonly considered as sensitive
topics, e.g., sex and health. The modelling of sensitivity management behaviour
demonstrates that sensitivity is affected by context as well. The modelling
demonstrates also the effect of time and subjectivity on data sensitivity.
Moreover, our analysis demonstrates the effect of context on data disclosure
patterns.
Secondly, the investigation involves a conceptual examination of the role
of context in communication. This investigation highlights the role of
v
context in facilitating the interpretation of disclosed data and estimating its
sensitivity. We propose controlling data sensitivity and interpretation to manage
contextual privacy. We propose facilitating the inference and management
of these ingredients and context by machine learning tools. The inference
would facilitate the automatic monitoring of changes of data sensitivity and
interpretation to identify misappropriation attacks. Through this approach,
contextual privacy management can be effective without overloading users.
Thirdly, the investigation extends to analyse contextual privacy in the legal
framework. This analysis compares how privacy is tackled in the technical
and legal frameworks to assess the possible degrees of control, privacy and
surveillance. It puts forward criteria to assess these degrees. The analysis shows
the interdependence between privacy and surveillance in both frameworks.
In summary, the thesis puts forward an extensive exploration and analysis of
contextual privacy. It decomposes contextual privacy and shows through big
data analysis that it is an interaction between data sensitivity and context. The
information provided in this thesis could contribute to developing usable and
effective contextual privacy management mechanisms.
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Beknopte Samenvatting
Privacybeheer is een fundamentele taak aan het worden voor het alledaags
gebruik van het web. Mensen geven vaak grote hoeveelheden gegevens vrij
op het web. Op verschillende webdiensten, in het bijzonder op sociale media,
communiceren mensen door middel van het vrijgeven van gegevens. Door te
kiezen welke gegevens ze openbaren en aan wie, bouwen en onderhouden ze
hun online identiteiten. Deze vrijgegeven gegevens kunnen variëren in hun
gevoeligheid. Het ongepast omgaan met of verspreiden van gevoelige gegevens
kan de identiteiten, privacy en levens van de gebruikers echter drastisch
beïnvloeden. Om het ongewenst vrijgeven van gegevens te voorkomen is een
hoge graad van controle over gegevens en context noodzakelijk. Contextuele
privacy geeft de gebruikers zulke controle.
Contextueel privacybeheer kan een ingewikkeld proces zijn. Het vereist dat we
kunnen redeneren over gegevens en contextveranderingen. Het vereist ook een
beoordeling van de gevoeligheid van de gegevens en hoe deze wordt beïnvloed
door de context. Door deze complexiteit bieden de meeste technologische
benaderingen een beperkte en simplistische mate van contextueel privacybeheer.
Een fundamentele stap om deze complexiteit aan te pakken zonder de mate van
contextuele privacy te beperken, is om het verband tussen gegevens, context en
privacy te onderzoeken.
Deze thesis pakt dit probleem aan door middel van een multidimensioneel
onderzoek naar contextuele privacy. Ten eerste wordt het onderzoek uitgevoerd
vanuit een empirisch standpunt. Door middel van big data-analyses en machine
learning onderzoeken we het effect van de context op de gevoeligheid van
gegevens en het gedrag van de gebruikers. Deze analyses tonen aan dat
gevoeligheid niet gedefinieerd kan worden aan de hand van wat doorgaans
als gevoelige onderwerpen worden beschouwd, bvb. geslacht en gezondheid.
Het modelleren van het gedrag van hoe gebruikers hun gevoelige gegevens
beheren, toont aan dat de gevoeligheid wordt beïnvloed door de context. Het
modelleren toont ook het effect aan van tijd en subjectiviteit op de gevoeligheid.
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Onze analyse toont bovendien het effect aan van de context op patronen van
onthulling van gegevens.
Ten tweede houdt de studie een conceptueel onderzoek in naar de rol van
context in communicatie. Dit onderzoek belicht de rol van context in het
ondersteunen van de interpretatie van vrijgegeven gegevens en het inschatten
van hun gevoeligheid. We stellen voor om de gevoeligheid en interpretatie van
gegevens te controleren om contextuele privacy te beheren. We stellen tevens
voor om werktuigen van machine learning toe te passen om het beheer en de
gevolgtrekking van deze eigenschappen en hun context te ondersteunen. De
gevolgtrekking zou het automatisch opvolgen van wijzigingen van gevoelige
gegevens en interpretaties ondersteunen om identiteitsdiefstallen te detecteren.
Door deze aanpak kan contextuele privacy effectief beheerd worden zonder
gebruikers te veel te belasten.
Ten derde wordt het onderzoek uitgebreid tot de analyse van contextuele privacy
in het wettelijk kader. Dit onderzoek vergelijkt hoe privacy aangepakt wordt
in technische en juridische kaders om de mate van beheer, privacy en toezicht
in te schatten. Het stelt ook criteria voor om deze mate in te schatten. Deze
analyse toont de wederzijdse afhankelijkheid aan tussen privacy en toezicht in
beide kaders.
Samengevat geeft deze thesis een uitgebreid onderzoek naar en analyse van
contextuele privacy. Het breekt contextuele privacy op en toont aan door
gebruik te maken van big data-analyse dat het een interactie is tussen de
gevoeligheid van gegevens en context. De lessen uit deze thesis kunnen leiden
tot de ontwikkeling van bruikbare en doeltreffende mechanismes voor het
beheer van contextuele privacy.
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Glossary and Abbreviations
AIC Akaike Information Criterion
CAP Context-approximation Parameters
Context Any information that can be used to characterise
the situation surrounding a data item
CPML Contextual Privacy Management Layer
CPS2 Contextual Privacy Framework for Social Soft-
ware
Deletion Pattern The information that characterise how data is
deleted from search history. The information may
describe the topic of data, the context surrounding
the data or the user
Functional Surveillance The monitoring and surveillance required for
operating data control approaches to offer privacy
management
Identity The information that characterise only one individ-
ual. An online identity is the information extracted
from the data this individual discloses on the web.
LTP Long-term Pattern
Offline Context Any information that can be used to characterise
the real-world situation surrounding a user
Online Context Any information that can be used to characterise
the situation on the web surrounding a data item
OR Odds Ratio
PaC Privacy as Control
PCA Principal Component Analysis
SD Standard Deviation
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Sensitivity The degree of inappropriateness of handling a data
item by a certain party or in a certain context
Sensitivity Management The information that characterise how sensitive
Pattern data is managed by users. The information may
describe the topic of data, the context surrounding
the data or the user
Social Software Application software for the exchange of personal
data and social interaction with a large number of
users
STP Short-term Pattern
Trust The belief of the truster that the trustee would act
in the truster’s best interest [53]
UP User-specific Pattern
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Privacy on the Web
The recent advances in technology have changed our lives and made us
increasingly dependent on web services. The web incorporates a wide spectrum
of services relevant to almost every single daily activity. There are many types
of online activities that people perform daily, such as emailing and searching
the web. At the same time, people can use the web to complement offline
activities, such as finding the nearest restaurant given a particular location.
Moreover, people communicate and even socialise using web-based social
software. Through using social software, users can foster relationships and
connect to other users. Users can create and manage one or more online
identities. Such identities may mirror or differ from the real identities of users.
Consequently, the web is becoming an essential part of every day life.
The dependence on web services may come at a price of privacy. The wide
spectrum of web services makes performing daily activities much more easier
than ever before. Users disclose different data depending on the web service.
In social software, users upload data to communicate with each other. This
data becomes available online to facilitate further interaction with the web.
By having one’s data available online, different parts of one’s life becomes
available online. When users are not aware of who can access the data and
how it is handled, the user’s life can be affected. The availability of data online
is risky if the user does not have the proper means for privacy management.
In some cases, privacy risks can have drastic consequences. An example is
losing one’s job when the employer accesses the employee’s data that reveals an
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improper behaviour. Such a behaviour may not necessarily be related to work,
e.g., smoking marijuana at a party. Yet, the availability of such data online
increases privacy risks, and hence, undesired and unexpected consequences.
The problem in many web services is that users do not have sufficient technical
means to protect their privacy on the web.
In this thesis, we focus on technical issues of privacy on the web. We focus
mainly on social software because personal data is often disclosed via such
software. Personal data can reveal private details about users. Disclosures of
personal data can be coupled with privacy issues. Addressing privacy issues
in social software requires exploring the different privacy-related dimensions.
These dimensions involve social software communication, data sensitivity, and
the causes of privacy issues.
1.1.1 Social Software
Social software is the class of web services that facilitates online communica-
tion and building online communities. With social software, users can create
profiles reflecting their identities. Users can connect to each other and foster
social relationships. Relationships link users who may be friends in the offline
world or strangers. Users communicate through social software via disclosing
their personal data. A user can disclose a data item to communicate a particular
messages a particular audience. The type of disclosure and communication
varies based on the design of the software. One variant of social software
(Facebook-like software), such as Facebook and Google+, are designed to
allow users disclose data to the public or to a particular audience. Another
variant facilitates public data disclosure such as Twitter, LinkedIn, blogging
services, peer-to-peer, collaborative and content sharing sites such as Youtube
and Flickr, and social bookmarking services such as CiteULike.
Using social software can be coupled with high privacy concerns. Web users
can disclose personal or non-personal data. Personal data is “any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person [...]; an identifiable person
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”, according to the
EU Directive 95/46/EC [EU, 1995], Art. 2 (a) [38]. In social software, users
mostly share personal data. Personal data can vary in its sensitivity. According
to the sensitivity of a data item, the user may have various concerns regarding
who can view the data, in which context, and how it is handled. In contrast,
when a user shares non-personal data, privacy risks can be less due to the fact
that the data does not identify this user.
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The ease of communication via social software gives to rise to privacy concerns.
In this communication, the user can communicate with friends, and strangers.
When communicating with strangers, the user may not be able to anticipate
how a data item will be handled. Consequently, the user may encounter privacy
violations. Even when the user communicates with friends who are trusted, they
could behave inappropriately towards the user’s data and privacy. To facilitate
communication and avoid privacy issues, users are offered technical means to
control their data and manage their privacy.
1.1.2 Privacy as Control
“Privacy as control” (PaC) is a one of three research paradigms proposed by
Gürses. This class focuses on approaches that offer privacy management
through control [48]. PaC focuses on approaches that offer the possibility
to control aspects related to privacy. Such control may involve controlling
data, the audience who can access it or are prohibited from accessing it, and
various parameters concerning the contexts in which data is put. Privacy as
confidentiality focuses on approaches that offer the possibility to hide and
keep data confidential. Privacy as practice focuses on approaches facilitate the
assessment of the constructed identity.
PaC is a broad paradigm that subsumes other privacy management approaches.
Besides PaC, Gürses defines another two paradigms, namely, privacy as
confidentiality and privacy as practice. These paradigms refer to approaches
that offer privacy management through keeping data confidential and practicing
data and identity management. However, these two paradigms are also based
on control. In privacy as confidentiality, users have control over hiding or
revealing data. In privacy as practice, users have control to observe and assess
how their identities are constructed, and can intervene when the construction
is inappropriate. In our view, these two paradigms are sub classes of PaC. For
this reason, we focus on PaC approaches in this thesis.
In particular, we focus on contextual privacy within the PaC paradigm. PaC
approaches facilitate controlling data or the situations or contexts in which
data is disclosed. The term contextual privacy refers to privacy management
through context control. Different approaches offer different methods to control
context. Context is the informational construct that describes the online or
offline situation surrounding the user and the data. The complexity and offerings
of each context-based approach vary. In this thesis, we investigate contextual
privacy, the related problems, and possible solutions.
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1.2 Problem Statement
Privacy management can be a complicated task for social software users. A
user often posts a high number of data to a variant number of users. A data item
can be disclosed in a private space to a particular set of recipients; alternatively,
it may be posted publicly for a large, and a priori unrestricted, audience.
Given that humans reason based on context [41], privacy management requires
reasoning about context. Thus, decisions related to what data to disclose, where
to disclose and with whom are context-dependent. To manage privacy, the data
owner needs to control every single data item, the audience who can access it,
the context in which the data is handled. However, it can be complicated for
users to control these various aspects all at once.
Controlling context to manage privacy is in particular, a challenging task.
Many accounts have confirmed the role of context in how users control their
privacy [66, 75, 79, 117]. Due to the high dimensionality of context and
its complex nature [109], controlling it can be complicated. Moreover, in
social software, context includes data from the real (offline) and online worlds,
possibly from different users, making it challenging to separate one context
from another. The resulting uncertainty and ambiguity of online context makes
controlling context more challenging. Additionally, the data owner has to
control contexts in which the data could be disseminated. Such type of control
requires knowing the possible contexts in advance in order to list the ones
that are appropriate and inappropriate, depending on closed- or open-world
assumption of possible contexts. Given the theoretically infinite complexity of
the social situation and its context that can be one of an unbounded number of
possible contexts [108, 99], it is not feasible for users to exhaustedly provide
the list of all contexts.
Most technological approaches are not sufficient to offer effective contextual
privacy management. In a previous study of privacy management approaches,
we reviewed many approaches that offer context control [90]. However, these
approaches have various problems. Some approaches lack simplicity for
average users to use. Other approaches simplify context to offer simple control.
Such a simplification results in approaches that do not offer a high degree of
control and protection.
A particular class of privacy violations that are related to context control and
is challenging to mitigate is data misappropriation. After the data subject
discloses data in a particular context, this data can be disseminated further
by others. When data is disseminated into an inappropriate context, the data
is said to be misappropriated. Data misappropriation can result in privacy
violations. An example is when Alice shares her breastfeeding photo with
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public and then Bob disseminates her photo from the context she put it in into
pornographic context. Such dissemination is not appropriate to Alice and can
affect her identity, and therefore her privacy. However, not every act of data
dissemination has to affect privacy, e.g., when Alice’s photo is disseminated
into a context of mothers and babies.
Protecting against data misappropriation is rather challenging for users. To
avoid data misappropriation, a user has to handle the complexity of controlling
contexts in which the data could be disseminated. Also, the user may need to
monitor the actions of others on their data, which can be viewed as surveillance
of others. To understand the complexity of monitoring the actions of others and
reasoning about them, the task can be viewed as a Bayesian game of incomplete
information. In such a game, the players, or users, have incomplete information
about the actions of others. Players can be said to be acting rationally when an
equilibrium is achieved in a Bayesian game [44]. Acting rationally means that
each player has the best strategy in response to other players’ strategies. In other
words, each player has the best strategy towards an attacker’s strategy. However,
it has been showed that reaching an equilibrium is NP-complete [44]. Thus,
such reasoning is highly complicated for users. To protect privacy effectively,
it should be possible to detect data misappropriation without burdening users
with context control and the monitoring of the actions of others. A first step
towards achieving that is understanding the effect of context on data is. Such
an understanding would show when misappropriation occurs, how to depict it,
and mitigate it.
We focus on the following research questions towards offering better context-
based or contextual privacy management:
• How does context affect data and privacy?
• How do users manage their privacy given different contexts?
• How to detect and protect from data misappropriation?
• How to assist users in the burden of managing contextual privacy given
the large amount of data and size of audience in social software?
• Is it possible to offer a high degree of control to achieve a high degree of
privacy without limitations, whether technically or legally?
Towards investigating these questions and enhancing contextual privacy
management, we adopt the following approach.
5
1.3 Approach
The approach in this thesis is based on a multidimensional investigation of
context and privacy. To better identify the role of context role in privacy
management, we perform empirical and conceptual analyses of context-based
privacy management.
The empirical analyses facilitate inferring information about how users behave
and manage their privacy in different contexts. To perform such analyses, we
need to have access to a large amount of data, or big data. Through big data
analysis, it is possible to analyse various aspects of privacy management. Firstly,
we investigate privacy management patterns and user subjectivity. Secondly, we
investigate the sensitivity of data. Thirdly, we investigate the effect of context
on sensitivity management.
We perform conceptual analyses to understand the role of context in
communication and privacy. We mainly discuss the dominant issue of
context unclarity and ambiguity in social software [17]. This analysis aims at
understanding data misappropriation to identify the relevant attacker model.
Based on the analyses we perform, we propose a conceptual framework for
contextual privacy management that addresses the problems we discussed
above.
In the following, we summarise the research approach towards proposing a
contextual privacy management approach.
1.3.1 Privacy and Big Data
To develop privacy management approaches, it is required to observe how users
manage their data using technological tools offered by web services. Privacy is
a domain of an interdisciplinary nature. Privacy is studied in social sciences,
psychology, law, and computer sciences. There exists a relatively large number
of studies related to humans and privacy perception and issues, in social and
psychological disciplines. Comparatively, there is relatively a small number of
empirical research that investigates humans and privacy. In many cases, privacy
management approaches, are security management approaches that are adapted
to social software. Examples are access control and encryption approaches
that are originally for security management, but they are adapted for privacy
management in social software [2]. Given the difference between privacy and
security, it is required to collect empirical data about how users handle their
data and privacy in order to propose the appropriate approach.
6
The main challenge of analysing privacy behaviours is the difficulty of
provisioning relevant data. Analysing privacy behaviours requires accessing
data about how users handle their sensitive and non-sensitive data in order to
understand how privacy is managed. Such a dataset is difficult to access due
to avoid exploiting users. Mostly, access to a dataset is limited to big service
providers. Such providers have big data sets that describe a large number of
users, and their behaviour in different situations. Fortunately, we got access to
Microsoft’s internal data from Bing the search engine. The data set represents
226,000,000 deleted and kept searches disclosed by 413,000 users.1 The dataset
encompasses a wide spectrum of topics and various contextual information
that describe web searches issued to Bing. Searches of a user are kept in the
search history and are used for serving new searches. Past searches can be
displayed while entering a search to help the user in case the search has been
issued before. The display of some searches may cause a privacy issues for
the user. By studying the patterns of disclosing, deleting and keeping search
items, we indirectly analyse privacy management behaviour in web search. The
analysis explores the effect of context and content on disclosure and deletions
of data, and hence, on privacy management.
To avoid overgernalisation, we refine our analysis of privacy to an analysis of
data sensitivity. Because the Bing dataset does not include information about
users’ motivations, we avoid interpreting deletions as privacy management
behaviour. Deletions can be random or motivated by a particular concern of
the user due to the sensitivity of data. These concerns may not necessarily be
privacy concerns. Rather, they can be related to the appropriateness of using
the data, e.g., the appropriateness of using data for ads. Our hypothesis is that
deletions are motivated by sensitivity of data. Commonly, topics related to sex,
health, and finances are considered sensitive. Our analysis evaluates whether
topics that are commonly considered sensitive are sufficiently informative and
can explain deletions of searches. By investigating deletions of searches, it
is possible to infer what makes data sensitive, and what affects it. Through
this investigation, we discuss whether it is valid to link sensitivity to privacy in
Chapter 2. Next, we elaborate on our analysis of sensitivity.
1.3.2 Sensitivity
Studying sensitivity is a rather challenging task. Since the Joint Computer
Conference 1967, the difficulty of identifying sensitive data had been
realised [50]. The early solutions were to classify military-related data as
sensitive and non-military-related data as insensitive. Since then, there has been
1This work has been partially done during my internship at Microsoft–Cambridge.
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more focus on identifying sensitive data in non-military-related contexts [50].
In reality, sensitivity may vary based on data type and content, as well as on the
surrounding context. Investigating sensitivity patterns by interviewing people
is ineffective and provides limited information. Alternatively, it is possible to
investigate sensitivity patterns by analysing a large dataset that describes a wide
spectrum of data in varying contexts. Ultimately, investigating sensitivity could
be performed through quantitive and qualitative analyses.
We analyse the effect of context on data by assuming a latent variable of data
that represents its sensitivity. Sensitivity indicates the degree of concern a user
has when her data is accessed by others, whether privacy-related or otherwise.
Sensitivity can be also viewed as the degree of appropriateness of putting an
item in certain situation and giving access to certain audience. The latent nature
of sensitivity means, by definition, that observing this variable is not possible in
most cases. Rather, it is possible to estimate this variable through other variables
that can be observed—following a latent structure analysis approach [62]. In
our case, sensitivity is a variable that affects actions on data, whether disclosure
or post-disclosure related. Post-disclosure actions refer to the set of actions
performed on data after disclosing it on the web. For instance, sensitivity
affects deletions and privacy management actions on data. By observing the
actions on data, it is possible to infer information about sensitivity. However,
the possible actions on data in our dataset are rather limited. These actions are
data disclosure, or submitting data to the search engine, deleting or keeping
the data. The observation benefits from large amounts of data to understand
sensitivity in different situations.
We utilise machine learning techniques to investigate whether it is possible to
infer an accurate mathematical model of sensitivity. The aim of our analysis is
to investigate whether, firstly, content and contextual features affect sensitivity.
If there is such an effect, then we investigate the underlaying model. We
choose to learn the sensitivity pattern from our dataset by modelling how data
is deleted or kept. The pattern indicates when data is deleted, and thus, when it
is sensitive. We also investigate the effect of time and subjectivity on sensitivity.
The investigation provides evidence that context, content, time and subjectivity
affect sensitivity, and hence privacy management.
1.3.3 Context
A fundamental aspect of understanding the effect of context on sensitivity is
analysing the effect of each context separately, as well as the effects of all
contexts together. We model context in terms of categories that represent
situations. Each category can have multiple values. An example is the category
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Home that represents the Home context. This category has two alternative
values representing whether the user is at home or at work. We are interested
in examining whether the context effect differs based across its possible values.
Additionally, we are interested in observing the effects of all contexts at once.
Our dataset describes actions of data disclosure—submitting searches—and
post-disclosure—managing searches by deletions. We analyse the effect of
individual context categories on data disclosure. We analyse the effect of
multiple context categories at once on post-disclosure actions.
Firstly, we quantify the effect of context on disclosure patterns. We consider a
disclosure pattern to be represented by the counts of items across the content
features per a context category, i.e., the counts of items across the content
features in the context category Home. We quantify the effect of context by
analysing the patterns of each value of one context at a time. We test whether
the effect of the values of one context varies significantly, i.e., whether the
context value at home affects the disclosure pattern significantly different from
how the value at work affects the data. We apply the test of homogeneity (χ2)
to investigate whether the tested patterns are drawn from the same distribution,
which is the null hypothesis. Rejecting the null hypothesis provides evidence
that the context values affect the disclosure of data differently.
We also analyse the effect of context on post-disclosure patterns. By modelling
the deletion pattern, discussed above, we also investigate the effect of all
context categories on sensitivity. The model shows what contexts—contextual
features—affect deletions, and sensitivity. To quantify the effect of context,
we investigate whether adding more contextual information would affect the
inferred pattern. In particular, we compare the two patterns by adding extra
contextual parameters that describe the user offline context, e.g., occupation,
proxy type, etc.
A relevant research question is whether it is possible using the information
about data content to predict information about context. The analysis discussed
above investigates the dependency of content on context. It is equally important
to investigate whether the context depends on content. The dependency means
that by knowing the data content that is disclosed, it is possible to predict the
context in which the data was disclosed. We use the disclosure patterns to
model the probabilities of being in a particular context category using content
features. For this purpose, we utilise the multinomial logit modelling [5].
We also review the literature on the role of context in communication. We
mainly focus on two extreme ends of the communication spectrum, namely,
cooperative and adversarial communication. These two ends incorporate
varying roles of context, trust and privacy degrees [53]. In general, when
the data is put in a context, it is possible to infer the relevant interpretation
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of data, and thus the communicative message. Similarly, it is possible to
infer the sensitivity of data. We also discuss how ambiguous contexts affect
communication and privacy by affecting the inference of the interpretation, and
sensitivity of data.
1.3.4 Subjectivity
We investigate whether subjectivity plays a role in sensitivity and privacy
management. In our investigation of the possibility to model the data, the focus
is on finding a general model that describes the behaviour of users. However,
if subjectivity has an effect on how users behave, the individual patterns that
describe the behaviour of individual users may vary. By taking a sample of users
and inferring their individual sensitivity management patterns, we investigate
the effect of subjectivity.
1.3.5 The Attacker Model
An essential aspect of developing privacy management for online communica-
tion is modelling the attacker the approach should protect against. Traditionally,
privacy management approaches are not based on the explicit modelling of
attackers. Attackers are generally any user who is not given permission to access
data. Privacy approaches usually facilitate delivering data to the appropriate
audience. The appropriate audience are trusted to handle the data in a manner
that is appropriate to the data owner. The attacker model in most approaches
implicitly refers to any user the data owner does not grant access to. There
are cases, however, where even the authorised and appropriate audience could
perform an inappropriate action, or an attack, after accessing the data. For this
reason, it is required to define attackers, and have means to detect them, whether
they are authorised or not. A first step towards achieving that is modelling the
attacker to protect against and detect.
To identify the attacker model in online communication, it is required to identify
the role of data disclosure in communication. By reviewing the literature of
communication, we infer that data disclosure aims at delivering a particular
communication objective. The misappropriation of data is an act that affects
the communicative message when the context changes. The attack is, hence,
any act that affects the communicative message. In the following is a high level
model of the data misappropriation attacker:
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• A (trusted) system: a social software system that facilities social
communication functions. The system enforces users’ privacy policies
and allows actions that are not prohibited otherwise by the data owner.
• A data owner: a user who discloses a data item to communicate a message
in a private or a public space.
• An attacker: a user who can access the data item, and by performing a
particular action the context is changed into an inappropriate one. The
change can be achieved by putting the data in a new context, or by
causing the current context to evolve by an action that adds or removes
data from the context. An example is when Alice posts her breastfeeding
photo in a breastfeeding context, and Bob (the attacker) changes the
context to a pornography context by adding a comment that changes the
conversation topic.
Alternatively, misappropriation attacks can result by users’ actions that
unintentionally affect the communicative message. We refer to such
misappropriations as unintentional attacks.
1.3.6 CPS2: a Contextual Privacy Framework for Social
Software
We present a conceptual framework to facilitate communication to protect
against misappropriation without burdening users with the management of
context. Based on our attacker model and the role of context, we propose
to decrease the complexity of controlling context by managing the possible
interpretation of data. The framework provides means to ensure that the
interpretation of data is appropriate in any context. The framework proposes to
lift the burden of reasoning about context to the level of the social platform. In
theory, misappropriation attacks can be prevented by monitoring actions on data.
In practice, monitoring and detecting attacks requires complete information
about all users’ actions. The framework assumes the utilisation of artificial
intelligence approaches to monitor users and detect misappropriation attacks.
We propose a contextual privacy management framework to maintain the
appropriate interpretation and sensitivity of data. An attack results when the
data is put in a context in which the interpretation changes. To counter attacks,
the framework offers can allow users to specify the appropriate interpretation
upon disclosure. When the interpretation of an item is different to what the
user specified, an attack is detected. Another form of managing contextual
privacy is without the need to specify the interpretation. In such a case, when
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the interpretation changes from the interpretation in the original context the
data is put in, an attack is detected. The framework can notify the user to judge
whether the change is appropriate or not. Alternatively, contextual privacy can
be managed by maintaining the sensitivity of data. The framework can monitor
the changes of the sensitivity in comparison to the value of the data in the
original context the data is put in. The sensitivity can be monitored instead of
the interpretation to detect misappropriation.
We propose a three-layer architecture for the framework. The architecture
design includes two layers to infer context, and the interpretation and sensitivity
of the data. These layers can be embedded in the social software platform,
and have access to all users’ data. The third layer is a contextual privacy
management layer. It allows the user to specify the appropriate interpretation
or sensitivity, and interacts with the user upon changes. The design is assessed
for usability and is compared with the well-known theory of Contextual
Integrity [75]. The assessment shows that the usability of our platform is
potentially higher than the usability of the Contextual Integrity. We discuss
the possible implementation of the framework, and argue how the framework
could facilitate privacy in private and public spaces.
1.3.7 Privacy and Surveillance
Another relevant aspect of understanding privacy is to examine the various
privacy management approaches in the technical and legal frameworks. We
investigate the approaches of contextual privacy and the consequences of the
control offered.
Privacy management approaches can have varying aspects of surveillance.
Different approaches offer varying means to protect privacy. The degree of
privacy they offer can also vary, according to the adopted approach. However,
in many cases, many parties can be involving in the functioning of an approach.
Such parties can monitor the data and the behaviour of users. With such a
capability, these parties can apply surveillance on users.
To understand the possible degree of privacy in PaC approaches, we perform
a conceptual analysis of privacy management approaches in the technical and
legal frameworks. To perform the analysis, we put forward criteria to evaluate
the degree of control and privacy and the degree of surveillance entailed by each
approach. The criteria are based on requirements to achieve a high degree of
contextual privacy. The analysis shows how certain aspects of surveillance are
deeply rooted in the realisations of PaC. We argue that data control approaches
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should offer transparency, reciprocity and a balanced degree of control as a first
step towards addressing the interdependency of privacy and surveillance.
1.4 Contribution
The main contribution of this thesis is an extensive exploration and analysis of
contextual privacy. The first main contribution is an extensive information of
the interaction of context and content in relation to privacy management. The
second main contribution is deploying various data analysis methods to test
various hypotheses about context and privacy management. The third main
contribution is a proposal for usable contextual privacy management using
artificial intelligence. In the following, we detail the contributions of this thesis.
• An exploration and modelling of sensitivity and privacy management
patterns. These patterns describe the following:
1. Modelling data disclosure patterns: by modelling how data of
different content topics is disclosed in different contexts.
2. Modelling post-disclosure patterns: by modelling how context and
content topics affect how users manage the sensitivity of their data.
• An analysis of the effect of context on sensitivity and privacy
management, including:
1. Analysis of the effect of individual contexts on data disclosure
patterns: the analysis quantifies the effects of context on the
intensity of disclosures, and identifies the significance of the effects.
2. Analysis of the effect of multiple contexts on post-disclosure
patterns: the analysis quantifies the effect of context on two
post-disclosure patterns with variant contextual parameters, and
identifies the significance of the effect.
3. Modelling the context based on content of data: the modelling
shows that by knowing the content of data it is possible to predict
the context in which the data is disclosed.
• A demonstration of the effect of users’ subjectivity and time on sensitivity
and privacy management.
• An exploration of different analyses methods to test different hypotheses
and explore various aspects of data. The analysis in this thesis is
performed on the same dataset. However, by selecting different
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sub-datasets and different analysis methods, we demonstrate how to
investigate various hypotheses and aspects of contextual privacy and
users’ behaviour.
• A design of a conceptual framework for contextual privacy using artificial
intelligence to protect from data misappropriation and overcome usability
issues of privacy management.
• Criteria to evaluate the possible degree of privacy and surveillance
entailed by a privacy management approach, whether technical or legal.
1.5 Outline
Chapter 2: Exploring Sensitivity and Privacy Management on the Web
Explores privacy management patterns through exploring data sensitivity.
This chapter investigates sensitivity patterns in a big data of 226 million
searches from the search engine Bing. The searches are deleted or kept,
indicating sensitivity or insensitivity. The identified patterns provide
insights into sensitivity and privacy management that go beyond the
common world knowledge of sensitivity. The chapter demonstrates
evidence for contextual effects on sensitivity such as temporal evolution,
and subjective diversity.
Chapter 3: Quantifying the Effect of Context on Sensitivity Based on the
effect of context that we report in the previous chapter, this chapter
explores the effect of context in more detail. It explores the effect of
context on sensitivity in disclosure and post-disclosure patterns. In this
chapter, we perform a large-scale analysis to extract sensitivity patterns
from 226 million searches. We assume sensitivity is a latent variable in
search patterns. Each pattern is a subset of searches characterised with
content-related features in a particular context. We observe the sensitivity
variation across contexts and quantify the significance of the effect of
context. Through these tests, we identify contexts in which sensitivity
patterns significantly vary, additionally, such identification is achieved on
even the content-features levels. Thus, it is possible to predict searches
of certain features that may or may not vary across contexts.
Chapter 4: Conceptual Analysis of Context Presents a conceptual analysis
of context and privacy in social software communication. This chapter
elaborates on the issues of context control and context ambiguity to
manage privacy. It reviews the relationship between context, privacy,
communication and identity to understand contextual privacy. Issues
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of context ambiguity are analysed further to elaborate its effect on data
misappropriation. Based on this analysis, the chapter defines contextual
privacy and defines the data misappropriation attacker model.
Chapter 5: A Contextual Privacy Framework for Social Software (CPS2)
Presents a conceptual framework for contextual privacy management. It
conceptualises a contextual privacy management framework based on
maintaining the interpretation and the sensitivity of data. It presents an
architecture based on the utilisation of artificial intelligence mechanisms.
The design of the framework is analysed for usability aspects. The
chapter provides a discussion about how the framework enhances
communication and privacy in private and public spaces.
Chapter 6: The Other Side of Privacy: Surveillance in Data Control
Explores privacy as control approaches in relation to surveillance issues.
The chapter analyses the counter-privacy consequences of the various
privacy management approaches. The analysis focuses on the technical
and legal approaches. The analysis is based on criteria to evaluate the
degree of control and privacy and the degree of surveillance entailed
by a data control approach. The analysis shows how certain aspects of
surveillance are deeply rooted in the realisations of “privacy as control”.
In this chapter, we argue that data control approaches should offer
transparency, reciprocity and a balanced degree of control as a first
step towards addressing the interdependency of privacy and surveillance.
Chapter 7: Conclusion Summarises the findings of this thesis and discusses
the implications of these findings and future research.
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Chapter 2
Exploring Sensitivity and
Privacy Management on
the Web
2.1 Introduction
Vast amounts of data are disclosed and handled on the web on a daily basis.1
Each data item has an implicit degree of sensitivity depending on its type,
content, and owner.2 We define sensitivity as the degree of inappropriateness of
handling a data item by certain parties or in certain contexts. Data ranges from
being not sensitive to highly sensitive. Highly sensitive data are commonly
associated with concerns of misuse and require a high degree of privacy
management. For data owners, reasoning about the appropriate audience and
disclosure context of a data item depends on its sensitivity. An item can be
protected by limiting its availability by deleting it [17, 113, 106], or by using
privacy management to define constraints on who, how, when and for which
purposes data can be handled [48].
A first step towards better privacy management is understanding the nature
of data sensitivity. Currently, privacy management approaches offer users
the possibility to select the data they want to control. Based on the user’s
1This work has been partially done during Rula’s internship at Microsoft–Cambridge.
2We do not refer to the legal ownership of data. Rather, we user ownership to refer to the
individual that uploads a data item to the web.
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assessment of data sensitivity, the user can decide who can access the data, in
which context, etc. However, users can easily disclose large amounts of data.
Managing privacy of each item can be challenging, therefore. Moreover, data
that can be not very sensitive in one context, can become sensitive in another
context, e.g., health-related data is sensitive to disclose in work-related contexts.
Managing privacy effectively requires an understanding of what makes data
sensitive, and whether sensitivity changes. This understanding could also be
utilised to indicate sensitive data that users should particularly manage. It can
also be utilised to detect when sensitivity changes, for instance.
While there is a substantial body of work on privacy for protecting sensitive
data, the knowledge about what counts as sensitive is limited. Sensitivity of
data guides how, when and with whom data is shared. In the Joint Computer
Conference of 1967, the difficulty of identifying sensitive data was realised [50].
The early solutions were to classify military-related data as sensitive and non-
military-related data as non-sensitive. Since then, there has been more focus
on identifying sensitive data in non-military-related contexts [50]. The main
challenge is that sensitivity of data may be affected by the type of data and its
content, as well as on the surrounding context.
To protect sensitive data, users can hide or delete it, or disclose it carefully.
Typically, there is some consensus on few topics that people consider sensitive.
We refer to this consensus as the common world knowledge about sensitivity.
This knowledge comprises sex-, health-, religion-, finance-related topics, as
well as other legally codified topics. However, there is a discrepancy between
how the common world knowledge identifies sensitive data, and what users’
actions reveal about data sensitivity. An example is the deleted items found
in the top 10000 deleted searches during one day from Bing—the Microsoft
search engine. In Bing, users can delete their searches from the search history.
The top three most deleted search items in Bing (table 2.1) are item that are
not commonly viewed as sensitive. However, it is reasonable to assume that
“Syria” and “Facebook” are sensitive because they are at the top of the deleted
searches. This discrepancy suggests that the assumptions of the common world
knowledge may not always hold. A better-understanding of sensitivity requires
an in-depth investigation of big data sets to analyse and establish descriptive
knowledge about sensitivity.
Understanding sensitivity of data is challenging due to its latent nature. When
uploading a data item on the web, the user can specify various attributes of
this item such as the title, date of creation, etc. However, it is uncommon to
specify a value that indicates the sensitivity of a data item. Rather, sensitivity
is often latent. It can be possible to estimate sensitivity by observing other
actions and data about a particular data item. For instance, the sensitivity can
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Search Search Count
Facebook 16,357,880
Syria 115,353
Lindsay Lohan 123,501
Table 2.1: The three most deleted searches in Bing during one randomly-
selected day.
be estimated by estimating the item’s availability and accessibility online, e.g.,
if the item is accessible to the public, it is assumed to have a low sensitivity.
Alternatively, information about sensitivity can be extracted by interviewing
individuals. However, such an option is, firstly, complicated to perform on a
large scale. Secondly, the extracted information can be of limited reliability
because the interviewed subjects may be too embarrassed to share what they
consider sensitive [55].
As a first step to understanding sensitivity and privacy, we apply data analysis
techniques on a big data set from the Microsoft search engine Bing. We access
226,000,000 data items, requested by 413,000 users. Bing allows users to
manage their sensitive data by deletion. To help users formulate their searches,
the auto-suggest features displays text completion suggestions as the user types,
e.g., “xbox one” and “xbox live” for “xb”. Bing also suggests matching searches
previously issued by the user, though not necessarily popular across the entire
user population. The per-user search history keeps a record of searches issued
in the past, for improving and personalising the search results. Bing’s interface
encourages search history management. On the homepage alone, two links
point to search history. Past searches are also displayed on the homepage, for
ease of access. Deleting searches, however, removes them from the search
history of the user, without removing them from the server. We analyse this
dataset to infer sensitivity patterns of deleted and kept items. We investigate
particular aspects that are captured in the following questions:
Q1) Is sensitivity defined by the content of data?
Q2) Is sensitivity temporal?
Q3) Is sensitivity contextual?
Q4) Is sensitivity subjective?
Towards answering these questions and investigating sensitivity patterns, this
chapter contributes the following:
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1. A discussion of challenges of investigating sensitivity, and the need for
big data to perform large scale analyses of sensitivity (Section 2.2)
2. A description of a data set that includes sensitive data items, and
descriptive statistics providing evidence for effect of context on
sensitivity (Section 2.3)
3. An inference of sensitivity patterns and contextual effects using machine
learning. Three patterns are inferred that show the effects of context,
time and subjectivity on sensitivity (Section 2.5)
4. A discussion of the results and the possible motivations for deletions
(Section 2.7).
2.2 Investigating Sensitivity and Privacy
This section investigates sensitivity and contextual dependencies, and argues
about the relation between sensitivity and privacy.
2.2.1 The Challenge of Investigating Sensitivity
Identifying sensitive data is a challenging task. The most straight-forward
method to investigate sensitivity is to interview people about what sensitive
data is, and whether sensitivity varies. This method is relatively challenging
to perform due to the issues of discussing sensitive data with subjects [63]. In
this setting, the more detailed and sensitive the data is, the more embarrassed
and reluctant subjects are to provide information about sensitivity. Moreover,
it might be difficult for subjects to provide accurate information regarding
whether sensitivity changes depending on location, time or any other contextual
parameter. Thus, a more comprehensive investigation of sensitivity would
require interviewing a large number of subjects in various contexts to ensure
the reliability of the extracted information.
An alternative to interviewing people is analysing a large dataset that includes
sensitive data plus sensitivity information. To infer accurate information about
sensitivity, the dataset should satisfy the following requirements. Firstly, the
dataset should include sensitive and insensitive data for comparison. Secondly,
the dataset should represent a significantly large number of people to avoid
subjectivity. Thirdly, the data should span a considerable period of time.
Fourthly, to investigate the effect of context, the dataset should include as much
contextual information as possible about each data item. These requirements
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can be satisfied in a dataset that includes data of varying sensitivity disclosed
by different users in different contexts. In the following, we discuss the big
data set we use to analyse sensitivity.
2.2.2 Big Data to Understand Sensitivity and Privacy
We analyse a big dataset from Bing that contains deleted and kept searches. The
dataset encompasses a wide spectrum of topics and include various contextual
information that describe searches. Using these details,we investigate deletions
of searches to infer what makes data sensitive and what affects it.
The prominent display of past queries in Bing gives rise to two privacy issues:
incidental access and intentional access. Incidental access can happen when the
list of proposed queries includes sensitive items. If the user is not in a private
space, others could incidentally have access to such sensitive data. For instance,
the user is at work, and she accesses Bing in the presence of a colleague. When
she types in a search, some sensitive searches are displayed in the proposed
searches list (Figure 2.1). Intentional access happens when the search history
items are accessed by the others or the search engine. The search engine
accesses the history data to enhance the search results of the user. Also, the
engine accesses the history of a user for targeted advertisements. Besides the
search engine, other users can deliberately access the user’s search history by
accessing the user’s machine. All of these types of intentional accesses raise
privacy concerns.
Figure 2.1: Example of privacy exposure. Auto-suggest displays stem-matching
queries, sourced from generally popular queries and the user’s own search
history. The search ‘Kim Kardashian’ in this example can be considered
inappropriate in certain contexts.
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We avoid interpreting deletions as privacy management behaviour due to the
lack of information about users’ motivations. Although many studies show
that people delete their data as an act of privacy management [17, 113, 106],
however, it is not possible to generalise and assume that any deletion in any
context is an act of privacy management without evidence. Through deletions
of history items, the user can manage privacy to avoid the privacy concerns
discussed above. However, deletions can be motivated by non-privacy-related
concerns. A user may simply wish not to receive certain ads related to a
particular search. This is similar to labelling a past purchase as for someone else
in one’s order history with an electronic retailer, so that it does not contaminate
product suggestions. We assume that deletions are motivated by the sensitivity
of items, which in turn relate to privacy or data usage concerns. Sensitivity
implies that when an item is accessed by others, the user might have concerns,
whether privacy-related or otherwise.
2.3 The Bing Dataset
The dataset encompasses search data issued by a sample of Bing users over
the period of six months from November 2012 to May 2013. The dataset
encompasses 226 million searches of 400,000 users. The dataset has both
deleted and kept items. The deleted items account for 22% of the dataset. The
dataset is anonymised and includes no user-identifying data. According to the
Microsoft privacy policy, the users’ data can be used for research [72].
In Bing, a search query is a data item. Each item is represented by a set of
features. A feature corresponds to an attribute of the content or context of a
search. Content features describe the submitted search and the relevant results.
The context features describe the context in which the search is submitted, as
well as the context the user is in upon submitting the search. Next, we classify
the features in three classes, content, data context and user context, and describe
the features of each class, as well as the deletion indicator feature. We refer to
a feature A as ft.A, a content feature or topic B as tp.B, a context feature X as
cxt.X. A context can have different values. A value Y of context X is denoted as
cxt.X.Y.
2.3.1 Class of Content
This class includes the standard set of features corresponding to the possible
topics of searches in Bing. Through these features a search is represented, and
results are matched. A content feature is binary, indicating the relevance of a
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search to the feature. A search can be relevant to one or more features at once.
In the following is the list of features, with search examples, and the count of
searches within each feature, where the value is “on":
• tp.Adult: “freeporn”, “adult friend finder”, (n=661,400). Bing has the
feature tp.AdultScore a numerical value that indicates the relevance of a
search to “sex" and “porn" topics.
• tp.AppIntent: “angry birds”, “ MSN free games”, (n=12,894,972).
• tp.Autos: “Cadillac”, (n=162,936).
• tp.Book: “game of thrones”, “Oxford dictionary”, (n=3,796,631).
• tp.Bus: “bus schedule”, (n=93,668).
• tp.Celebrities: “Kim Kardashian”, “paparazzi”, (n=14,098,552).
• tp.ClothesAndShoes: “Summer 2013 shoes”, (n=811,919).
• tp.Commerce: “buy lawnmower”, (n=14,816,246).
• tp.ConsumerElectronics: “xbox 360”, (n=1,085,562).
• tp.Dictionary: “meaning of pleasant”, (n=1,129,695).
• tp.tp.Download: “cnet free downloads USA”, (n=1,952,517).
• tp.Education: “university of Cambridge”, (n=479,337).
• tp.Events: “football matches”, (n=3,589,495).
• tp.Finance: “MSFT”, (n=1,286,520).
• tp.Flight: “cheap flights”, (n=792,636).
• tp.FlightStatus: “flight arrival schedule”, (n=3,271).
• tp.Galleries: “MSN games”, “Disney channel”, (n=18,501,786).
• tp.Health: “drugs”, “Catherine zeta-jones bipolar”, (n=3,393,061).
• tp.Hotel: “holiday inn”, “booking.com”, (n=1,119,532).
• tp.HowTo: “weight loss snacks ”, “how to tie a tie”, (n=1,779,386).
• tp.Image: “Kim Kardashian blonde”, (n=37,199,290).
• tp.Jobs: “career builder”, “job search engine”, (n=502,538).
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• tp.List: “TV listings”, (n=964,703).
• tp.Local: “white pages”, “news”, (n=19,395,305).
• tp.Maps: “California map”, “where is Syria”, (n=512,548).
• tp.MovieShowtime: “Butler movie showtime” (n=1,472,319).
• tp.MovieTheatre: “Movie theatre in Cambridge”, (n=401,641).
• tp.MovieTitle: “Butler movie”, “Great Escape”, (n=1,080,991).
• tp.Music: “Frank Sinatra”, (n=3,798,576).
• tp.Name: “Einstein”, (n=5,917,571).
• tp.NameNon-celebrity: “Zoe Tishler”, (n=5,349,557).
• tp.NamePlus: “Will Smith sells mansion”, (n=16,059,194).
• tp.Navigational: “Hotmail.com”, “Bing”, (n=69,940,890).
• tp.Nightlife: “Las Vegas shows”, “prostitutes”, (n=230,957).
• tp.Nutrition: “calories in a banana”, “nutritional yeast”, (n=18,647).
• tp.OnlineGames: “addicting free games”, (n=285,657).
• tp.QuestionAndAnswer (Q&A): “pregnancy test”, (n=1,615,269).
• tp.QuestionPattern: “how i met your mother”, (n=6,134,986).
• tp.RadioStation: “CNN news”, (n=1,592,502).
• tp.RealEstate: “real-estate news”, (n=659,574).
• tp.Recipes: “cabbage soup”, (n=2,081,378).
• tp.Restaurant: “Italian restaurants”, (n=1,430,975).
• tp.Seasonal: “fashionable mittens”, (n=4,066,639).
• tp.Sports: “NBA”, (n=2,563,947).
• tp.Tech: “ctrl + alt + del”, (n=2,923,418).
• tp.ThingsToDo: “park”, (n=1,372,730).
• tp.Travel: “Sweden”, (n=875,803).
• tp.TravelGuide: “Belgium attractions”, (n=554,501).
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• tp.TVShows:“so you think you can dance show”, (n=1,550,361).
• tp.University: “University of Cambridge”, (n=445,014).
• tp.Url: “MSN.com”, (n=17,402,652).
• tp.VideoExcludesAdult: “cartoon network”, (n=32,816,037).
• tp.VideoGames: “gamespot.com”, (n=790,141).
• tp.Weather: “weather channel”, (n=1,468,680).
• tp.WikipediaReference: “Star Wars”, (n=2,735,907).
• tp.ContainsLocation: “Microsoft in Redmond”, “Syria”, (n=20,645,406).
From these features, we curate S cwk a set to correspond to what commonly is
considered sensitive:
S cwk = {adult,commerce, f inance,health}
2.3.2 Class of Data Context
This class includes the following features characterising the online context in
which the item is submitted:
• cxt.Vertical: the type of content to search for. Verticals can be web,
images, or videos.
• cxt.VerticalChange: indicating that the user searched for an item within
different verticals.
• cxt.SafeSearchSetting: is one of three possible modes to filter adult
content. The modes are: moderate, strict, off.
• cxt.AppType: the application from which the search is submitted. It can
be an app or a browser.
• cxt.Browser, can be Internet Explorer (IE), Chrome, Firefox, etc.
• cxt.IsAutoSuggest: the search is suggested to the user by Bing, based on
the input of the user.
• cxt.IsAlteration: the search is suggested by Bing by altering the original
search the user entered.
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• cxt.IsForced: the search is submitted between quotes, by the user, to be
searched for as it is.
• cxt.IsSpellSuggestionCorrection: the search is suggested by Bing as a
correction for the search the user submitted.
• cxt.SessionPageNumber: is the number of the search results page the
user navigates to and clicks on a link from.
• cxt.InSearchHistory: indicates that the search has been searched for
before and is in the search history, and the number of past searches
through cxt.SearchHistoryItemCount.
• cxt.IsDotCom: indicates searches for a url ending with ‘.com’.
2.3.3 Class of User Context
This class includes the following features characterising the user’s context of
submitting the item:
• cxt.IPCount: the number of IP addresses the user uses during the day to
access Bing.
• cxt.OperatingSystem, the family of the operating system the user is using
to access Bing, can be Windows NT 5.1, Linux, etc. This feature captures
users context as it is not limited to search activities, rather, it captures
other users’ activities.
• cxt.DeviceClass: the type of device from which the search is submitted.
• cxt.DeviceModel: the brand of device from which the search is submitted.
• cxt.FacebookUser: indicates whether the user has signed into Bing using
Facebook credentials, as a result searches are saved under the user’s
Facebook account.
• cxt.WindowsLiveUser: indicates whether the user has signed into Bing
using windows live credentials, as a result searches are saved under the
user’s windows live account.
• cxt.Hour: the hour at which the item was deleted, and is ‘Null’ when it
is kept.
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Deletion Indicator: indicates whether a data item is deleted or kept, with
values {1,−1}, respectively. A deleted item has a lifespan value that indicates
the period between searching for and deleting the item.
We consider the ‘deletion indicator’ a dependent variable, and the rest of
the features are independent variables. This means that the value of deletion
depends on the values of the independent variables. In other words, the decision
to delete an item is dependent on the features of this item.
We consider a deleted item to be highly sensitive. We consider the features of an
item represent the implicit or the latent sensitivity of this item. The sensitivity,
in turn, indicates whether an item should be deleted or kept. In the following,
we investigate sensitivity through analysing the deletions and the other features
of the data.
2.4 Preliminary Aspects of Sensitivity
This section presents preliminary aspects of sensitivity in relation to time
and content. Initially, we are interested in observing whether deleted items
have varying lifespans, and whether they are mainly associated with particular
content features or topics.
2.4.1 Time and Sensitivity
Deletions are consistent over weekdays, except for a small rise in deletions on
Mondays (1.13% above average). Deletions, however, incur a spike every 24
hours after submitting the search.
The cumulative percentage demonstrates that the lifespan varies across the
dataset (Figure 2.2). More than half of all the data has a lifespan of one hour at
most. After a day, 72% of all data have been deleted. This variation indicates
that sensitivity is temporal. The temporality implies that not all sensitive data
is deleted immediately after searching for the item. A short lifespan suggests
that users are mostly aware of the sensitivity of their data that they delete them
shortly after submission. A long lifespan indicates that deletions continue over
time. Such a continuation means that sensitivity of items changes over time,
i.e., what was not judged sensitive in the past, might be judged sensitive later.
Alternatively, this continuation may be due to periodic or random deletions
over time. The relationship between sensitivity and time is investigated further
in Section 2.6.
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Figure 2.2: Lifespans of data: cumulative proportion of deleted data. The X
axis represents the number of hours, and the Y axis represents the cumulative
percentage of deletions.
2.4.2 Content and Sensitivity
Deletions and sensitivity in the dataset vary across content features. In general,
adult topics are assumed to be sensitive. However, only 4% of all deleted
items are related to adult. To investigate the association between sensitivity and
content topics, we employ the odds ratio (OR) [16].
The OR quantifies the association between two proportions without implying
causality. The OR quantifies how strongly the presence or absence of a property
A is associated with the presence or absence of property B. We apply this
test to analyse the association between the deletion variable (the dependent
variable) and each of the independent variables in the content class. The ORD,T
examines the prevalence of deletions, and hence sensitivity, given a particular
topic, according to the following formula:
ORD,T =
(
Countdel,T
Countdel,−T
/
Countkept,T
Countkept,−T
)
where Countdel,T , Countkept,T represent the count of deleted or kept searches
related to topic T , respectively. Countdel,−T , Countkept,−T represent the count
of deleted or kept searches related to any topic except T , respectively. The
OR computation is applied on the whole data set, as well as on sub-datasets
that represent data submitted by individual users. The standard deviation (SD)
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between the OR values of the users’ sub-datasets is computed to quantify the
subjective variation.
The OR values demonstrate the lack of strong associations with deletions,
and hence sensitivity (Figure 2.3). All OR values are < 1 indicating that
being related to a topic T is associated with lower odds of deletion (relative
to not being related to topic T ). The OR values show there is no single strong
association between topics and deletions. For example, ORD,tp.Navigational shows
that the odds of a deletion given the topic tp.Navigational is 0.19 the odds of a
deletion given searches not related to this topic. This low association suggests
the need to investigate other features that are strongly associated with deletions.
The SD values provide evidence for subjective variation of the association
between topics and deletions, as well as topics and sensitivity. The
computations reveal an inverse relationship between the OR values computed
from the whole dataset and the SD between the OR values of individual sub-
datasets. The lower the values of the OR per topic in the whole dataset,
the higher the SD of individual ORs. The high SD values indicate a high
disagreement between users on the association between topics and deletions.
The subjectivity variation is significant particularly in the topics commonly
considered as non-sensitive, e.g., tp.Bus and tp.Nutrition. The subjectivity
demonstrated by the SD requires further investigation of subjective sensitivity
management given contextual and content features. In the next section, we
include contextual features to model the patterns of how users delete and
manage sensitive data.
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Figure 2.3: ORD,T per topic and the standard deviation of the OR values
computed from user sub-datasets.
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2.5 Modelling Sensitivity Patterns
This section presents our approach to model deletions and sensitivity.
We model sensitivity through modelling the classification of deleted and kept
data. Modelling deletions is a binary classification problem. The deletion
indicator is the dependent class variable. This variable can have ‘deleted’ or
‘kept’ as class values. The assumption is that when a data item is ‘deleted’,
the deletion indicator implies that it is sensitive. Items might have different
sensitivity values. When the sensitivity value is high enough, the item is deleted.
By learning the underlying classification model or pattern we learn what makes
an item ‘deleted’ or ‘kept’. We also learn what makes an item sensitive to be
deleted. Such a pattern explains how an item is classified. The explanation
is based the independent features or determinants that affect the value of the
dependent class variable.
2.5.1 Data Preprocessing and Analytics
Data preprocessing and analytics were performed on Cosmos—the cloud
infrastructure for big data analytics developed by Microsoft Online Service
Division [111]. Machine learning algorithms were executed with SCOPE
language [27].
To learn statistically significant patterns, the dataset requires preprocessing.
Preprocessing is required because of the imbalanced data problem. This
problem emerges because the kept data items outnumber the deleted items.
Such an imbalance is referred to as a between-class imbalance [28]. This
problem causes bias of classification algorithms towards the majority class. The
bias contributes to classification errors. To overcome this problem, we excluded
users with kept or deleted items that account for less than 3% of their total
items. We filtered out users who delete more than 97% and less than 3% of their
items, which translates to filtering out 594,655 user and 42,724,389 data items.
This filter reduced the imbalance in the overall data set and excluded users
whose actions include little signal. Secondly, we applied data level random
undersampling 30%. This sampling is the most conservative approach for
imbalanced data [46]. It preserved the distribution of the deletion indicator
values.
We also applied optimisation approaches to optimise the performance of the
learning algorithms. We applied minimax normalisation to map the values to
the range [0,1]. The normalisation increases the speed of the training. To learn
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a proper model and avoid over-fitting given the high dimensionality of the data,
we used L1 and L2 Regularisation [15].
2.5.2 Learning Deletion and Sensitivity Patterns
To learn the deletion and sensitivity pattern, we use linear regression models.
The most appropriate learner algorithms for such a high-dimensional dataset
are Generalised Linear Models [68]. In particular, we applied linear regression
to model the data through the following functions:
fˆ (x,w) = w0+
∑N
j=1w jx j
yˆ = sign( fˆ (x,w)))
yˆ =
0, if fˆ (x,w)) ≤ 01, if fˆ (x,w)) > 0
where w0 is bias parameter, w j is the weight of the determinant x j, fˆ (x,w)
estimates sensitivity, and yˆ is the binary classification function of deletion,
i.e., classifies an item as deleted or kept. A determinant is a feature with a
particular value. One feature can result in one or more determinants according
to its possible values, e.g., the feature tp.Health can result in two different
determinants corresponding to the values {true, false} that we refer to as
tp.Health, and tp.Health=false, respectively. Weights indicate the importance
of the determinants in contributing to outcome. The higher the weight, the
more significant the role of the corresponding determinant. A positive weight
implies that the corresponding positive determinant indicates the sensitivity,
and the deletion of the item. A negative weight implies that the corresponding
determinant indicates the insensitivity, and the keeping of the item. In the
following sections and due to the high number of features in our dataset, we
mainly focus on the positive determinants to understand the features that directly
indicate sensitivity.
To learn the weights of the function, the data was split into two sets. The
dataset was split by a 70:30 ratio into a training and a test set. The function was
learned from the training set. Afterwards, the function was adapted through
cross validations. During the test phase the weights are adapted.3
3We also applied logistic regression and SVM algorithms for modelling the data. However, the
linear regression resulted with the highest accuracy.
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2.6 The Inferred Patterns
In this section, we apply the modelling approach discussed in the previous
section to infer three different patterns. The aim of inferring patterns is testing
the following hypotheses:
Hgenerality: There exists a pattern that explains the general behaviour of users in
relation to managing their data through deletions at any point in time.
Hcontextuality: Content and context affect sensitivity and data management.
Htemporality: Patterns learned from sub-datasets that correspond to different time
frames are non-identical.
Hsub jectivity: Patterns learned from sub-datasets that represent different users
are non-identical.
To extract knowledge about sensitivity and test the hypotheses mentioned above,
we apply linear regression to infer different patterns. The patterns are inferred
from the whole dataset, and from splitting this dataset into sub-datasets. The
aim of inferring patterns from sub-datasets is to infer particular information
that is explained in the following:
1. A long-term general sensitivity pattern (LTP), learned from the entire
dataset. This pattern tests Hgenerality and Hcontextuality0.
2. Short-term patterns (STPs), learned from 6 sub-datasets each corre-
sponding to the period of one month. The inference of these patterns
investigates the effect of time on sensitivity, and tests Htemporality0.
3. User-based pattern (UPs), learned from 75 sub-datasets each represent-
ing an individual user. The inference of these patterns tests Hsub jectivity0.
2.6.1 The Long-term Pattern (LTP)
The LTP validates Hgenerality and provides evidence that content and context
contribute to sensitivity. The LTP is inferred from the whole dataset with a 72%
accuracy of the whole model. This pattern represents the general behavioural
pattern of users at any point in time during the period of data collection.
Hgenerality is validated through this pattern that represents 226 million data
items of 4 million users with a high accuracy. The pattern validates Hcontextuality
by showing that the context features, in additions to content features contribute
to the sensitivity of data. The pattern shows that many features of the three
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classes are determinants of sensitivity. Due to the high number of determinants,
in the following, we summarise the determinants of the three classes that
significantly4 contribute to the pattern, whether positively or negatively.
Class of Content This class includes various topic determinants that
significantly affect sensitivity, or can be referred to as sensitive topics. These
determinants are:
1. tp.Adult (w = 0.2), has the highest weight in this class. However, the
tp.AdultScore (w = 0.69) has the highest weight amongst all classes.
This means that an item relevant to tp.Adult with a high ft.AdultScore
value is highly likely to be sensitive. Comparatively, an item with a low
tp.AdultScore is less likely to be sensitive. At the same time, not being
related to this topic, tp.Adult=false, has the most significant negative
effect of sensitivity (w = −0.16).
2. tp.Celebrities (w = 0.12), this topic is not commonly considered sensitive,
yet it has the second highest weight amongst topics.
3. tp.NightLife (w = 0.1), indicating night life activities may not be
appropriate to keep.
4. tp.Health (w = 0.074), health is commonly considered as a sensitive
topic.
5. tp.NameNon-celebrities (w= 0.067), a user may search for a certain name
that she is interested in knowing more about (e.g., an ex-boyfriend).
6. tp.ClothesAndShoes (w = 0.06), this topic is not often considered
sensitive.
7. tp.Name (w = 0.047), searching for names may indicate the user’s interest
in other people.
8. tp.NamePlus (w = 0.046), searching for names and other aspect can also
indicate sensitivity.
9. tp.VideoExcludingAdult (w = 0.039), even non-adult-related videos
indicate sensitive content.
10. tp.Image (w = 0.034), items related to this topic can be sensitive. At
the same time, not being related to this topic, tp.Image=false, has a less
positive effect on sensitivity (w = 0.0059).
4The aim is not to list every single determinant, rather, to mainly show that determinants of high
weights that have the major effect on sensitivity. The aim is to also show that different determinants
from the different classes have different weights and effects.
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11. tp.MovieTitles (w = 0.032), which might be related to a movie about
some sensitive or embarrassing topic, e.g., dirty dancing movie.
12. tp.QuestionAndAnswer (w = 0.031), which might expose socially
awkward ignorance (e.g., how to tie a tie), reflect interest in sensitive
issues (e.g., how to arrange a funeral, how to treat AIDS), or non-sensitive
issues.
13. tp.Restaurant (w = 0.01), this topic indicates the user’s interest in food
and restaurants.
14. tp.RadioStation (w = 0.0099), this topic indicates the user’s interest in
radio stations and music.
15. tp.URL (w = 0.0093), this topic might expose the user’s interest in certain
sites.
16. tp.Finance (w = 0.006), which might expose high or low wealth, each of
which can be sensitive.
17. tp.MovieShowtime (w = 0.0058), indicating the user’s interest in movies
and entertainment.
18. tp.Autos=false (w = 0.0036), being unrelated to this topic is indicative of
sensitivity.
19. tp.FlightStatus (w = 0.00035), might expose that the user is tracking the
flight of someone else (e.g., visiting or being visited by a secret affair).
20. tp.TVShows (w = 0.00022), indicating the user’s interest in entertainment.
21. tp.VideoGames (w = −0.14), has a negative effect on sensitivity.
22. tp.Jobs (w = −0.09), has a negative effect on sensitivity.
These determinants are broader than S cwk. Despite the overlap with the S cwk,
the pattern suggests that sensitivity goes beyond topics that are commonly
considered sensitive. The dataset does not provide information about why
certain topics are highly indicative of sensitivity.
Class of Data Context This class has various determinants that affect
sensitivity. These determinants are:
1. cxt.InSearchHistory (w = 0.24), indicating that reoccurring searches are
sensitive. cxt.SearchHistoryItemCount (w = 0.091) indicates the more
the item is searched for the higher the sensitive it is.
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2. cxt.SessionPageNumber (w = 0.14), which means that the more the user
navigates the results page—to find an answer, the higher the sensitivity.
3. cxt.IsForced (w = 0.1), forced searches indicate sensitivity.
4. cxt.AppType.SSL Bing (w = 0.094), using secure SSL service indicates
sensitivity.
5. cxt.VerticalChange (w = 0.083), the more the user navigates through the
verticals, the higher the sensitivity.
6. cxt.SafeSearch.Strict (w = 0.066), using strict search mode can indicate
sensitivity of data. cxt.SafeSearch.Moderate (w = 0.049) has a lower
indication of sensitivity.
7. cxt.IsDotCom (w = 0.0073).
8. cxt.IsSpellSuggestionCorrection (w = 0.0058), an item that is corrected
for spelling by the search engine is less sensitive than forced item.
9. cxt.Browser.IE (w = 0.0144), indicating that users of this browser are
more likely to manage their sensitive data than users of cxt.Browser.
FirefoxAndOthers (w = 0.0108). However, upon considering the version
of the browser, we get more detailed information about how browsers
affect sensitivity (Table 2.2). The versions 6 and 7 of IE have the highest
weights although they are not recent releases (2001, 2006) as the other
browsers in the table. Other browsers have relatively smaller effects. The
Safari browser version 4 have a negative effect on sensitivity. The table
show there is no correlation between the year of release and the effect of
the browser.
The determinants in this class show that the interest of the user in searching for
certain items might indicate sensitivity.
Class of User Context In contrast to the traditional view on sensitivity, these
determinants show that the context surrounding the user and the data affects
sensitivity. The positive effect of determinants indicates context in which data
is sensitive and inappropriate to view. The negative effect, however, indicates
contexts in which data is not highly sensitive and can be appropriate to view.
1. cxt.OperatingSystem has a varying effect on sensitivity based on its value
(Table 2.3). The effect of cxt.OperatingSystem.WindowsNT5.2 (w = 0.22)
is the most significant effect amongst all the determinants in the three
classes. At the same time, cxt.OperatingSystem.Linux has a significantly
negative effect on sensitivity. This might be, however, due to the low
number of linux users.
36
Browser Weight Year of Release
IE6 0.11 2001
IE7 0.094 2006
Chrome17 0.05 2012
IE8 0.047 2009
Chrome24 0.023 2013
Firefox5 0.0178 2011
Firefox18 0.0171 2013
Firefox13 0.008 2012
Safari5 0.006 2010
Chrome13 0.0051 2011
Chrome19 0.0044 2012
Chrome18 0.0041 2012
Firefox9 0.0041 2011
Chrome6 0.0034 2010
Chrome11 0.0019 2011
Chrome20 0.0018 2012
Chrome28 0.00039 2013
Firefox14 0.00036 2012
Safari3 0.00029 2007
Silk1 0.00023 2012
Safari4 −0.1 2009
Table 2.2: The effects of browser with versions. IE6&7 have the highest effect
on sensitivity management. The negative effect of Safari4 means that Safari
users are more likely not to manage their sensitive data than users of other
browsers.
2. cxt.FacebookUser.False (w = 0.079), indicating that Bing users who do
not sign-in with their Facebook account credentials are more likely to
delete and manage their sensitive data than those who sign-in with their
Facebook credentials. On the other hand, cxt.FacebookUser (w = −0.11)
indicating that signing-in with Facebook credentials implies that the
users are likely not to manage their sensitive data.
3. cxt.WindowsLiveUser (w = 0.019), indicating that Bing users who sign-in
with their Windows live credentials are likely to delete and manage their
sensitive data—more likely than those who sign-in with their Facebook
credentials.
4. cxt.DeviceModel.GameConsole (w = 0.014), indicating the users ac-
cessing the internet through game consoles are likely to manage their
sensitive data. Other device classes indicate sensitivity as well, such
as cxt.DeviceModel.Wii (w = 0.013), cxt.DeviceModel.BlackBerry (w =
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0.0006), cxt.DeviceModel.LG (w = 0.0002), cxt.DeviceModel.Windows
tablet (w = 0.00012), and cxt.DeviceModel.OperaMobileAndroid (w =
0.0001). Also, cxt.DeviceModel.Smartphone (w = −0.888) indicates that
users of smart phone are likely not to manage their sensitive data.
5. cxt.IPCount (w = −0.12), indicating that the more IP addresses the users
uses during the day, the less likely the user is to manage sensitive data.
6. cxt.Hour (w = −0.11), indicating that the higher the hour, the less likely
the user is to delete and manage sensitive data. This means that during
the night hours, users are less likely to manage sensitive data.
Operating System Family Operating Systems Weight
Windows NT 5.2 Windows XP (64-bit), Windows Server 2003 0.22
Windows NT 5.1 Windows XP 0.043
Windows NT 5.0 Windows 2000 0.031
Windows98 Windows98 0.029
Unknown Unknown 0.0049
Linux Linux −0.097
Table 2.3: The effects of different operating systems on sensitivity.
The LTP shows how various content and context features are associated with
sensitivity. Some of these features are not often considered to be associated to
sensitivity. For instance, the cxt.DeviceModel=Game console and Wii affect
sensitivity management although they are not commonly considered within the
devices that are associated with sensitive data. Usually, computers and mobile
devices are the focus of privacy management patterns [20, 105]. The pattern
also shows that the measured effect of a feature is affected by how specific
the feature is. For instance, adding or removing the version of the cxt.Browser
feature results with different weights. Adding the version results with a more
granular information about how the browser is associated with sensitivity.
In summary, the LTP provides evidence that sensitivity is contextual. The
contextual nature of sensitivity is two dimensional, based on the context of data
and the user. In contrast to the traditional view, sensitivity may not be defined
only by content, but rather, by many aspects of context, and any aspect that
reveals the users’ interests. Users’ interests can be considered sensitive, even
without necessarily being inappropriate. However, it should be noted that it
would be beneficial to validate our results by users’ feedback. In chapter 3, we
investigate inferring the LTP with more contextual parameters to check whether
the contribution of contextual parameter would vary accordingly.
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2.6.2 The Short-term Patterns (STPs)
In this section we analyse the inferred short-term patterns. The analysis
supports Htemporality and shows divergence across the individual STPs, as well
as divergence between the LTP and the STP.
The STPs vary in the number of determinants. The average number of selected
determinants is 81 determinants, and the standard deviation is 8 determinants.
Such a variation suggests that sensitivity determinants vary over time. By
examining the persistent determinants across STPs, we find similarity with
the LTP determinants. Such a similarity is expected since the transitory
determinants are excluded. The main difference between the LTP and the STPs
is found in the content class. This suggests that the sensitivity determination of
content varies over time. The variance is evident in determinants that reflect
seasonal topics, such as flight status related to holidays (Figure 2.4). The
variance between the STPs and the LTP provides evidence for the temporal
contextual nature of sensitivity.
2.6.3 User-specific Patterns (UPs)
This section examines subjectivity of the user-specific patterns. We inferred
sensitivity patterns of 75 randomly-sampled users. According to the central
limit theorem, this small dataset of 75 users is normally distributed and is
representative of the whole dataset.
The analysis of the inferred UPs supports Hsub jectivity and provides evidence
for the effect of subjectivity on sensitivity. Subjectivity is demonstrated by the
variance between different UPs. Subjectivity implies individual differences
between users with regards to what they delete and keep. The UPs vary in terms
of the number of determinants and their weights. To demonstrate the difference
between UPs, we present examples of mainly the commonality of determinants,
without necessarily having to discuss the weights. For instance, within the
set of positive determinants, only one determinant (tp.Navigational=False) is
common in 48 UPs. The tp.AdultScore is common in 42 UPs. This means that
adult data may not necessarily be considered sensitive to all users. The third
most common determinant is tp.Commerce=False, common in 40 UPs.
The UPs show prevalence of both True and False values of the same feature.
An example is the tp.VideoExcludesAdult=False that is common in 28 UPs and
tp.VideoExcludesAdult that is common in 28 UPs. These two determinants
are common at once in 6 UPs—with different weight for each determinant—
and each of them is mutually exclusive in 22 UPs. The 6 UPs show that
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Figure 2.4: Persistence of content determinants across STPs. Columns represent
the month of an STP, and rows represent determinants. A cell[x,y] indicates
‘1’ if the determinant x is selected in the STP of month y, ‘0’ otherwise. Flight
status only shows up in December (Christmas!) and February.
some items that are relevant to tp.VideoExcludesAdult may or may not be
sensitive, depending on the other features of these items. The 22 UPs in which
tp.VideoExcludesAdult=False is exclusively common indicate that what is not
relevant to tp.VideoExcludesAdult is sensitive. The same prevalence of both
True and False values of the same feature is observed in the data and user
context classes. An example is the cxt.IsAlteration that is common in 39 UPs,
and cxt.IsAlteration.False that is common in 37 UPs.
The scale of agreement in the content class is associated with a smaller number
of positive determinants and a higher number of negative determinants. For
each determinant, the scale of agreement reflects the number of UPs in which
this determinant is common. Within the set of positive determinants, the number
of common determinants decreases with the scale of agreement (Figure 2.5(a),
2.6(a)). In contrast, within the set of negative agreement, the number of
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common determinants does not drop with the increase of the scale of agreement.
Rather, the number of common negative determinants slightly increases with the
increase of scale of agreement. In contrast to the content class, the data and user
context classes do not comprise the same pattern of association (Figure 2.5(b),
2.5(c), 2.6(b), 2.6(c)).
To provide more details about the positive determinants and the scale of
agreement, we list the determinants in the corresponding classes.
Class of Content This class shows a varying scale of agreement across
determinants with True and False values. In contrast to the LTP, the
tp.Celebrities=False is more common than tp.Celebrities, for instance.
Although, tp.Celebrities has a high effect in the LTP on the majority of users,
however, this does not mean tp.Celebrities=False is not a common indicative
of sensitivity for some users. The determinants are:
• tp.Navigational=False in 48 UPs, tp.Navigational in 23 UPs.
• tp.AdultScore in 42 UPs, tp.Adult=False in 14 UPs.
• tp.Commerce=False in 40 UPs, tp.Commerce in 21 UPs.
• tp.ContainsLocation=False in 38 UPs, tp.ContainsLocation in 22 UPs.
• tp.UrlQuery=False in 37 UPs, tp.UrlQuery in 21 UPs.
• tp.Image=False in 34 UPs, tp.Image in 33 UPs.
• tp.Galleries=False in 31 UPs, tp.Galleries in 24 UPs.
• tp.Local=False in 29 UPs, tp.Local in 24 UPs.
• tp.VideoExcludesAdult=False in 28 UPs, tp.VideoExcludesAdult in 28
UPs.
• tp.Seasonal=False in 27 UPs, tp.Seasonal in 16 UPs.
• tp.Autos=False in 24 UPs, tp.Autos in 14 UPs.
• tp.Celebrities=False in 23 UPs, tp.Celebrities in 12 UPs.
• tp.QuestionPattern=False in 23 UPs, tp.QuestionPattern in 12 UPs.
• tp.Q & A=False in 22 UPs, tp.Q&A in 5 UPs.
• tp.ConsumerElectronics=False in 21 UPs, tp.ConsumerElectronics in 10
UPs.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2.5: Common positive determinants across UPs per feature class.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2.6: Common negative determinants across UPs per feature class.
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• tp.NamePlus in 21 UPs, tp.NamePlus=False in 19 UPs.
• tp.Events=False in 19 UPs, tp.Events in 12 UPs.
• tp.Health=False in 19 UPs, tp.Health in 11 UP.
• tp.HowTo=False in 19 UPs, tp.HowTo in 5 UPs.
• tp.Name=False in 19 UPs, tp.Name in 17 UPs.
• tp.RadioStations=False in 19 UPs, tp.RadioStations in 8 UPs.
• tp.Book=False in 18 UPs, tp.Book in 3 UPs.
• tp.WikipediaReference=False in 18 UPs, tp.WikipediaReference in 8 UPs.
• tp.NameNonCeleb in 17 UPs, tp.NameNonCeleb=False in 15 UPs.
• tp.Music=False in 16 UPs, tp.Music in 6 UPs.
• tp.Restaurant=False in 16 UPs, tp.Restaurant in 7 UPs.
• tp.Sports=False in 16 UPs, tp.Sports in 8 UPs.
• tp.Tech=False in 16 UPs, tp.Tech in 11 UPs.
• tp.MovieShowtimes=False in 15 UPs, tp.MovieShowtimes in 5 UPs.
• tp.Recipes=False in 15 UPs, tp.Recipes in 2 UPs.
• tp.List=False in 14 UPs, tp.List in 6 UPs.
• tp.TravelGuide=False in 14 UPs, tp.TravelGuide in 3 UPs.
• tp.Travel=False in 14 UPs, tp.Travel in 5 UPs.
• tp.Hotel=False in 13 UPs,tp.Hotel in 8 UPs.
• tp.MovieTitle=False in 13 UPs.
• tp.RealEstate=False in 13 UPs.
• tp.Weather=False in 13 UPs.
• tp.Dictionary=False in 12 UPs.
• tp.Download=False in 12 UPs.
• tp.Finance=False in 12 UPs.
• tp.Flight=False in 12 UPs.
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• tp.Jobs=False in 12 UPs.
• tp.MovieTheater=False in 12 UPs, tp.MovieTitle in 5 UPs.
• tp.ThingsTodo=False in 12 UPs, tp.ThingsTodo in 5 UPs.
• tp.University=False in 12 UPs, tp.University in 3 UPs.
• tp.Education=False in 11 UPs, tp.Education in 2 UPs.
• tp.Nightlife=False in 11 UPs, tp.Nightlife in 3 UPs.
• tp.AppIntent=False in 10 UPs.
• tp.Bus=False in 10 UPs, tp.Bus in 1 UPs.
• tp.ClothesAndShoes=False in 10 UPs, tp.ClothesAndShoes in 5 UPs.
• tp.FlightStatus=False in 10 UPs.
• tp.Maps=False in 10 UPs, tp.Maps in 5 UPs.
• tp.Nutrition=False in 10 UPs.
• tp.OnlineGames=False in 10 UPs.
• tp.TvShows=False in 10 UPs, tp.TvShows in 6 UPs.
• tp.VideoGames=False in 10 UPs, tp.VideoGames in 1 UPs.
• tp.VideoWithAdult=False in 10 UPs.
• tp.Download in 8 UPs.
• tp.Dictionary in 5 UPs.
• tp.Flight in 4 UPs.
• tp.Weather in 3 UPs.
• tp.Finance in 2 UPs.
• tp.Jobs in 1 UPs.
• tp.MovieTheater in 1 UPs.
• tp.RealEstate in 1 UPs.
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Class of Data Context This class also shows the variance in the agreement in
the determinants. For instance, instead of one prevalent value, the different
values of SafeSearchSetting are common in different UPs. The determinants
are:
• cxt.IsAlteration in 39 UPs, cxt.IsAlteration.False in 37 UPs.
• cxt.IsDotCom.False in 36 UPs, cxt.IsDotCom in 23 UP.
• cxt.IsSpellSuggestionCorrection.False in 29 UPs.
• cxt.SearchHistoryItemCount in 25 UPs.
• cxt.Vertical.Web in 23 UPs, cxt.Vertical.Images in 12 UPs, cxt.Vertical.
Video in 7 UPs.
• cxt.SessionPageNumber in 19 UPs.
• cxt.IsSpellSuggestionCorrection in 19 UPs.
• cxt.SafeSearchSetting.Moderate in 11 UPs, cxt.SafeSearchSetting.Strict
in 7 UPs, cxt.SafeSearchSetting.Off in 6 UPs.
• cxt.AppName.Bing in 10 UPs.
• cxt.AppType.Browser in 10 UPs.
• cxt.Browser.IE in 10 UPs. Upon considering the version of the browser,
there is a prevalence for IE9 in 7 UPs, IE8 in 4 UPs, IE10 in 1 UPs.
• cxt.IsAutoSuggest.False in 10 UPs.
• cxt.IsForced.False in 9 UPs, cxt.IsForced in 3 UPs.
Class of User Context The variance in the agreement in the determinants
is observed in this class. In contrast to the LTP, the True and False values
of cxt.WindowsLiveUser, for instance, are common. Moreover, there is a
considerable agreement on the positive effect of cxt.Hour, while in the LTP,
this determinant as a negative effect. The determinants are:
• cxt.Hour in 36 UPs.
• cxt.FacebookUser.False in 21 UPs.
• cxt.IPCount in 17 UPs.
• cxt.WindowsLiveUser.False in 15 UPs, cxt.WindowsLiveUser in 13 UPs.
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• cxt.DeviceClass.PC in 10 UPs.
• cxt.FacebookUser in 7 UPs.
• cxt.OS.Windows NT 5.1 in 4 UPs, cxt.OS.Windows NT 6.0 in 4 UPs,
cxt.OS Windows NT 6.1 in 2 UPs.
The variance of the UPs in shows the importance of learning such patterns
in addition to the LTP. The information that a UP provides is not possible to
capture in the LTP due to the generality of the LTP. A UP shows the particular
details of the subjective preferences of the user it represents.
2.7 Discussion
The three inferred types of patterns provide complementary insight that could
not be learned from any of these patterns alone. The LTP, STPs, and UPs
provide information about what determines sensitivity, and how sensitivity
changes over time and from one user to another. The findings show that users
are not exclusively concerned with topics traditionally considered as sensitive.
A second important finding is the contextual nature of sensitivity. A third
finding is that the aspects of the information inferred by a pattern depends
on the selection of the dataset. Generality, for instance, is the main aspect
of the information inferred by the LTP. This aspect is inferred by selecting a
dataset that represents a considerably high number of users. Subjectivity is
another aspect inferred by selecting smaller datasets of individual users. In
general, our work demonstrates the importance of specifying the aspects and
the hypotheses of interest to facilitate the proper selection and modelling of
data. Our approach of pattern inference can be adopted to investigate similar
hypotheses and aspects of information.
Next, we discuss the relation between context, sensitivity, and privacy.
2.7.1 Context and Sensitivity
Our work provides evidence for the role of context in indicating sensitivity
of data. The patterns show that a particular set of contextual parameters and
situations, e.g., in cxt.Operating system.WindowsNT affect sensitivity. These
contextual parameters capture both short-term and long-term contexts. The
sensitivity of data cannot be judged only based on the content of data. Rather,
sensitivity of an item may vary based on the context in which the data is
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put. This means that data can be judged as sensitive in particular contexts
and as not sensitive in others, e.g., breastfeeding photos can be not sensitive
and appropriate to put in contexts related to health and baby care, and can be
sensitive and inappropriate in other contexts.
The understanding of the effect of context on sensitivity is fundamental to adopt
in privacy management approaches. Current privacy management approaches
aim at incorporating context to enhance privacy. In data control approaches,
most privacy management approaches are developed to offer control over
context. Such control is not adaptive, it does not adapt to the changes of
context [91]. The lack of adaptiveness may result in privacy risks. The risks
emerge in situations where the change of context results in increasing the
sensitivity of data. The challenge is that controlling every change of context
can be complicated. A possible solution to address such a challenge is to
incorporate mechanisms for context and sensitivity inference that assist users
in detecting the changes of the sensitivity of their data, we discuss such an
approach for privacy management in chapter 5.
2.7.2 Data Deletion and Privacy
In this section, we discuss the possible reasons for data deletion in relation to
privacy management.
Deleting data can be a means for users to fight the predictiveness of intelligent
algorithms. In general, web services utilise users’ data and behavioural patterns
to adapt their services to fit users’ expected needs [53]. The service may use
users’ data to serve targeted ads, as well. Such a usage means that the web
service models the user. Intelligent algorithms use the user model to predict
what is relevant to the user. Users may not want some data to be included
in how the service models them. Some data can be inappropriate and the
user may not wish to be associated with that such data, e.g., the user may not
want to be associated to his search for “lap dance in Newcastle”. By being
able to delete their data, users can have control over the predictive algorithms.
Such an approach is even facilitated by the EU Data Protection Directive
(95/46/EC) [38] The directive empowers users over predictive algorithms by
allowing them to control the input to the internal algorithms with the right to
object, access, and erase data, according to article 12 of the Directive. Although
users do not have the right to alter the algorithm itself, controlling the input to
the algorithm is sufficient to a certain extent to have an effect on the internal
algorithm and its output.
Deletions can be viewed as a means to manage privacy. Fighting predictive
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algorithms is an act of data management. Privacy management is also based
on data management. Any data that users have in a web service reflect certain
aspects of the user’s interests and behavioural patterns. By deleting data,
users curate their online identity [78]. From the point of view of privacy
as self-determination and identity management [78], deletions are means for
privacy management. Whether users delete their data to avoid receiving certain
ads, or to fight the predictiveness of algorithms, they manage their identity
through deletions, and hence privacy. Such privacy management addresses
social privacy concerns. These concerns emerge due to potential technology
harms to users social lives.
2.8 Related Work
Our investigation extends two existing streams of work: analysing sensitive
topics and deletion behaviours. Lee et al. [63] provide evidence on the difficulty
of inferring information about sensitive topics. These authors present various
approaches to conduct research on sensitive topics, such as surveys. They also
presents the ethical and legal issues related to conducting sensitivity research.
Our work focuses on sensitivity without facing the challenges identified by Lee
et al. because our work is quantitive.
Similar to our approach of learning patterns in different settings, Kaplowit [55]
discusses two qualitative methods of extracting information about sensitivity.
He states that studies based on focus groups provide less information than
studies based on interviews. At the same time, the two study types extract
complementary information about sensitivity. Such results are comparative to
our quantitive analysis approach. In our work, the different patterns extract
different information. The LTP provides general information about sensitivity,
when the UPs provide more specific information that describe individuals.
In total, the patterns provide complementary information that could not be
extracted otherwise. In relying on opportunistically observed behaviour rather
than self-professed attitudes, our work provides richer patterns about sensitivity
and covers a variety of contexts.
Many works have provided evidence as to the association between deletions
and privacy management. According to a study of Wang et al., users manage
their regrettable Facebook posts through deletions [113]. Deletions are used for
privacy management due to the lack of usability of current privacy management
approaches in Facebook. According to Boyd, youngsters delete their sensitive
data, rather than using access control mechanisms provided by Facebook [17].
Similarly, Tufekci states that a majority of Facebook users delete data from
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their profile for privacy management purposes [106]. A previous experiment
of Preibusch [82] that examined the value of privacy in Web search, delivered
similar results. Users delete items from their search history to manage their
privacy. This study provides information about sensitive data that users delete.
Although that study was confined to a laboratory experiment, celebrity searches
(“Justin Bieber”), for instance, were found to be excluded from the search
history more often than tax fraud topics. All these studies have contributed to
an increasing interest in studying deletion behaviour to extract insight about
sensitivity and privacy management behaviour. However, to the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first empirical study on such a large dataset that
identifies deletions and sensitivity patterns to serve in better understanding
contextual sensitivity and privacy.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyse a big data set of 226 million search items from Bing.
To uncover sensitivity patterns, we learn three patterns: a general long-term
pattern of the whole dataset over the entire period, multiple short-term patterns
of subsets that cover one month each, and user patterns of a single user subset
at once. The patterns provide varying information about sensitivity that is,
yet, complementary. The patterns provide evidence that content and context
affect the sensitivity of data. On the content level, tp.Adult topics are highly
indicative of sensitivity. However, other topics that are not generally considered
as sensitive seem to indicate sensitivity, e.g., tp.Celebrities. The user patterns
show that other topics indicate sensitivity as well. On the context level, data
and user context parameters seem to affect sensitivity. The items that have
been searched for before and the type of operating system seem to indicate of
sensitivity, as well. Time of the day only emerges as a significant determinant
once deletions are considered on a user-per-user basis.
In the next chapter, we investigate further the effect of context on how users
disclose and manage their data. The investigation aims at quantifying the effect
of context on sensitivity. The quantification shows which contexts affect data
disclosure patterns significantly. The investigation also analyses the effect of
adding more contextual parameters on learning data management patterns.
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Chapter 3
Quantifying the Effect of
Context on Sensitivity
3.1 Introduction
Context is a construct that has various effects on how people behave on the web.1
Context usually identifies what is relevant to the user in a certain situation [101].
Based on the current context, the user performs relevant tasks or handles
relevant data. In the context of data management and privacy, context identifies
the relevant and proper manner of handling data. In the previous chapter,
we demonstrate that context affects sensitivity of data. Our work shows that
context affects how and when sensitive data is managed, by means of data
deletions. However, this effect does not show whether context affects data
disclosure as well. If context affects data disclosure, this might suggest that
sensitivity of data varies based on context. In this chapter, we explore the effect
of context on data disclosure. By sensitivity we refer to the appropriateness
of disclosing certain data item in a particular context. For instance, disclosing
photos of family party or porn is not appropriate in work contexts. Sensitivity
indicates the inappropriateness of certain data in certain contexts. In this
example, the particular context work is what makes the family party or porn
photos inappropriate. However, these photos are appropriate to disclose in
another context.
Analysing disclosure patterns and how context affects sensitivity is fundamental
1This work has been done partially during Rula’s internship at Microsoft–Cambridge.
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to understand sensitivity. Given that sensitivity of data may be judged based
on the context in which it is put, without information about what contexts may
affect or not affect data, understanding sensitivity can be limited. Contexts may
describe the situation wherein the data is disclosed, or where the user is upon
disclosing the data. We define a disclosure pattern as the information about
the intensity of data disclosure in a certain context. If disclosure patterns vary
across contexts, this implies that context affects the sensitivity of data upon
disclosure. To the best of our knowledge, disclosure patterns have not been
studied on a large scale. Performing analysis of disclosure patterns requires
access to a big dataset where users disclose data of different content types
in various contexts. Investigating the effect of context on data sensitivity,
requires investigating the relationship between context and content. Analysing
the role of context on sensitivity involves investigating how context affects
actions on data based on its content type, e.g., whether data about celebrities
is not disclosed intensely in work context. Such an effect of context on
content implies a dependency of content on context. Similarly, understanding
sensitivity requires investigating whether context is also dependent on content,
e.g., whether by knowing the content of data, it is possible to know the context
it can be disclosed in. Moreover, investigating the relationship of content
and context requires investigating their role on indicating sensitivity. Such an
investigation may involve analysing the contribution of content and context
features to the modelling of sensitivity management patterns. It may also
involve, for instance, analysing whether adding more contextual features would
affect the modelling.
In this chapter, we focus on analysing the effect of context on data sensitivity
upon disclosure and post-disclosure. We conduct our analysis on the same
dataset we used in the previous chapter. The dataset has 226,000,000 data
items from the Microsoft search engine Bing. These items are disclosed and
managed by 413,000 users. We incorporate extra contextual features that
describe the online and offline contexts of users. The online context describes
the online situation in which a data item is disclosed. The offline context
describes the offline situation surrounding the user upon disclosing a data
item. Towards investigating the effect of context on data disclosure and post-
disclosure patterns, this chapter contributes the following:
1. A description of the extra contextual data we add to the dataset
(Section 3.2)
2. A description of the analysis method. The method involves three type
of analyses. Firstly, we analyse and quantify the effect of context on
disclosure patterns through the utilisation of test of homogeneity through
the goodness of fit for multinomial distributions test. Secondly, we model
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context using content via multinomial logit modelling to investigate
the dependency of context on content. Thirdly, we analyse the role
of the extra contextual features and content in modelling sensitivity
management patterns post to disclosure. (Section 3.3)
3. A presentation of the results of the three analyses that show that context
significantly affects data disclosure, the dependency between context
and context, the role of the extra contextual features in enhancing the
modelling of sensitivity management patterns (Section 3.4)
3.2 Dataset
This section describes the dataset, and the disclosure and post-disclosure
patterns derived from the dataset.
We use the dataset described in the previous chapter 2 in addition to extra
contextual information. The extra contextual information represents the
offline and online context of users and their searches. The offline context
is represented by geolocation data that describes the situation surrounding the
user when accessing the internet, e.g., connecting from home. The online
context represents the online situation from within which the user submitted
a search, in addition to data about how the user is accessing the internet, e.g.,
using a proxy. The anonymity of users’ identities was preserved during the
extraction of the extra contextual information.
In the following, we describe the extra contextual features that is added to the
dataset within the data context and user context classes.
3.2.1 Class of Data Context
The following extra contextual features are added to this class:
• cxt.SearchService: the type of the web service from which the user
submitted the search to Bing. This context has the following values:
– Celebrities
– Domains
– Entertainment
– Explore
– Games
– History
– Local
– Movies
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– Music
– News
– OnlineGames
– Rewards
– Social
– Tags
– Travel
– TV
• cxt.MSNService: the search service offered by the MSN web portal. The
MSN search services are the following:
– Food channel
– Autos
– Careers and Jobs
– Clients
– Entertainment
– Health
– Healthy living
– Homepage
– Lifestyle
– Living
– Local edition
– Money
– Movies
– Music
– News
– MSN Now
– Photos
– Realestate
– Sports
– Tech and gadgets
– Travel
– TV
– Video services
– Weather
3.2.2 Class of User Context
This class includes features that characterise the online and offline context
surrounding the user upon disclosing the data.
• Online context: encompasses features of the machine or the network the
user is accessing when submitting the search. The following features are
added to this class:
– cxt.TouchDevice: the type of device the user is using. Its possible
values are Touch and NotTouch.
– cxt.LineSpeed: the speed of the internet connection of the user. Its
possible values are:
* Low
* Medium
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* High
– cxt.ConnectionType: this feature has the following possible values:
* Cable
* Consumer satellite
* Dialup
* DSL
* Fixed wireless
* Frame relay
* ISDN
* Mobile wireless
* OCx
* Tx
* Unknown high
* Unknown medium
Each value is characterised by different speeds (Table 3.1).
– cxt.AnonymiserStatus: the type of an anonymisation service the
user is using. The possible values are the following:
* Active
* Inactive
* Private
* Suspect
– cxt.ProxyLevel: the degree of obfuscation of the used proxy. The
possible values are:
* Transparent: A proxy that forwards the user’s IP address to
the target service. It offers no anonymity.
* Anonymous: A proxy that does not reveal the user’s IP address
to the target service.
* Distorting: A proxy that hides the user’s IP address to the
target service.
* Elite: a proxy that offers the highest degree of anonymity that
the target service does not know that the user is using a proxy.
– cxt.ProxyType: indicates the proxy technology used. The relevant
variations are:
* Http: A type that offers a range of anonymity levels.
* Tor: An onion routing proxy type.
* Web: A web-based type that conceals the real IP of the user.
* SOCKS: A type of proxy that offers a complete anonymity.
This type do not add any identifying information to the
communicated information.
• Offline context: encompasses features related to the offline situation the
user is in when disclosing the search. The features are related to the real
world environment, as follows:
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Type Description Speed
OCx Fiber optic connections, which are used
primarily by large backbone carriers.
High
Tx Leased line, which is circuits used by
many small- and medium-sized compa-
nies.
High
Frame relay Frame relay circuits, which can range
from low- to high-speed and are used as a
backup or alternative to Tx.
High
Unknown high Unknown connection type with an esti-
mated connection speed as high.
High
Consumer satellite High-speed or broadband links between a
consumer and a geosynchronous or low-
earth orbiting satellite.
Medium
DSL Digital Subscriber Line broadband cir-
cuits.
Medium
Cable Cable Modem broadband circuits, offered
by cable TV companies.
Medium
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network high-
speed technology. Offered by some major
telephony companies.
Medium
Fixed wireless Fixed wireless connections, where the
location of the receiver is fixed.
Medium
Unknown medium Unknown connection type with an esti-
mated connection speed as medium.
Medium
Mobile wireless Cellular network providers who employ
CDMA, EDGE, EV-DO, GPRS, 3G, and
4G technologies.
Low
Dialup Consumer dial-up modem technology. Low
Table 3.1: Description of connection types and their speed.
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– cxt.Home: indicating whether the user is at home or not.
– cxt.OrganisationType: the type of organisation the user is in when
disclosing the data item. The possible values are:
* Accounting and Auditing
* Advertising
* Agriculture
* Banking
* Business Conglomerate
* Construction
* Data Services
* Dining
* Education
* Finance
* Gaming
* Government
* Government (County)
* Government (Federal)
* Government (General)
* Government (Municipal)
* Government (State)
* Health
* Hospital
* Insurance
* Internet Cafes
* Internet Colocation Ser-
vices
* Internet Hosting Services
* Internet Service Provider
* Legal Services
* Library
* Lodging
* Manufacturing
* Medical and Dental Ser-
vices
* Member Organisation
* Motor Vehicles
* Pharmacy
* Private Service
* Professional Service
* Publishing
* Real Estate
* Religious Organisations
* Research and Development
* Retail
* Telecommunications
* Transportation
* Travel Services
* Utilities
* Wholesale
– cxt.Weekday: the day on which the data is disclosed.
In the following sections, we refer to a value Y of context cxt.X as cxt.X.Y.
3.3 Method
This section presents the statistical approach we follow to test the effect
of context on disclosure and post-disclosure patterns. It also describes our
investigation of the dependency of context on content.
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Our analysis investigates the interaction of content and context that affects the
sensitivity of data. We consider submitting a search item an act of disclosure to
the search engine that may or may not be related to privacy concerns. The user
assesses the latent sensitivity of a data item upon disclosure. The sensitivity of
the item affects when and where it is disclosed. The user can further manage
the sensitive data post disclosure. The user can hide, delete, or limit the access
to sensitive data items. We investigate the effect of context on disclosure
patterns. The effect of context on disclosure patterns is captured by the change
of disclosures in different content features based on context. We also investigate
whether the content affect context. Lastly, we present our analysis method to
investigate the effect of context on post-disclosure patterns.
3.3.1 Analysis of Disclosure Patterns
Our approach to analyse disclosure patterns is based on examining the effect of
one context on the intensity of disclosing data within the different values on
this context. The effect of context on disclosures implies that the sensitivity of
disclosed data varies based on this context.
Initially, we compute disclosure patterns from the dataset. A disclosure pattern
is the information that represents the intensity of data disclosures in a particular
context. To compute a disclosure pattern, we group the data based on one
contextual feature, or one context, at a time. We then compute the count of
items within each content feature. The result is a pattern that shows the intensity
of search items per content features and one context feature. The number of
possible values of the context corresponds to the number of disclosure patterns
of this context, e.g., two disclosure patterns are computed based on the context
cxt.Home that has two possible values.
Disclosure patterns of a context are represented in a two-dimensional
contingency table (Table 3.2). In our analysis, a context is a factor that can
affect data disclosure. The possible values of a context represent the levels of
the factor. The frequencies (sample sizes) of each content feature are hence
independent realisations of a Poisson distribution. The frequencies of the
content features within one level are a population. Thus, given the sizes of the
respective content populations, a level is distributed according to a multinomial
distribution. The contingency table represents the frequency of disclosures
within the levels of a context. Each row is a content feature, and each column
is a level.
To investigate the effect of a particular context, we apply the χ2 test of
homogeneity on the disclosure patterns of this context. The test determines
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Context Levels ft.Adult ft.Celebrities
Level1 Count1,1 Count1,2
Level2 Count1,2 Count2,2
Table 3.2: A contingency table of a context factor with two values and two
content features.
whether multinomial distributions are homogeneous or equal in reference to
one factor [14, 96]. The test is applied on a contingency table. It summarises
the discrepancy in the populations, and tests whether the population samples are
drawn from identical distributions. When there is a significant discrepancy, we
say that the factor affects the populations, and hence, affects the corresponding
disclosure patterns. χ2 is computed as follows:
X2 =
∑
i, j
(Oi j−Ei j)2
Ei j
where Oi j is the observed frequency count of content feature i for level j, and
Ei j is the expected frequency count of content feature i for level j. Ei j is
computed as follows:
Ei j =
(Ni ∗N j)
N
where Ni is the total number of observations from content feature i, N j is the
total number of observations at level j, and N is the total sample size.
X2 tests the null hypothesis that all the considered the multinomial distributions
of a context are equal—or, in other words, drawn from the same distribution.
The null hypothesis can be written for a particular factor, and a set of j levels
and i content features, as:
H0 : Pi1 = Pi2 = · · · = PiJ : ∀i
where Pi j is the probability that an observation from the ith content feature
belongs to the jth level.
Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates a significant effect of the factor on the
distributions, for P-value < 0.05.
We perform post-hoc analysis of χ2 to further analyse and quantify the effect of
the factor levels on content feature. The χ2 shows whether there is a significant
59
difference in at least one of the populations. Given that our contingency tables
are larger than (2X2), rejecting the H0 does not provide information about
which level of the contingency table is the source of a statically significant
result. To identify such levels, we perform post-hoc analysis based on residual
analysis. A residual is the difference between the observed and expected values
for a cell. This analysis quantifies the degree to which an individual cell diverges
from an overall hypothetical homogeneous distribution, and contributes to the
chi-square test result [96]. In other words, this analysis quantifies the effect of
each level on each content feature. We use the Pearson residual defined as:
PRi j =
(Oi j−Ei j)√
Ei j
where Oi j is the observed frequency count of cell i j of the contingency table,
and Ei j is the expected frequency of cell i j. To identify the contribution of each
cell, we follow Agresti’s recommendation [5] and choose a threshold value
T = 3. The threshold indicates that the absolute residual values greater than T
contribute to the statistically significant result. For a cell Ci j, if PRi j ≥ T , we
say that Ci j positively contributes to the result, or that Ci j has more values than
expected. If PRi j ≤ −T , we say that Ci j negatively contributes to the result, or
that Ci j has less values than expected. If T > PRi j > −T , we say that Ci j has no
contribution, or that Ci j has the expected number of values. The interpretation
of these cases is that the context level j affects the content feature i positively,
negatively, or has no effect, respectively.
Let us remark that two non-standard traits of the dataset pose potential problems
towards the interpretation of the results of the statistical analysis. Firstly,
the contingency tables are typically highly unbalanced, meaning that in an
individual table the marginal sums of observed values over the rows (and
columns) vary substantially (see also Section 2). This may result in an
inaccurate post-hoc analysis, since the rows (columns) with high number of
observations are typically more likely to indicate significance. Nevertheless,
this does not affect the overall results of the χ2 tests, and the main results
remain in order. Secondly, in the used dataset it is possible that one search item
relates to more than one content feature at once. However, it might be noted
that this phenomenon does not significantly affect the results, as the ratio of
the total number of contributions to the total number of items is still rather low
(1.53).
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3.3.2 Modelling Context based on Content
In this section, we present our approach towards investigating the effect
of content on context. We investigate the effect of content on context by
investigating the dependency of context on content. The possibility to model
the probabilities of being at a particular context using content features implies
the dependency of context on content. Context modelling means that through
knowing the content we can predict the context appropriate for the sensitivity
of this item. This also means that through knowing the content, the sensitivity
of an item is implicitly assessed to predict the relevant context. In contrast
to the previous analysis, this analysis demonstrates that sensitivity is not only
affected by context, rather by content as well.
Such a modelling is possible given the high dimensionality of the content
features in contrast to the low dimensionality of each context—except for the
cxt.Organisation that has a relatively equal number of dimensions to the content
features. For this context, the modelling can be performed in both directions,
modelling the context based on content or modelling the content based on
context. However, we only focus on modelling the context using the content in
this section.
Content Feature cxt.Context.Category1 cxt.Context.Category2
ft.Adult Count1,1 Count1,2
ft.Celebrities Count1,2 Count2,2
Table 3.3: A contingency table of two content features and a context with two
categories.
The modelling is based on a contingency table of the modelled context
(Table 3.3). The determinant variables are the content features and the
dependent variable is the context. The category values of the context are
mutually exclusive. Given that the probability distribution of the context is
multinomial distribution, we use multinomial logit modelling [5]. In this
modelling, a category of the dependent variable is selected as the baseline
category. The model computes the log-odds for other categories relative to this
category. The log-odds of each category of the dependent variable follow a
linear model:
ηi j = log
pii j
piiJ
= αi j+βi jXi j
where pii j = Pr{Yi = j} indicates the probability of an item of the ith content
falls in the jth context category, βi j is a vector of regression coefficients, for
j = 1, ..., J−1 context categories. The model describes the effects of X on the
J−1 logits.
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Through modelling context, we also investigate the similarity of content
features. Given the relatively high order of content features, we are interested
in dimensionality reduction of these features. The investigation aims at
discovering whether using a smaller number of features, we can model context.
If certain content features are similar, by clustering these features together,
we can reduce the dimensionality and thus model the context. We investigate
similarity through applying clustering of content features before modelling
context.
We use Ward hierarchical clustering analysis method [114]. This method
clusters data in a multivariate Euclidean space, similar to the approach of the
principal component analysis (PCA). Ward’s method is used for correspondence
analysis to represent categorical data in a low-dimensional Euclidean space [74].
This method follows a bottom-up approach and is low cost, compared to k-
means [74]. The method starts with an individual cluster for each data item,
and then clusters are merged together to minimises the within-cluster sum of
squares over all partitions.
For each context, we apply clustering with different numbers of clusters. We
assess the fit of each clustering in terms of the accuracy of predicting context.
3.3.3 Analysis of Post-Disclosure Patterns
Our approach to investigate the effect of context, and content as well, on post-
disclosure patterns is through modelling the sensitivity pattern from deleted
and kept data. It is not possible to apply χ2 test on post-disclosure patterns
because we aim at analysing how context, as well as content, affect the deletion
indicator variable at once. Rather, we adopt the approach of modelling the
sensitivity pattern. The modelling approach is the same as the approach of the
previous chapter 2.5. The current analysis focuses on whether adding more
contextual features would affect the inferred sensitivity pattern.
The preprocessing and modelling of the sensitivity pattern are performed
according to (Section 2.5). We refer to the inferred pattern with the extra
contextual features as LTPnew, and to the pattern with fewer features inferred
in the previous chapter as LTPold. We compare these two patterns to each other
and compare the contribution of the three feature classes to each pattern.
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3.4 Results
This section presents the results of the analysis as described in the previous
section. The analyses were performed on the whole dataset with the external
contextual features.
3.4.1 The Effect of Context on Disclosure Patterns
This section presents the results of applying our analysis method on disclosure
patterns of the contextual features, including the extra features. Each feature
represents one context, as previously mentioned. The χ2 is applied on each
context. When the test provides evidence for a significant difference between
the disclosure patterns of a context, we perform the post-hoc analysis to quantify
the difference between the disclosure patterns.
To represent the results of the post-hoc analysis, we use heat map plots. The
heat map represents the residual analysis table. Each cell of this table shows the
degree of contribution of each corresponding cell in the context contingency
table to the difference between disclosure patterns. A negative contribution to
the disclosure pattern means that the context level, of a cell, affects sensitivity
of the content feature, of the same cell, positively to the degree that disclosures
of this feature decrease. In contrast, a positive contribution means that the
context level, of a cell, affects sensitivity of the content feature, of the same
cell, negatively to the degree that disclosures of this feature increase. When
the cell has no contribution to the difference, this means that the counts of the
content feature do not differ from the expected counts.
The application of χ2 on each context resulted with a significant difference.
In other words, for each context, the intensity of searches across at least one
of the values of this context vary significantly. The significant variance of
disclosure patterns may be due to users being more interested in a particular
set of topics in a particular context variable than in other context variables.
Nevertheless, the variation of users’ interest affects what people search for, and
hence their disclosure patterns. In the following, given the significance effect
of all contexts separately, we mainly present the results of the post-hoc analysis
of each context.
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Vertical
The cxt.Vertical affects disclosure patterns significantly. The patterns vary
significantly across the values of this context (Figure 3.1). cxt.Vertical.Web,
cxt.Vertical.Video, and cxt.Vertical.Image context have a varying effect on
the content features. For instance, cxt.Vertical.Video negatively affects—
decreases—disclosures of tp.Adult, while cxt.Vertical.Image positively affects—
increases—disclosures of the same feature.
Safe Search Setting
The cxt.SafeSearch affects disclosure patterns significantly. Across the three
possible values, the cxt.SafeSearch.Moderate has mostly a positive effect on
the content features, while cxt.SafeSearch.Off has a mostly negative effect, and
cxt.SafeSearch.Strict has a varying effect on content features (Figure 3.1). For
instance, cxt.SafeSearch.Strict negatively affects tp.Adult disclosures, while
cxt.Safe Search.Off and cxt.Safe Search.Moderate affect disclosure positively.
App Type
The cxt.AppType affects disclosure patterns significantly. The cxt.AppType.Bro-
wser has no significant effect on disclosures across all content features, while
cxt.AppType.App has a varying effect on content features (Figure 3.2). The
significant effect of cxt.AppType means the two disclosure patterns vary
significantly, although cxt.AppType.Browser has no effect on disclosures.
However, cxt.AppType.App and cxt.AppType.Browser have no effect on the same
content features, e.g., on tp.Adult disclosures. Such an effect on tp.Adult means
that disclosures of this topic do not vary based on the value of cxt.AppType.
Forced Searches
The cxt.ForcedSearch context affects disclosure patterns significantly. The
cxt.ForcedSearch.True has a varying effect on content features although
while cxt.ForcedSearch.False has no effect on disclosures (Figure 3.2). For
instance, cxt.ForcedSearch.True has a positive effect on tp.NameNonCeleb and
cxt.ForcedSearch.False has no effect on tp.NameNonCeleb disclosures.
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Search Service
The cxt.SearchService affects the disclosure patterns significantly. Certain
values of this context have no effect on most of content features, e.g.,
cxt.SearchService.Tags and cxt.SearchService.Travel. Most of the context
values, however, have a relatively more negative effect on content features
(Figure in Appendix A.1). Positive effects can result from the relevance of
the content to the context, for instance, cxt.SearchService.Social has a positive
effect on tp.Sports disclosures and cxt.SearchService.Local has a positive effect
on tp.Maps. Such a correlation suggests that disclosure increase when the
content of the data is relevant to the context in which the data is disclosed.
MSN Service
The cxt.MSNService affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The majority
of the values of this context have a negative effects on content features, e.g.,
cxt.MSNService.Photos and cxt.MSNService.Travel (Figure in Appendix A.2).
The effect of cxt.MSNService.Homepage has a positive effect on most of the
content features. Similar to the cxt.SearchService, the positive effect of context
values on content features is correlated to the relatedness between the content
and context, for instance, cxt.MSNService.Jobs has a positive effect on tp.Jobs,
like cxt.MSNService.Health has on tp.Health.
Browser
The cxt.Browser affects the disclosure patterns significantly. All the values of
this context has either a negative or a positive effect on content features (Figure
in Appendix A.3). Despite the variance of the effect of the different browsers,
cxt.Browser.Safari and cxt.Browser.Opera, as well as cxt.Browser.Chrome and
cxt.Browser.Firefox are more similar in their effects than cxt.Browser.IE and
cxt.Browser.Silk. An example is cxt.Browser.Safari and cxt.Browser.Opera have
a positive effect on tp.Dictionary.
Device Class
The cxt.DeviceClass affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The
cxt.DeviceClass.True has a varying effect on content features, but mostly
positive. The cxt.DeviceClass.False has no effect on the majority of
content features, and a positive effect on few of the content features, e.g.,
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Figure 3.1: The heat maps of cxt.Vertical and cxt.SafeSearch. cxt.Vertical.Video
negatively affects—decreases—disclosures of Adult, while cxt.Vertical.Image
positively affects—increases—disclosures of Adult.
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Figure 3.2: The heat maps of cxt.AppType and cxt.ForcedSearch.
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tp.Navigational, tp.Local, and tp.ContainsLocation (Figure in Appendix A.4).
The effect of cxt.DeviceClass.False means that the intensity of items submitted
through a computer—not a mobile—is not affected, except for a very few
content features.
Touch Device
The cxt.TouchDevice affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The two
values of this context cxt.TouchDevice.False and cxt.TouchDevice.True have
a varying effect on different content features (Figure in Appendix A.4). For
instance, cxt.TouchDevice.False has a positive effect on tp.RealEstat and a
negative effect on tp.Celebrities.
Facebook
The cxt.Facebook affects the disclosure patterns of its possible values
significantly. The two possible values have a varying effect on the content
features (Figure in Appendix A.5). For instance, cxt.Facebook.True has a
negative effect tp.Education disclosures and a positive effect on tp.Adult
disclosures.
Windows Live
The cxt.WindowsLive affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The patterns
vary significantly across the context values (Figure in Appendix A.5). In
contrast to cxt.Facebook, cxt.WindowsLive.True has a negative effect on most
content features that cxt.Facebook.True has a positive effect on. An example
is the negative effect of cxt.WindowsLive.True and the positive effect of
cxt.Facebook.True on tp.Adult.
Connection Type
The cxt.ConnectionType affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The
values of this context have a varying effect on data disclosures. For instance,
cxt.ConnectionType.UnknownMedium and cxt.ConnectionType.UnknownHigh
have mostly no effect on content features, while cxt.ConnectionType.Consumer-
Satellite has mainly a negative effect on content features (Figure in Ap-
pendix A.7).
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Line Speed
The cxt.LineSpeed affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The cxt.LineSpe-
ed.High, cxt.LineSpeed.Low, and cxt.LineSpeed.Medium have varying effects
(Figure in Appendix A.6). The cxt.LineSpeed.High have more positive effect
than the other two values. This effect can be due to the ease of disclosing more
items when the line speed of the internet is high, and not necessarily related to
sensitivity of data. For instance, cxt.LineSpeed.High has a positive effect on
tp.Maps and a negative effect on tp.Navigational disclosures.
Anonymiser Status
The cxt.AnonymiserStatus affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The
values of this context have mainly no effect on most of the content
features (Figure in Appendix A.6). The cxt.AnonymiserStatus.Suspect and
cxt.AnonymiserStatus.Active have the most positive effect on content features.
Proxy Level
The cxt.ProxyLevel context affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The
values of this context have mainly no effect on content features (Figure in
Appendix A.8). While the cxt.ProxyLevel.Elite has no effect on all content
features, cxt.ProxyLevel.Distorting and cxt.ProxyLevel.Transparent have the
most positive effect on content, and cxt.ProxyLevel.Anonymous do not have
negative effect on any feature.
Proxy Type
The cxt.Proxy Type affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The values of
this context have a varying effect on disclosure. The cxt.ProxyType.Web has
mainly negative effect on most of the content features, and cxt.ProxyType.Tor
has the most of positive effect on content features (Figure in Appendix A.8).
Home
The cxt.Home affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The values of this
context exhibit various contribution of the content features to the difference
between disclosure patterns (Figure in Appendix A.9). The contribution is
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mainly negative or positive. Only tp.ThingsTodo and tp.FligthStatus are not
affected by any of the context values.
Organisation Type
The cxt.OrganisationType affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The pos-
sible values of this context very in their effect on content features. The context
values have mainly positive effect on features such as tp.ContainsLocation,
tp.Name, tp.NamePlus, tp.Celebrities, tp.Restaurant and tp.RadioStation
(Figure in Appendix A.10). The positive effect on content features
represent the topic that users disclose mostly in work places. The contexts
cxt.OrganisationType.Advertising, cxt.OrganisationType.Agriculture, cxt.Orga-
nisationTypeDataService, and cxt.OrganisationType.InternetCafes are exam-
ples of context values that have mainly no effect on most of the content features.
Such content features represent topics that are not affected by the type of work
place of a user.
Weekday
The cxt.Weekday affects the disclosure patterns significantly. The context
values have varying effect on content features. The cxt.Weekday.Saturday and
cxt.Weekday.Sunday have similar effects on content features. Context values
that represent week days have more negative effects on content in comparison
to weekend days (Figure in Appendix A.11).
3.4.2 Modelling Context based on Content
In this section, we present the results of context modelling and cluster analysis
of content features. We show that context is dependent on content. We also
show that it is possible to reduce the dimensionality of the content features and
cluster them to capture their similarity in affecting disclosure patterns. The
clustering exhibits semantic similarity between content features.
The modelling shows that all the contexts in our dataset are dependent on
content. The multinomial logit regression was performed with maximum
2000 iterations to guarantee the conversion of the model. The regression model
converges for all contexts. The convergence means that the regression algorithm
infers a model of the data. The algorithm requires different number of iterations
for each context depending on the number of values of the modelled context
(Table 3.4).
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Context Number of Iterations Number of Values
cxt.Organisation 1780 45
cxt.MSNService 960 24
cxt.Connection 760 12
cxt.SearchService 480 16
cxt.Browser 380 6
cxt.ProxyLevel 240 4
cxt.ProxyType 210 5
cxt.AnonymiserStatus 210 4
cxt.Line 160 3
cxt.Vertical 140 3
cxt.SafeSearch 130 3
cxt.Weekday 100 7
cxt.TouchDevice 90 2
cxt.Facebook 80 2
cxt.Mobile 70 2
cxt.Home 70 2
cxt.Windowslive 70 2
cxt.Forced 1 2
cxt.AppType 1 2
Table 3.4: The number of iterations to model a context, and the number of
values of each context. The number of iterations is high for contexts with high
number of values ≥ 12. This number varies for smaller number of values.
The cluster analysis of content features demonstrates that there is a similarity
between different content features in relation to modelling context. The
clustering groups content features based on the similarity of searches in relation
to a context. We modelled the context after clustering the content features based
on this context. We applied cluster analysis with a varying number of clusters
C = {15,30,56}. The clustering shows similarities between the content features
based on on their contribution to the disclosure patterns of one context. The
similarity varies based on the context and the number of clusters. For instance,
for the cxt.Vertical, the clusters differ from the clusters of the cxt.Weekday
(Figures 3.3, 3.4). The clustering shows that semantic similarity plays a role in
this clustering. For example, tp.Autos and tp.Bus, and tp.MovieShowTime and
tp.MovieTitle are in the same clusters (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Dendrogram of the cluster analysis of cxt.Vertical. The horizontal
axis represents the distance or dissimilarity between the content features, e.g.,
the distance between tp.Nutrition and tp.Jobs is 0.10. The clusters group certain
content features with semantic similarities together, e.g., tp.ContainsLocation,
tp.Hotel and tp.Travel are in the same cluster.
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Figure 3.4: Dendrogram of the cluster analysis of cxt.Weekday. The clustering
is different from the clustering in Figure 3.3. The horizontal axis represents
the distance or dissimilarity between the content features, e.g., the distance
between tp.Nutrition and tp.Jobs is < 0.1. The clusters include features with
semantic similarities, e.g., tp.Maps and tp.ContainsLocation are in the same
clusters, which belong to different clusters in Figure 3.3.
We measured the relative quality of clustering and modelling using the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) [88]. The AIC is a measure for the relative
quality of a statistical model for a given dataset. The smaller the AIC the
better the model. For example, the cxt.Weekday and cxt.Vertical models,
the AIC increases with the decrease of clusters numbers (Tables 3.5, 3.6).
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Number of Clusters Number of Iterations AIC
56 100 1,356,463,884
30 120 1,356,498,105
15 70 1,356,588,757
Table 3.6: The number of clusters, iterations and AIC values per the
cxt.Weekday model. The higher the number of clusters, the smaller the AIC,
and the better the model
As expected, the 56-clusters models for these two contexts are the most
accurate models (Figures 3.7(a), 3.5). However, the accuracy of the 15-clusters
model is accepted, despite that some models are better than other models,
e.g., the model of the cxt.Vertical is better than the model of the cxt.Weekday
(Figures 3.7(b), 3.6). To summarise, based on the modelled context, the content
features exhibit similarities that facilitate clustering and modelling of context
with a reasonable accuracy.
Number of Clusters Number of Iterations AIC
56 140 570,082,929
30 80 570,084,608
15 50 570,092,223
Table 3.5: The number of clusters, iterations and AIC values per the cxt.Vertical
model. The higher the number of clusters, the smaller the AIC, and the better
the model
3.4.3 The Effect of Context on Post-Disclosure Patterns
This section presents the results of modelling the post-disclosure patterns, and
the role of the different feature classes in determining sensitivity.
Modelling Sensitivity
In the following, we present the sensitivity pattern LTPnew inferred from the
dataset and the extra contextual parameters. Since our focus is on sensitivity
and given the high dimensionality of our dataset, we mainly discuss the positive
determinants of sensitivity.
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Figure 3.5: The fitted model of cxt.Vertical with 56 cluster. The circles are the
observed values, the lines represent the predicted probabilities, and the dotted
lines represent the mean probabilities. The model predicts the probabilities
accurately—the line passes through the circles centres.
The LTPnew shows that sensitivity is affected by the online and offline
context of the user. In this pattern, the three classes of features affect
sensitivity, positively and negatively. The extra contextual parameters
are amongst the positive and negative determinants of sensitivity as well.
The type of organisation of the user (cxt.OrganisationType) is an indicator
of sensitivity management. The pattern shows also that not being at
home (cxt.Home.False) is correlated with sensitivity management, while
being at home (cxt.Home.True) is an indicator of not managing sensitive
data. The pattern shows that using proxies or anonymisation services
(cxt.ProxyType.Tor, cxt.AnonymiserStatus.Private) is a negative indicator of
sensitivity. Similar to the LTPold, the LTPnew shows that being not signed-
in with Facebook credentials to Bing (cxt.Facebook.False) is an indicator of
sensitivity management, while being signed-in with Windows Live credentials
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Figure 3.6: The fitted model of cxt.Vertical with 15 cluster. The X axis
represents the indexed content features. The circles are the observed values,
the lines represent the predicted probabilities, and the dotted lines represent the
mean probabilities. The model predicts the probabilities relatively accurately—
the line passes through the circles, although not always through the centre.
(cxt.WindowsLive.True) is an indicator of sensitivity management. However, the
weights in the LTPnew differ from the weights in the LTPold. The difference is
due to the extra contextual features. Following is the list of the most significant
determinants:
Content Class
The effect of the determinants in this class is compared to the effect inferred in
the LTPold. Topics like tp.Health and tp.Name have a high effect on sensitivity.
The main difference between the LTPold and the LTPnew is the effect of sex
(tp.AdultScore) on adult data. In the LTPold the tp.AdultScore has the highest
weight across the three feature classes.
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(a) The fitted model of cxt.Weekday.Saturday with 56
cluster.
(b) The fitted model of cxt.Weekday.Saturday with 56
cluster.
Figure 3.7: The circles are the observed values, the lines represent the predicted
probabilities, and the dotted lines represent the mean probabilities. The
accuracy of the model drops with the decrease of the number of the clusters.
The low accuracy of the 15-cluster model is demonstrated by the line not
meeting all the circles.
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• tp.Adult (w=0.27), and tp.AdultScore (w=0.14).
• tp.Health (w=0.088)
• tp.NameNonCeleb (w=0.073)
• tp.Celebrities (w=0.071)
• tp.Name (w=0.046)
• tp.VideoExcludesAdult (w=0.038)
• tp.NightLife (w=0.35)
• tp.QuestionAndAnswer (w=0.032)
• tp.MovieTitle (w=0.028)
• tp.Navigational = False (w=0.021)
• tp.Image (w=0.016)
• tp.ClothesAndShoes (w=0.0128)
• tp.NamePlus (w=0.0113)
• tp.Finance (w=0.0082)
• tp.RadioStations (w=0.0059)
• tp.Commerce=False (w=0.005)
• tp.Galleries = False (w=0.0036)
• tp.Local=False (w=0.0033)
• tp.UrlQuery (w=0.002)
• tp.TvShows (w=0.0019)
• tp.MovieShowtimes (w=0.0012)
• tp.Autos = False (w=0.0008)
• tp.ContainsLocation = False (w=0.0007)
• tp.Restaurant (w=0.0003)
• tp.VideoGames (w=−0.15)
• tp.Adult (w=−0.14)
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• tp.Jobs (w=−0.1)
• tp.Recipes (w=−0.084)
• tp.MovieTheater (w=−0.082)
• tp.Book (w=−0.081)
Data Context Class
This class exhibits more effect of the cxt.Browser than in the LTPold. The
selected values of this context differ from those selected in the LTPold.
However, the other determinants of sensitivity are comparable to those in
the same class in the LTPold, for instance, reoccurring searches have a high
effect on indicating sensitivity in the two patterns.
• cxt.InSearchHistory (w=0.24)
• cxt.Browser, the selected values are:
– IE7 (w=0.089)
– IE6 (w=0.087)
– IE8 (w=0.042)
– Firefox18 (w=0.014)
– Safari (w=−0.047)
– Chrome (w=−0.041)
• cxt.VerticalChange (w=0.068)
• cxt.IsForced (w=0.059)
• cxt.SafeSearch
– Strict (w=0.026)
– Moderate (w=0.016),
– Off (w=−0.06)
• cxt.AppType.SSLBing (w=0.0131)
• cxt.IsDotCom (w=0009)
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User Context Class
This class shows the effect of the extra contextual features on sensitivity.
Similar to the LTPold, the cxt.OperatingSystem.WindowsNT has the highest
effect. Different values of the cxt.OrganisationType are significant indicators of
sensitivity, e.g., working for health and governmental institutions is associated
with sensitivity management. The following determinants show the role of the
extra contextual features in the inferred pattern.
• cxt.OperatingSystem
– Windows NT5.2 (w=0.071),
– Windows NT5.0 (w=0.0136)
– Linux (w=−0.04)
– Android (w=−0.038)
• cxt.OrganisationType: this feature indicates sensitivity to a greater degree
than other contextual features. The following values of this feature have
varying effects on sensitivity:
– Government State (w=0.066)
– Medical and Dental Services (w=0.062)
– Government County (w=0.052)
– Government Municipal (w=0.034)
– Finance (w=0.023)
– Motor Vehicles (w=0.019)
– Manufacturing (w=0.015)
– Government Federal (w=0.0145)
– Lodging (w=0.0142)
– Banking (w=0.0129)
– Government (General) (w=0.011)
– Insurance (w=0.008)
– Utilities (w=0.007)
– Private Service (w=0.006)
– Gaming (w=0.005)
– Transportation (w=0.004)
– Religious Organizations (w=0.003)
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– Data Services (w=0.0023)
– Legal Services (w=0.002)
– Health (w=0.000002)
– Internet Hosting Services (w=−0.064)
– Telecommunications (w=−0.02)
– Library (w=−0.003)
• cxt.MSNService
– Entertainment (w=0.05)
– Local edition (w=0.04)
– Homepage (w=0.0105)
– Sports (w=0.009)
– Lifestyle (w=0.007)
– Money (w=0.006)
– Food Channel (w=0.0031)
– Career and Jobs (w=0.0016)
• cxt.Facebook.False (w=0.035) and cxt.Facebook.True (w=−0.15)
• cxt.WindowsLive (w=0.028)
• cxt.ConnectionType
– OCx (w=0.066)
– Tx (w=0.062)
– DSL (w=0.0088)
– ISDN (w=0.0087)
– Framerelay (w=0.0023)
– Consumer Satellite (w=−0.07)
– Mobile Wireless (w=−0.03)
• cxt.LineSpeed
– High (w=0.0125)
– Low (w=−0.007)
– Medium (w=−0.008)
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• cxt.HomeFalse (w=0.0108), being outside home is an indicator of
sensitive data management, while being at home has a negative effect on
sensitivity management
• cxt.ProxyType
– Http (w=0.0034)
– Tor (w=−0.001)
– Web (w=−0.003)
– Socks (w=−0.000004)
• cxt.AnonymiserStatus
– Suspect (w=0.0032)
– Inactive (w=0.000037)
– Private (w=−0.004)
• cxt.SearchService
– Explore (w=0.0006)
– Music (w=0.0003)
– News (w=0.00007)
– Rewards (w=−0.007)
– Domains (w=−0.005)
– Movies (w=−0.001)
– Social (w=−0.00007)
• cxt.ProxyLevel
– Distorting (w=0.0003)
– Elite (w=−0.002)
– Transparent (w=−0.0001)
• cxt.DeviceClass (w=−0.06), mobile devices negatively affect the
management of sensitive data
• cxt.IPCount (w=−0.018)
• cxt.DeviceModel (w=−0.014)
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In summary, the context affects post-disclosure patterns to a high degree.
The LTPnew shows that most of the extra contextual features are selected
as sensitivity determinants. Moreover, the extra contextual features enhance
the accuracy of the inferred pattern. The accuracy of the inferred pattern
LTPold increased from 0.70 to 0.75 in the LTPnew. The increase of the accuracy
is mainly due to the extra contextual information, since the same learning
algorithm was used. The extra contextual information enhances the accuracy of
predicting the management of sensitive data.
3.5 Discussion
The results of our analysis demonstrate the effect of context on data sensitivity
upon disclosure and post disclosure. When data is disclosed, the sensitivity
can be affected by context. The user can assess the sensitivity of data post-
disclosure, and limit its availability on the web. The analysis shows that
data disclosure patterns vary based on the online and offline context. The
effect of the offline context might indicate that the user reasons about the
appropriateness of disclosing or viewing certain data in a particular offline
context. The appropriateness of data may not be limited to situations where
the data can be viewed by others. The user might judge the data as sensitive,
inappropriate, and embarrassing based on imaginary audience [37]. Such a
judgement may be the reason why the online context affect data sensitivity.
The results of our analysis can be incorporated into developing privacy
management approaches. Our results provide detailed knowledge about the
effects of different contexts on different content types. Privacy management
approaches offer users functionality to manage data on the web [49]. Data
management involves controlling what to disclose and in which context. By
incorporating knowledge about the effect of context on disclosure patterns and
post-disclosure patterns, it is possible to enhance how a privacy management
approach assists users in managing their data. An approach can assess the
sensitivity of disclosing a data item in a particular context. It can also detect
the data that needs to be managed post to disclosure.
3.6 Conclusion
Context is an essential ingredient in reasoning about sensitivity. This chapter
provides evidence as to the role of context in determining sensitivity in different
phases of data management. The evidence shows that context affects data
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disclosure. The evidence also shows that context affects the management of
sensitive data post-disclosure.
The chapter demonstrates the dependency between content and context. The
analysis of the effect of context on content shows that content is dependent
on context. The modelling context using content shows that context depends
on content as well. The analysis shows that all the contexts in our dataset
affect data disclosures significantly. The analysis shows the effect of context on
each content feature in our dataset. The analysis also shows that adding more
contextual parameters leads to an increasing the contribution of context towards
determining sensitivity. The effect of context on content of data need to be
adopted when developing various data and privacy management approaches in
order to enhance the usability and effectiveness of these approaches.
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Chapter 4
Conceptual Analysis of
Context
4.1 Introduction
In the era of social software, privacy management is essential to protect one’s
data. Social software user can disclose different types of multimedia (e.g.,
images, videos) rather than the exchange of explicit messages. Data are subject
to mishandling and inappropriate dissemination. Through privacy management,
users can control dissemination of data to avoid manipulation of their data.
Privacy mechanisms offer various types of control over context and the audience.
However, misappropriation may not be avoided by current privacy mechanisms.
These mechanisms should guard against misappropriation of data such as the
following scenario:
Scenario 1. Proud mother Alice posts her photo breastfeeding her new born
baby and shares it with public. The intended message is how she loves and
cares for her baby. However, she did not anticipate that pervert Bob could
also have access. Bob disseminates the photo further in an ‘pornographic’
context. Alice finds out about the inappropriate dissemination, and reports
the abuse to the social software provider as it is a privacy violation due to
the identity damage she and her daughter have experienced.
Avoiding misappropriation of data is complicated and requires controlling
dissemination contexts. Controlling dissemination contexts requires reasoning
about the current context of a post and how it may change [69]. It also requires
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allowing appropriate or prohibiting inappropriate contexts [76]. Such control
requires the ability to control the various contextual parameters to constrain
change of context. Due to the high dimensionality of context and its complex
nature [109], controlling it can be complicated. The complexity of context
control can be even more complicated due to ambiguity, which is a characteristic
of social software contexts. Without the ability to control misappropriation,
users may incur privacy violations and identity damage.
Towards offering contextual privacy approaches to counter data misappropri-
ation, it is required to examine the role of context in communication, data
misappropriation and privacy. This chapter contributes the following:
1. An elaboration on the issue of controlling context in social software
communication (Section 4.2)
2. A presentation of the concepts relevant to contextual privacy and its
relation to communication (Section 4.3)
3. An analyses of context ambiguity in relation to data misappropriation
(Section 4.4)
4. A definition of a contextual privacy and data misappropriation attacker
model (Section 4.5).
4.2 Problem Statement
In this section, we discuss the problem of privacy management in a context-
based manner in online communication to avoid data misappropriation.
Managing privacy to mitigate data misappropriation requires a high degree
of control over context. From a ‘privacy as control’ point of view [48], users
should be able to control their data and the context wherein data is put. By
controlling context, it is possible to limit the changes of context or actions
of disseminating data into new contexts. The main challenge for context-
based privacy management is the complexity of controlling context in online
communication. In the following, we describe context control issues that are
related to context and communication.
4.2.1 Context-related Issues
This class includes issues that are caused by the nature of context. Context can
be complex in certain situations, and it can be ambiguous as well. These two
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characteristics of context contribute to the complexity of controlling context, as
we discuss in the following.
Context Complexity
Context is the information construct that defines a situation. Context can define
a situation with a certain degree of specificity. A context can be represented
by a set of parameters from within the situation, such as the location, time,
the type of users, their age, and the topics discussed in a situation. The more
parameters, the more complex the context is. To control context, users need to
control the various parameters of this context. Thus, context complexity may
hinder context control.
Simplified context representation is insufficient to mitigate data misappro-
priation [90]. To avoid the complexity of context control, most approaches
adopt simple means for control. The simplification is achieved by capturing
context by a few parameters such as roles of users [13], location or time [6].
This simplification may fail to actually capture contexts that users may want
to control. In Scenario 7, limiting access to the photo to users with the
role ‘mother’ is not enough to avoid the dissemination in the ‘pornographic’
context. Such a simplification results in offering limited control over
the disclosure context, and a lower degree of control over dissemination
context [92]. Consequently, users cannot control every change of context to
avoid inappropriate changes. Controlling context changes is essential because
sensitivity of data may change, as we demonstrate in Chapters 2 and 3. When
context changes, the sensitivity of data may increase. When the data with
increased sensitivity is put in an inappropriate context, the data owner may
incur privacy violations.
Mitigating data misappropriation contributes to the complexity of context
control. To avoid disseminating data in inappropriate context, users can specify
the set of appropriate and inappropriate contexts. However, this specification
is infeasible due to the theoretically unbounded number of contexts [91].
Moreover, users may not be willing to invest much time in managing their
data [60].
Context Ambiguity
Controlling context becomes more challenging when context is unclear and
ambiguous. Social software contexts can possibly be ambiguous due to the
mix of audience and data [17]. Context ambiguity has been firstly identified
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by Meyrowitz as the main issue of broadcast media [71]. Boyd extends this
concept to social software and suggests that the dynamics that cause ambiguity
in the unmediated spaces apply to the mediated networked spaces [18]. These
dynamics are: the audience invisibility and the obscured viewing of others’ data,
the contexts collapse due to lack of boundaries in social software situations,
and the blurred boundaries between private and public and how posts can be
accessed. These issues hinder estimating the context of a situation. Context
ambiguity can affect reasoning about data sensitivity. When sensitivity is not
estimated properly, reasoning about the appropriateness of putting data in a
particular context can be affected. Incorrect assessment of appropriateness can
result in misappropriation.
4.2.2 Communication-related Issues
Online communication gives rise to a class of issues concerning managing
privacy in both private and public spaces. Communication is based on the
delivery of a communicative message. Online communication can occur via
disclosing data within private or public spaces. Private spaces are situations in
which a message is communicated to a limited number of audience. In public
spaces, the message is accessible to anyone. In private spaces, the user can
estimate in advance the audience, their actions, etc. and hence control the
context to manage privacy. However, the complexity of context control makes
privacy management challenging. In a public space, the user may not be able
to predict who will access the data, what actions can be performed, how the
context can evolve, etc. In such a case, data misappropriation can occur easily
due to the lack of context control.
In the next section, and as a first step towards addressing context problems
and data misappropriation, we conceptually investigate the interaction between
context, communication and privacy.
4.3 The Interaction of Context, Communica-
tion and Privacy
In this section, we examine the main concepts related to contextual privacy. We
discuss the interaction of context, privacy and communication. The discussion
provides the conceptual platform required to understand contextual privacy.
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4.3.1 Context
Context is “any information that can be used to characterise the situation" [1].
An online context is any information that can be used to characterise an online
situation. The context indicates the topic of communication and possibly some
characteristics of the interlocutors. According to the theory of relevance and
context [101], the communication discourse context can be approximated by
the set of available informational parameters in the situation. We refer to those
parameters as the context-approximation parameters (CAP). The inaccessibility
of these parameters hinders the correct approximation of context, which makes
the context ambiguous.
A situation in social software can be characterised by a post and the context
wherein the post is put (Figure 4.1(a)). The communication context includes
the data surrounding the post, the data owner and an audience. These data are
the CAP of context in most social software, e.g., Facebook, Google+. The
data owner is the user who discloses the post in the original context. The
original context is the situation in which the post is originally disclosed via the
software (Figure 4.1(b)). The audience in a context can be potential or actual
audience. The potential audience are the users that can view the post. The
actual audience are the members of the potential audience who have already
viewed the post. When the actual audience contribute to the communication
(e.g., comments or likes), they become subordinate owners. Another class is
the extended audience, which is a feature of Facebook (Jan. 2016). This feature
characterises the friends of a friend who become part of the audience of public
posts. When a friend of the owner likes a public post, the post is displayed
in the newsfeed of the friends of this subordinate owner, as if the data owner
shared the post with these friends.
By controlling context, it is possible to affect the approximation of context.
Adding or removing data to context can affect the CAP, and as result the
context changes. Whenever the observer is unaware of this change, e.g., a
member of the audience, there can be discrepancy between the perceived and
the actual context resulting in ambiguity (Figure 4.1(b)). Ambiguity disrupts
the interpretation of the communicated message. By controlling the CAP,
approximating the context can be facilitated.
Context approximation is required to infer information relevant to the actions
and data in a situation. Context provides guidance about the relevant, and
appropriate behaviour in a situation [107]. Also, context provides information
about how to perceive data in this context. In particular, context affects the
following two latent values of data, as follows:
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Context
Owner
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Audience
(Potential
+Actual)
view
Page Title
(a) A simplistic representation of a
communication situation.
Social Software Realm
move p
C: Original 
context
C``: Ambiguous 
Context
move p
C`: Dissemination 
context
Owner C: interpret(p)=i
disclose p
C`:interpret(p)=i`
C``:interpret(p)=?
(b) The post p is disclosed in C, where it has the
interpretation i. When p is in C′, the dissemination context,
the interpretation is i′. When p is in the ambiguous context
C′′, an observer may not be able to interpret p.
Figure 4.1: Context in social software.
• Data Interpretation: Context provides the appropriate interpretation in a
situation [22]. The interpretation captures the meaning of the message [9].
A data item can have a limited set of possible interpretations. Based
on the context, the relevant interpretation can be disambiguated [7, 11].
The relevant interpretation implicitly reflects that the data item is in that
context (Figure 4.1(b)). By controlling the CAP to facilitate the context
approximation, it is possible to facilitate a particular interpretation of
data.
• Data Sensitivity: A data item has a latent value of sensitivity. Sensitivity
indicates how appropriate it is to disclose the item in a particular situation.
This sensitivity is affected by the context whether it is online or offline.
We have demonstrated how context affects data sensitivity in Chapters 2
and 3. By controlling the CAP to facilitate the context approximation, it
is possible to maintain the sensitivity of data.
The sensitivity is related to the interpretation of data. In Scenario 7,
when interpreting the photo as a motherly action, the sensitivity is not
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as high as when interpreting the photo as pornographic action in the
pornography context.
The interpretation and sensitivity are the ingredients that are affected by context
when data is contextualised. Contextualisation is the act of putting a data
item in a particular context [67]). Also, decontextualisation is the process of
taking a data item out of the current context, to where the interpretation is
unavailable [67]. We identify a third process of moving data items between
two contexts as recontextualisation. This process decontextualises a data item
and contextualises it in another context. Recontextualisation can affect the
interpretation and sensitivity of data. Similarly, the change of these ingredients
indicate a context change, or a recontextualisation of data. However, not every
recontextualisation may necessarily change these ingredients.
Next, we discuss the role of context in facilitating communication.
4.3.2 Communication in Social Software
Social software communication is initiated by the data owner to interact with
her audience. A data owner1 posts her data through the social software to
convey a particular message. Each communication is characterised by an owner
who is the communication initiator, and an audience selected by the data owner.
The interlocutors, the owner and the audience, communicate about the owner’s
data.
In general, communication can take various types based on how the
interlocutors act and reason about privacy and context. On one hand, the
interlocutors trust each other and cooperate in cooperative communication. On
the other end, they may not fully trust each other and communicate adversarially
in adversarial communication [53]. These two types of communication have
varying privacy concerns. Additionally, context plays different roles in these
two types of communication. To emphasise the roles of context and privacy, we
focus in the following on the two extreme ends of the communication spectrum,
namely, cooperative and adversarial communication.
Cooperative Communication
In cooperative communication, interlocutors act jointly to understand the
communicated message. Any contribution to the conversation should be clear,
1We do not imply the legal ownership.
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relevant and easily understood. According to Grice, cooperative communication
can be achieved by following the following four maxims [45]:
1. Quantity: provide a sufficient amount of information
2. Quality: provide statements that are true
3. Relation: provide the relevant information that is appropriate and needed
4. Manner: avoid ambiguous, obscure and unnecessary information while
being orderly.
By means of these maxims, Grice describes how interlocutors make the
context explicit to infer the conversational implicature of what is being
communicated. The conversational implicature is the meaning that can exceed
the literal meaning of the utterance given the intentions of the speaker and
the context [45]. To infer the conversational implicature, the communicative
message, the interlocutors abide by the maxims and rely on the communication
context. At any point, if the context is ambiguous, any of the interlocutors trust
that the others will cooperate in clarifying it, based on the presumed shared
knowledge [100]. Accordingly, the conversational implicature can be inferred
properly, and the speaker maintains her self-presented identity [42].
In cooperative communication, the privacy concerns of the interlocutors are
minimal, or at reasonable levels. When disclosing data to deliver a message, the
owner trusts the audience to cooperate to perceive the message correctly [53],
and that they would not violate her trust. When the message is unclear, the
audience should clarify the message to avoid performing actions that might
misappropriate the message. In this communication, the clarity of the context
and the CAP is essential to facilitate communicating messages. Therefore, the
privacy of the data owner is maintained, against misappropriation—unless there
is an intentional attack.
In social software, however, cooperative communication is challenging to
achieve. Although users aim to communicate cooperatively, they may not
necessarily succeed in acting cooperatively [60]. The setting and design of
social software does not fully support such trust and cooperation. A user
could disclose a large amount of data and share it with a large audience. The
overload of data and audiences makes abiding by Grice’s maxims a highly-
demanding task. Abiding by the maxims is more problematic when the audience
members and the owner are not highly familiar with each other. The failure in
following the Gricean maxims results in ambiguous context or ambiguous data.
Consequently, audience members fail to behave in an appropriate manner that
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preserves other owner’s privacy [60]. Additionally, the difficulty of managing
privacy can result in making users less trusting and less cooperative.
Adversarial Communication
Adversarial communication is characterised by the manipulation of the
communicated message. An interlocutor—the adversary—acts maliciously and
misleads others into misinterpreting the message to disrupt the communication
or force others to reveal certain information [36]. Alternatively, when context
is ambiguous, communication can also become adversarial [100]. In such
communication, users can protect privacy by providing less information [110],
with detrimental consequences to the clarity of context and the inference of the
communicative message. Consequently, data can be misinterpreted resulting in
a data misappropriation attack. In this form of communication, privacy concerns
are high, the degree of trust is low, and data interpretation is manipulated.
In social software, it is challenging for users to identify adversarial commu-
nication and act properly. One of the main features of social software is the
possibility to communicate with large audiences. Users may not always be
familiar with the audience they communicate with. The unfamiliarity results
in a low degree of trust [53]. The low degree of trust may prevent users from
providing sufficient information to avoid ambiguity. Ambiguity, in turn, hinders
users’ ability to distinguish situations where others are acting adversarial, and
situations where some users are simply unfamiliar with each other. In other
cases, users may use adversarial communication to protect their privacy. Users
can act adversarially and use steganography to hide one message and mislead
the audience into perceiving another inaccurate message. Steganography is
mostly teenagers [19] to disclose data that has more than one meaning for
which only a subset of interlocutors is able to perceive the intended meaning
or the conversational implicature. To elaborate steganography, consider the
following scenario reported previously by Boyd [19]:
Scenario 2. Carmen was sad because she broke up with her boyfriend. She
wanted to express that to her friends but not to her mother so that she
would not worry. Carmen posted lyrics from “Always Look on the Bright
Side of Life” from the film “Life of Brian", which is about the main character
who was about to be crucified. She knew that some of her friends would
infer her exact implicature, while her mother would infer a literal meaning
of the post.
This scenario shows how users can adopt certain strategies when they are
unable to control context or to avoid investing time and effort in selecting the
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appropriate audience [60], for instance, Carmen could have excluded her mother
from the audience. Although the intended message in the example is delivered
to the right audience, such a strategy is insufficient to guide the appropriate
behaviour of the audience and preserve one’s privacy. A friend of Carmen
can be unaware of the presence of her mother and can act inappropriately by
making Carmen’s implicature explicit. Moreover, using steganography can be
safe in the original context, but not when the data is put in another context.
4.3.3 Identity and Privacy
Privacy management is one of the means to manage identity in online
communication. Through interacting and communicating with others, people
express their identity. In social software, users communicate with others by
means of the data they disclose. Through this communication, users build and
manage their online identity by managing who they communicate with and
what data they disclose [119]. In other words, thee act of identity management
is achieved through privacy management [78].
To make proper privacy management decisions, the owner needs to be aware
of how others would perceive and interpret her data [78]. Based on the
expected interpretation of others to the owner’s data, the owner could make
the privacy decision of to whom disclose her data. The owner’s expectation
is that the audience would most probably interpret the owner’s data in a way
that corresponds with the identity the owner is aiming to express. Therefore,
the interpretation of the disclosed data is of a central role in the privacy
management process. In other words, privacy management aims at making
disclosure decisions that facilitate the proper perception of the owner’s data
in order to express the owner’s desired identity. When context is ambiguous,
the expression of identity can be affected, as we demonstrate in the following
section.
4.4 Context Ambiguity and Data Misappropri-
ation
In this section, we discuss context ambiguity and how it facilitates data
misappropriation.
As discussed above, the ambiguity of context can be the main reason for data
misappropriation. The analysis of context in the previous section suggests
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that ambiguity results due to invisibility of some of the CAP in a situation.
The issues identified by Meyrowitz as the causes of context ambiguity [71],
despite being widely accepted as causes of ambiguity, are not specific enough.
Since context approximation is based on the contextual parameters available
in the situation, we argue that the invisibility of these parameters is the main
cause of context ambiguity. We use the following scenarios to demonstrate
how ambiguity affects the communicative message. These scenarios illustrate
how data can be misappropriated, and how data misappropriation affect the
user’s privacy and identity. The scenarios are based on the CAP we identify in
Section 4.3.1. They are cases where communication can be sensitive such as
activism-related communication.
Invisible Owner
Scenario 3. Bill lives in San Francisco where he is an activist against
gentrification. He anonymously posts a photo of a demonstration with
violent protesters. He shares the photo with his wider group of friends
through the social software. Some of the actual audience are unable to
infer the reason for the violence and its relation to the people in the photo.
The anonymous post disrupts the audience’s ability to infer that the photo is to
report violence in Bill’s neighbourhood. Beside the identity of the owner, the
owner’s attributes play a role in approximating the context. Knowing Bill is
an activist, makes possible approximating that the context as social uprising.
Invisibility of owners can be a privacy feature of anonymous social software.
However, anonymity may come at a price of ambiguity.
Invisible Subordinate Owner
Scenario 4. Sam is a police officer and comments on Bill’s photo, saying
that he was attacked and injured. Dean, being unable to see that Sam
posted the comment, assumes a fellow protester was injured. He comments
back saying that the police are brutal and the protests should continue
against them.
The invisibility of the subordinate owner Sam, affects the approximation of
context by Dean. Dean’s comment is inappropriate because misrepresents the
police as brutal. The comment disrupts the communication. Had Dean been
able to know that Sam is a police officer, he could have approximated the
context more accurately.
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Invisible Potential Audience
Scenario 5. Rex, a friend of Bill who works for the secret service, is a
member of the potential audience. If he views the communication after
Dean has commented, he might disseminate the comment in a page about
people who encourage violence against the police.
Had Dean been aware that the potential audience include Rex, the intelligence
employee, he could have been able to approximate the context more accurately
and reason that his comment was inappropriate to be disclosed or that it may
be assigned an interpretation that is not right. The possible act of taking Dean’s
comment and putting it in another context is a recontextualisation of his post.
The recontextualised comment is interpreted different to what intended. The
sensitivity of this comment is higher in the new context in comparison to the
sensitivity in the old context. Recontextualising the comment is a violation of
Dean’s privacy, and does not contribute to the identity he is expressing. In this
case, the communication becomes adversarial regardless of Rex’s intentions.
Invisible Actual Audience
In the previous scenario, if the actual audience were visible, Dean would have
been able to detect the context change, namely Rex becoming a member of the
actual audience, assuming that he has his profession accessible in the social
software. To Dean, Rex is an adversary who may (mis-)interpret his message.
Being aware of this transition, Dean could have removed his comment, or taken
precautions.
Invisible Extended Audience
Scenario 6. (Scenario 4 cont.) After Sam commented on Bill’s post, Sam’s
colleagues, who are also police officers, become part of the audience and
see the interaction. They think that Dean has urged the crowd to attack
the police.
When Sam becomes a subordinate owner, his friends become part of the
audience. This extension of the audience changes the context. The invisibility
of the extended audience challenges Dean to approximate the context to reason
about how the new audience may perceive his message. The extension of
audience is a case of blurred boundaries between private and public. The new
audience can be total strangers for Dean, and sharing his comment with them
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takes it out of the private space he thought his comment would only be viewed
in. Moreover, to the extended audience, the new communication context can
be ambiguous, and this is a problem because the audience who get accidental
access to personal data of others do not have the same ethical obligations and
responsibilities towards respecting the privacy of the owners [81].
The scenarios discussed above demonstrate how ambiguity negatively affects
privacy, as well as communication. Context ambiguity disrupts the interpre-
tation of data, and hence disrupts communication and privacy. The scenarios
also show how privacy is affected when data is misappropriated. In many
cases, social software users wish their data to be disseminated in different
contexts. The problem arises when the data is disseminated to convey a
message different from the one intended by the data owner. This means that the
misappropriation occurs when the interpretation of the data item is different
from the interpretation in the context the owner shared the data within originally.
The misappropriation occurs also when the sensitivity of data changes.
4.5 Contextual Privacy and Data Misappropri-
ation
In this section, we present our definition of contextual privacy based on the
analysis in the previous sections, and define the data misappropriation attacker
model.
4.5.1 Defining Contextual Privacy
Generally, contextual privacy is the aspect of privacy concerned with controlling
data in a context-dependent manner. Privacy concerns the control of data to
manage one’s identity or the mediated self [49]. In particular, privacy as practice
concerns having the ability to construct one’s identity without constraints [4].
The analysis in the previous section demonstrates how the identity can be
affected by the communicative message or the interpretation of data [119].
Controlling context aims at controlling the change of context to avoid changing
the communicative message. This control results in maintaining the sensitivity
and interpretation of data, as well. Thus, we conclude that the interpretation
and sensitivity of data essential ingredients of contextual privacy management.
We define contextual privacy as the concept that concerns controlling data in a
context-dependent manner to preserve the interpretation and the sensitivity of
data, in order to preserve the user’s expressed identity.
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We propose using the interpretation of data and sensitivity to manage contextual
privacy. A data item can have limited possibilities of interpretation and
sensitivity. The possibility to manage the appropriate interpretations or
sensitivity values could potentially overcome the complexity of controlling
context.
4.5.2 Data Misappropriation Attacker Model
One of the main objectives of contextual privacy management is countering
data misappropriation. Towards achieving this goal, we firstly discuss the
need for defining data misappropriation attacker model, and put forward our
representation of such a model.
Commonly, and within privacy as control [49], privacy attack models are
often rather general. Privacy attack models, or violations, often represent how
an unauthorised or inappropriate action on the data is performed [25]. Such
descriptions of attacks assume that the data owner can specify all the possible
authorised or unauthorised users and actions. However, data owners may not be
able to perform such an extensive specification. They may not be able or willing
to invest time to list the authorised actions and users. Consequently, without
users’ specification of what is unauthorised, it may not be possible to properly
detect attacks. Data misappropriation can be viewed as an unauthorised act of
disseminating data in an inappropriate context. However, in order to mitigate
this attack and given the complexity of context control, we need to define what
exactly makes certain dissemination acts inappropriate. By such a definition, it
would be possible to detect attacks even when the user does not list all possible
inappropriate actions.
We model data misappropriation based on the interaction of context, com-
munication and privacy. Data misappropriation is commonly identified as
data decontextualisation [43, 115, 118]. But decontextualisaiton refers only
to taking data from one context to another. It does not refer to taking data
from one context to an inappropriate context. Based on the analysis of the role
of context in communication and privacy (Section 4.3), context affects that
communicative message of the data owner. When the context changes, the
communicative message (the interpretation) of data, as well as the sensitivity
change. We can state that decontextualisation misappropriates the data if the
new context changes the interpretation or sensitivity of data. We define the data
misappropriation attacker model given the following items:
• A (trusted) system. A system that offers social communication functions.
The system enforces users’ privacy policies and allows actions that are
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not, otherwise, prohibited by the data owner.
• A data owner. A user who discloses a data item to communicate a
message—that is appropriate. This user can be targeted by the attacker.
• An attacker. A user who can access the data item, and by performing a
particular action, the communicative message of the data item becomes
inappropriate—in comparison to the message intended by the data owner.
The attacker can misappropriate the data by causing the context to change.
The change can be achieved by putting the data in a new context, or by
causing the current context of the data to evolve.
The attack can be intentional or unintentional. The intentional attack is
characterised by the deliberate intent of the attacker to perform the attack
to misappropriate the data item. An unintentional attack occurs as a result
of an action that does not aim to misappropriate the data. In both cases, the
interpretation and the sensitivity of the data can change, resulting in a privacy
violation of the data owner. Contextual privacy approaches should offer means
to protect the interpretation and sensitivity of data from changes to counter data
misappropriation.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides a conceptual analysis of the role of context in privacy
management. The chapter mainly focuses on the role of context in facilitating
communication in social software. Given the common context ambiguity
in social software, the chapter provides an analysis of the causes of context
ambiguity. The analysis shows how ambiguity affect communication and
the privacy of users. Based on this analysis, we conclude that contextual
privacy aims at maintaining the interpretation and sensitivity of data. Lastly, we
define the data misappropriation model considering our definition of contextual
privacy. In the next chapter, we propose a framework for managing contextual
privacy.
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Chapter 5
CPS2: a Contextual Privacy
Framework for Social
Software
5.1 Introduction
Privacy management is essential to facilitate communication in private and
public spaces within social software. Social software communication can be
achieved through data disclosure. Through each disclosure, a user expresses
a particular communicative message and builds a desired identity. A data
post can be disclosed in a private space to a particular set of recipients;
alternatively, it may be posted publicly for a large, and a priori unrestricted
audience. Data are subject to mishandling and inappropriate dissemination.
Inappropriate dissemination can affect the communicative message, and the
user’s identity [91]. Privacy as self determination is the key to protect data and
identity [78]. Through privacy management, users can control dissemination
of data to avoid manipulation of their data and the communicative messages.
While privacy is commonly viewed as a means for data protection, it can also
facilitate communication in private and public spaces.
To facilitate communication, privacy management mechanisms should offer
control of contexts to preserve the communicative message. However,
misappropriation may not be avoided by current privacy mechanisms. These
mechanisms should guard against misappropriation of data such as the
101
following scenario:
Scenario 7. Proud mother Alice posts her photo breastfeeding her new born
baby and shares it with public. The intended message is how she loves and
cares for her baby. However, she did not anticipate that pervert Bob could
also have access. Bob disseminates the photo further in an ‘pornographic’
context. Alice finds out about the inappropriate dissemination, and reports
the abuse to the social software provider as it is a privacy violation due to
the identity damage she and her daughter have experienced.
To avoid the complexity of controlling context, security and privacy manage-
ment mechanisms focus on simplifying the control offered to users. The user
can select the disclosure context to disclose a post and can control various
aspects of this context. Also, the user can allow or prohibit dissemination in
a few contexts that form a small subset of all possible contexts. This context
control may not be sufficient to limit misappropriation of data [90]. At the same
time, a higher degree of control requires more complex mechanisms. Complex
mechanisms can be too sophisticated for non-technical users to handle.
Offering users usable privacy management mechanisms requires a shift
in the conceptualisation and design of privacy management mechanisms.
Most of privacy mechanisms are security mechanisms applied in social
software contexts. An example is access control mechanisms for privacy
management [90]. Using security mechanisms for privacy management can
address various privacy concerns. However, it may not necessarily result in
mechanisms that strike a balance between ease-of-use and expressivity. Privacy
management mechanisms should offer context control to facilitate identity
management and communication with ease-of-use for non-technical users.
Proposing such contextual privacy mechanisms requires a shift in designing
such mechanisms towards utilising artificial intelligence to assist users in
managing their privacy and controlling context [51]. Such assistance is required
particularly to overcome context ambiguity.
We define contextual privacy as the concept that concerns controlling data in a
context-dependent manner to preserve the interpretation and the sensitivity of
data, in order to preserve the user’s expressed identity. Based on this definition
and the analysis of context and communication in the previous chapter, in this
chapter, we propose a framework for contextual privacy management (CPS2).
The framework is based on the management of the interpretation and sensitivity
of data. It aims at overcoming limitations of current privacy management
approaches. This chapter explores possible designs of effective and easy-to-use
contextual privacy mechanisms by contributing the following:
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1. A conceptualisation of a contextual privacy management framework
CPS2 to address the data misappropriation model that we presented in
the previous chapter (Section 5.2)
2. A proposal for a design, and a discussion of deep learning approach for
the possible implementation (Section 5.3)
3. An assessment of the usability of CPS2 and comparing it to Contextual
Integrity [76], and a discussion the implications of the proposed design
on users experience (Section 5.4).
4. A conceptual assessment of how CPS2 can address context ambiguity,
enhance privacy in private and public spaces; as well as a demonstration
of how it facilitates cooperative communication and helps avoiding
adversarial communication (Section 5.5).
5.2 Contextual Privacy Management
In this section, we propose a conceptual framework CPS2 to facilitate
communication with an increased level of privacy without burdening users
with the management of context. We also discuss a possible realisation of our
framework.
In order to detect misappropriation attacks, it is required to use quantifiable
measures. In theory, misappropriation attacks can be prevented by monitoring
actions on data. In practice, monitoring and detecting attacks requires complete
information about all users’ actions. However, users cannot monitor and know
all actions of other users. The social software provider, on the other hand,
can perform such monitoring. Given the complexity of context control and
the challenge of having complete information about other users actions, it is
required to integrate automatic approaches to detect such an attack. Such an
approach can be utilised to monitor acts on data that lead to misappropriation.
The monitoring requires quantifiable measures that can be any value related to
the data that changes with context change. Given our definition of contextual
privacy, the interpretation or the sensitivity of data can be used as these
measures, as we discuss next.
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5.2.1 CPS2: Contextual Privacy Framework for Social
Software
We propose CPS2 to manage contextual privacy by managing the interpretation
and sensitivity of data within the communication context in social software. The
framework facilitates communication with an increased level of privacy without
burdening users with the management of context. The framework differs
from other approaches in the way it addresses context complexity. Rather
than simplifying context or imposing reasoning about context on users, the
framework proposes to manage contextual privacy by having means to ensure
that the interpretation of data is appropriate in any context. The framework
proposes to lift the burden of reasoning about context to the level of the social
platform, using the technological advances in context inference, user intent
inference [24, 85], automatic data interpretation mechanisms [26], and the
sensitivity inference approaches we demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3.
In CPS2, we propose the separation of the context inference and the inference.
The assumption is that the interpretation and the sensitivity in a specific context
are appropriate if the owner allows the disclosure in this context. Thus, the user
needs to only indicate the appropriate interpretation explicitly. Alternatively,
these values can be inferred from the data item when disclosed by the user.
The platform can be responsible of monitoring the context changes, as well as
the interpretation and sensitivity of data. Monitoring only the interpretation
or sensitivity is sufficient to indicate change of context, and potential data
misappropriation in online contexts. This approach, however, is not intended to
and cannot detect misappropriation in offline contexts. This approach is also
not intended to control the interpretation the audience infer, it rather aims at
facilitating the inference of the intended interpretation by the audience. The
framework aims at prohibiting the dissemination of data in contexts that would
facilitate inferring an inappropriate interpretation.
In the following are the steps using contextual privacy management in CPS2:
1. The user discloses a data item in a context.
2. The user can specify a value of the data’s interpretation or sensitivity. Al-
ternatively, the framework infers the value of the the data’s interpretation
or sensitivity in this context.
3. The framework monitors the value specified or inferred in the previous
step to avoid changes.
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5.3 An Architecture Design for Contextual
Privacy Management
In this section, we propose an architecture design for CPS2.
The framework lifts the burden of reasoning about context to the level of
the social platform, and proposes three layers to manage contextual privacy.
The realisation of CPS2 implies a system with three main functions: context
inference, data inference, and contextual privacy management. The inference
layers need not be managed by users, but by the social software provider, for
instance.1 While such layers are seemingly challenging to have in practice, such
systems are available, e.g., the Cyc system [64], which provides a knowledge
base to represent contexts and data interpretation.
In the following, we provide a high-level description of an architecture proposal
to facilitate the realisation of CPS2. We present also the interaction between
these layers (Fig. 5.1), and investigate techniques to implement the inference
layers.
5.3.1 Context Inference Layer
This layer is responsible for processing data to approximate the current relevant
context of a situation in social software. The input is the social software data:
users, their attributes, data items, and relations, ads, and the structure of its
pages. When data is added to the platform, this layer adapts to the change by
adapting the approximated context. For example, and inspired by the model of
Buvacˇ [23], this layer can represent two types of knowledge, namely, general
knowledge and discourse context knowledge. The general knowledge reflects
the propositions that hold in the world. The discourse contexts reflect the
communication context labels. The realisation of this layer can be based on the
realisation of the following two modules:
1. Approximating the communication or discourse context: this module
is required to approximate context based on specific variables that
characterise the communication.
2. Logic of Context: this module is required for reasoning about context
and its transitions. In certain cases, it might be needed to reason about
1Such an assumption raises concerns regarding the control the social software provider will
have [93] But the addressing of such concerns can be of a similar approach to that of decentralised
social software, where the context layer can be embedded at the user level or at distributed trusted
parties [98].
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a context other than the current one. For instance, allowing an action
on a data item might result in changing the current context, or allowing
a recontextualisation of a data item. In both cases, it is required to
transition to another context in order to test the appropriateness of the
interpretation in the new context. For instance, a logic of McCarthy
offers means to transition between contexts by offering two contextual
operations enter and exit context [67] to move between contexts.
5.3.2 Data Inference Layer
This layer is responsible for inferring the interpretation and sensitivity values
of data. This layer can infer these values based on the context inferred by the
previous layer. The inference is similar to how a search engine performs page
ranking to match a query to a document: the document is the context and the
query is the post. The query has a specific interpretation in a document, based
on the popularity of this interpretation, the engine judges the relevance of the
document. Similarly, the interpretation, or the sensitivity, of a post can be
inferred in an online context.
The inference layers need to be embedded in the software platform. These layers
can be implemented by machine learning models, especially deep machine
learning generative models. Deep learning focuses on computational models
for complex information representation [10]. Generative models are useful for
unsupervised learning with a high number of parameters [54]. These models
are useful in social software situations because the parameters are many and
vary across users; and because it may not be possible to have context and
interpretation labels during the training phase. Generative models can learn
a joint probability distribution over observable data and labels. This means
that it is possible to estimate the conditional probability P(O|L) and P(L|O),
where L is a label and O is a set of observable data variable. In CPS2, the
observable data is the CAP, and labels are information about context names and
interpretations, whether meanings or sensitivity values.
In the following, we discuss two possible approaches to infer the interpretation
or the sensitivity.
Inferring of data interpretation A relevant model for such an inferences is
the Multimodal Learning with Deep Boltzman Machine proposed by
Srivastava and Salakhutdinov [104]. A Deep Boltzman Machine is a
network of symmetrically coupled stochastic binary units [89]. The
network consists of interconnected hidden and visible layers. It can be
used to model situations with millions of parameters. The model learns a
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multimodal data representation to perform classification and information
retrieval tasks. Multimodal data includes different representations at the
same time, such as an image with text. Data disclosed in social software
can be multimodal, for instance, the user can post a photo with a title or
tags of friends in the photo.
The model classifies images and tags them. The tags in this case refers to
the interpretation. The learning, however, is based on the availability of
observable data with tags. After learning, when a data item is disclosed,
given the CAP, the model infers the relevant interpretation. It is also
possible to allow the user to give feedback on the inferred interpretation
to enhance the inference.
Inference of data sensitivity A simpler approach is to infer the sensitivity
of data and monitor its changes. A relevant model is similar to the
models developed in Chapters 2 and 3. Those models infer sensitivity by
observing users’ behaviour. In the disclosure patterns, we assume that the
intensity of data disclosures indicate the appropriateness and sensitivity
of disclosing data in various contexts. In the post-disclosure patterns,
we assume that the act of deletion indicates sensitivity. However, this
model infers only two values of sensitivity, sensitive and not sensitive.
Ultimately, the inference of sensitivity can be made more fine grained
given the availability of a wide spectrum of actions that indicate varying
sensitivity values. An example is the availability of information about
the number of people who could access an item before it is deleted.
Alternatively, users can provide a value of sensitivity for each item they
post. The post-disclosure model can be adopted to infer the pattern of
sensitivity in social software. When the context in which a data item
changes, the sensitivity of the item can be inferred accordingly.
5.3.3 Contextual Privacy Management Layer (CPML)
This layer facilitates contextual privacy management by maintaining the
appropriateness of interpretation. This layer can follow two ‘privacy as control’
approaches, access control or accountability and auditing approaches [91]. In
access control, CPML allows users to specify the appropriate interpretation
of their posts. CPML verifies any action or change of context to maintain
the appropriateness of the interpretation. Alternatively, without specifying the
appropriate interpretation, CPML notifies the owner when the interpretation
changes, following an accountability and auditing approach. The owner judges
the appropriateness of the new interpretation, and accordingly the change of
context is allowed or prohibited.
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Social Software Platform
Context inference layer
Interpretation inference layer
Contextual privacy management layer
User Interface
Dissemination 
Context (C)
data (d)
action
commit(action,d , C)? Yes/No
interpret(d, C?, Id?)
infer(d,C?) C
C,Id interpret(dx, C, Ix?) C,Ix
Figure 5.1: Interaction between layers. Upon adding a post d, CPML checks whether
the action can be committed by consulting the inference layer. To infer the interpretation,
the context inference layer is consulted to check if the current context changes by
simulating the action. Based on the inferred context, the interpretation layer infers the
new interpretation Id . If Id is appropriate and the context changes, CPML checks the
appropriateness of the interpretations of other posts dx before allowing the action.
This layer requires monitoring of data. CPML is responsible for the continuous
monitoring of context and interpretation of posts through interacting with the
other layers (Fig. 5.1). The interaction is triggered by by actions on data in
any situation. Upon an action, e.g., adding a photo in a situation, the CPML
checks whether this action can be performed. Firstly, the CPML consults the
data inference layer to infer the values of the photo within the current situation,
namely the interpretation or the sensitivity of the photos. This layer also
consults the context inference layer to check whether the context transitions
by committing this action of adding the photo. The context inference layer
assesses the context by simulating committing the action. The context layer
sends the inferred context to the data inference layer. The latter infers the values
of the data and sends them to the CPML. The CPML checks if the values are
appropriate. If the context transitions in the simulation of the action, other
data items in the same situation will be checked for appropriateness post the
transition. When the values of all the data items in the situation are appropriate,
the action is authorised to be committed.
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5.4 Conceptual Analysis of Usability
In this section, we present a comparative assessment of the design of the
CPS2 and the conceptual framework of contextual integrity (CI) proposed
by Nissenbaum [76]. CI is a widely accepted framework for addressing
recontextualisation of posts. CI is based on controlling four parameters:
contexts, actors, attributes, and transmission principles. CI requires the
specification of the norms including: terms of information flow; the prevailing
contexts and possible sub- and super-contexts; subjects, senders, recipients;
and transmission principles.
Usability is an important aspect in achieving the objectives of security and
privacy management mechanisms [21]. If a mechanism is not easy to use,
non-technical users would fail to use it to preserve their security or privacy
regardless of the effectiveness of the mechanism. Assessment of usability is
difficult and time consuming. It requires implementing a system and testing
it with users for a particular period of time. This approach requires therefore
a significant engineering effort. To avoid such time-consuming tasks, many
works have focused on assessing usability at the design phase [95, 21]. Given
the similarity in the objectives of CPS2 and CI, we assess their usability using
the ‘Security Usability Model’ proposed by Braz et al. [21] for designing usable
security mechanisms. In their model, they select metrics from the Quality in
Use Integrated Measurement model for usability standards [95] to assess the
usability of a security mechanism. This model is considered to provide the best
usability standard [21]. We use these metrics for our assessment.
The assessment is an estimate of the performance of the designed system. We
only use two degrees ‘high’ and ‘low’ to indicate the estimated degree of
satisfaction of each metric (Table 5.1). In principle, CI requires more effort
from users and may pose challenges to usability in contrast to CPS2. CI
requires specifying parameters that may be challenging to specify in advance,
for instance, users may not be aware of the terms of information flow in the
system, or they not be able to predict how the terms may change over time. The
most challenging aspect of CI is that it is based on the prohibitive requirement
of specifying appropriate contexts. On the practical level, when CI is deployed
in formal access control models or technical mechanisms [13, 59], users are
still required to specify the same number of parameters stated in CI. Such
models and mechanisms do not offer significant simplification to enhance the
usability of CI. In contrast, CPS2 limits the number of parameters users need to
specify for the interpretation of their data. It also requires the incorporation of
intelligent mechanisms to overcome the burden of handling context. These two
aspects make CPS2 satisfy the most of the metrics to a higher degree than CI.
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Even if CI incorporates intelligent mechanisms, its usability may not
significantly increase. Assuming CI can be deployed with the incorporation of
intelligent mechanisms (e.g., context inference). The intelligent mechanism can
help to present the users with the possible values of the parameters. However,
the users would still need to reason about the appropriate values of these
parameters. Such reasoning is not required in CPS2, except for the interpretation
values. On the other hand, the effectiveness and the usability of CPS2 is
dependent on the accuracy of the inference layers. Accuracy may take time to
achieve in the system and to adapt to different users.
5.4.1 Implications of CPS2
With our vision and proposed architecture of CPS2, we foresee three main
design features that enhance the user interaction experience of social software,
contribute to the usability, and offer better privacy management. These
aims are in line with privacy requirements by various privacy management
approaches [3]:
Context change alerts. Besides alerts of inappropriate interpretations, users
can be alerted when CAP change. Users will also be alerted of
unexpectedly expanded audiences or new co-owners in posts, as
hidden audiences and invisible owners are at the source of potential
recontextualisation. Users will be given the opportunity to prevent those
new audiences, before the damage happens.
Awareness tools. More generally, users will be made more aware of how
their communication evolves. As demonstrated in the previous chapter,
communication may become adversarial when new interlocutors are
brought in who cannot see the full context (e.g., invisible owners) or
who have missed previous parts of the discussion. The communication
owner will be notified of such potential sources of context change and
be given the opportunity to exclude new participants. Alternatively,
social software users may selectively disseminate other’s posts without
violating other’s privacy.
Feedback loops. CPS2 relies on the application of intelligent mechanisms to
take the burden off the users and offer them easy identity and privacy
management. Users can have the opportunity to provide feedback to
the system (e.g., rate alerts or confirm blocked interlocutors) to improve
system recommendations. Over time, social software can refine how the
intended interpretation is concisely presented to users.
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Besides the contribution of the implications discussed above on the usability, we
describe in the next section how the proposed concept and the design contribute
to minimising user effort in managing contextual privacy.
5.5 Applying CPS2
In this section, we present how CPS2 can be applied in private and public
communication situations and also how it can enhance privacy management
in ambiguous contexts. This section also delivers scenarios to demonstrate the
usability aspects of the framework [31].
5.5.1 CPS2 in Private Contexts
We define private contexts as the communication contexts in which owners
constrain access to data to protect their privacy. In the following, we describe
using CPS2 to manage privacy and interact with the software, and demonstrate
how the framework requires minimal involvement of users during the following
phases.
Disclosure of a Post
The owner provides values for the various CAP, such as post attributes and the
audience. The context inference layer infers the context. The interpretation
layer infers a set of relevant interpretations. CPML prompts the owner with the
set of possible interpretations to specify the appropriate interpretation—in case
it follows an access control approach. In case it follows an accountability and
auditing approach, CPML saves the inferred interpretations from the original
context, or can also allow the user to specify the appropriate interpretation for
accuracy.
Context Evolution
CPML checks changes in context and allows only those that continue to
preserve the appropriateness of data interpretation. The change is simulated
so that the context inference layer and interpretation layer infer the context
and the interpretation after the change. Based on the appropriateness of the
interpretations of all posts in the new context, CPML either allows the change,
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or prohibits it, in case it follows an access control approach. If the change
affects the interpretation or the sensitivity of any post and if CPML follows an
accountability and auditing approach, it notifies the relevant owners to judge
the appropriateness in the new context.
Recontextualisation
When a post is added to a situation, CPML interacts with the data inference
layer to infer the post interpretation or sensitivity in the new context. If these
new values have not been specified as appropriate by the owner of the post, the
recontextualisation is prohibited. If an accountability approach is followed, the
owner can judge the appropriateness.
Upon any misappropriation attack, the framework would be able to detect the
misappropriation and prohibit it, or consult the attacked user.
5.5.2 CPS2 in Public Contexts
Besides managing privacy in private spaces, CPS2 offers contextual privacy
management in public spaces. The sharing of posts with the public is not always
safe. As an example, some Facebook users suffered from privacy violations
by the misappropriation of their profile photos—that are by default public—in
the incident of ‘hookers of Antwerp’ [34]. Profile photos of some girls were
put in a ‘prostitutes of city of Antwerp’ context. The possible interpretation in
the new context negatively affected the identity of the girls and counted as a
privacy violation for the girls and was reported to the police and Facebook [34].
With CPS2, users can have a certain degree of control when posts are public to
avoid inappropriate dissemination.
5.5.3 Enhancing Communication
In the following we discuss how CPS2 can enhance communication.
Adversarial Communication
In scenario 7, the manipulated interpretation of the photo through the
recontextualisation makes the communication adversarial. This type of
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adversarial communication can be mitigated by CPS2, as we describe in this
section.
The steganography Scenario 2 of the previous chapter reflects how users adopt
particular strategies when they are unable to control context or want to avoid
investing time and effort in restricting the audience [60]. Carmen keeps the
context ambiguous and chooses to disclose a post that has two interpretations
so that the correct interpretation is not inferred by all the audience member. By
doing so, she misleads those in the audience who believe she is truly happy when
they are unaware of the actual context. The interpretation is disambiguated
based on the knowledge of the audience with the film and not only the online
context. This way, the post will be potentially perceived correctly by the friends
but not the mother.
This approach of Carmen is referred to as social steganography [19]. It is based
on managing the interpretation to be conveyed to the appropriate audience. It is
convenient for users who are faced with the complexity of privacy management
approaches. It is also similar to the concept of CPS2, yet, insufficient for
contextual privacy management: any of Carmen’s friends could comment in a
way that reveals an interpretation that Carmen does not want to make explicit.
Another problem with this approach is that it obstructs communication. The
deliberate interpretation ambiguity may lead to ineffective communication It
also involves the risk of inappropriate behaviour by the audience who are unable
to perceive the intended interpretation.
CPS2 offers privacy management and better communication by guarding the
interpretation. The affordance of CPS2 allows the audience to communicate
without being concerned that they might reveal an inappropriate interpretation,
and thus, they may not become unintentionally adversarial. With CPS2, owners
do not need to resort to adversarial communication, and the audience does not
need to be concerned about violating the privacy of others, as reported in the
study of Lampinen et al. [60] that shows that the audience are concerned about
acting appropriately to avoid violating others’ privacy.
Cooperative Communication
CPS2 can guard cooperative communication where trust in the audience is high
leading to violations. Assume the same scenario as Scenario 2 but instead
Carmen does not have her mother as a member of the audience. In that case,
she can post a status expressing that she feels sad for breaking up with her
boyfriend. In this scenario Carmen trusts the audience in perceiving the message
and protecting her privacy. However, it is possible for any of the audience to
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disseminate the post into an inappropriate context, e.g., put the photo in a
context about ‘single loser girls’. CPS2 could assist users in guarding their data
in situations where the audience are assumed to be trusted.
5.5.4 Critique
One objection to the proposed contextual privacy approach is that it might
affect freedom of speech in public contexts. In principle, it is not possible
to practice total freedom of speech. In most cases, freedom of speech is a
process of negotiation within the boundaries of social norms, and ethics. For
instance, sexists and racist comments are socially not accepted. From an HCI
point of view, technologies are required to support freedom of speech and the
rights to privacy. Our work seeks to explore a more delicate approach to reach
freedom of data communication while respecting boundaries of others. When a
user approves the dissemination of her data, the user can still be in danger of
manipulating the message of the data. In the setting of an accountability and
audit approach, our work does not affect freedom of speech. Rather, it offers
keeping data subjects informed about the usage of their data. Once the data
subject is aware of how his/her data is used, the possible action is dependent
on the software design and legal rules that specify what the subject’s rights
are. For instance, the EU Data protection Directive allows subjects to rectify
inappropriate usage of their data [93]. In other cases, subjects may have the
right to prohibit the misappropriation of their data or to negotiate the usage of
their data.
5.6 Related Work
Various works realise the importance of context in privacy management and
focus on context-based privacy management approaches. However, most
approaches lack the dynamic adaptivity to changes in context [90]. Moreover,
most works on context-based privacy management address the complexity of
controlling context by simplifying the representation of context, as we discuss
in the following.
The simplification of context representation can be seen in various models. In
the access control model proposed by Fong [39], the context is approximated
by relationships between the audience and owner, regardless the type and
semantics of the posts they are communicating about. Current social software
such as Facebook and Google+ adopt models similar to Fong’s. In their
implementations, users can pre-specify contexts by specifying groups of
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friends. Users can disclose their posts to a specific group or context. The
contextual privacy approaches based on Nissenbaum’s work [76] also require
the prohibitive complexity of specifying details in advance. To overcome such
complexity, such approaches also simplify contexts and replaces them with
roles [13, 59].
There are multiple shortcomings with the simplistic context representation,
mentioned above. Firstly, grouping contacts is a time-consuming process
and users are not willing to invest time in managing social software
communication [65]. Secondly, such a process continues to be a challenge
given changes in friends that cannot be reflected easily in the grouping. One
model addresses the challenge of the manual grouping of friends by utilising
clustering algorithms to group friends [40]. However, this model does not
adapt the groupings over time and does not use disclosure patterns of users
in clustering the friends. It may result in groups that feel unnatural to the
user. Thirdly, this model does not offer protection against recontextualisation.
Fourthly, and most importantly, empirical studies with Facebook users showed
that grouping friends is not relevant to privacy management [58]. In contrast to
the models discussed above, our conceptualisation of contextual privacy reduces
the parameters needed to be controlled without simplifying the representation
of context, and proposes the integration of intelligent mechanisms to assist
users.
5.7 Conclusion
Context is an essential ingredient for communication and privacy management.
This chapter demonstrates that by managing contextual privacy through
managing the interpretation of posts, users could manage their privacy without
being faced with the complexity of controlling context. The proposed
architecture design using intelligent mechanisms is promising for addressing
the complexity of controlling context, and enhancing communication. It is
promising for offering a social software experience preserving privacy in private
and public spaces with a relatively high degree of usability, as well as offering
other functionalities related to feedback and awareness.
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Chapter 6
The Other Side of Privacy:
Surveillance in Data
Control
6.1 Introduction
The concepts of privacy and surveillance take new forms in social software
technologies. Privacy and surveillance are two important concepts in relation
to data disclosure and communication. Traditionally, privacy refers to the
right of an individual to be isolated or anonymous [116, 80]. Through privacy,
it is possible to avoid surveillance. However, the nature of social software
communication affects how these two concepts are viewed and practiced. In
social software, privacy may not be achieved through being alone if one is to
use the software. Rather, it is a compromise between disclosing data to a set of
trustees and hiding it from others. Surveillance takes a new form of monitoring
users through their data disclosure. Surveillance is achievable through the
utilisation of social software to monitor users. In such cases, privacy may not
necessarily counter such surveillance [33].
“Privacy as control” (PaC) is one of the most fundamental aspects of daily use of
social software. PaC is a research paradigm of privacy management approaches
through data control [49]. Social software users can disclose their personal
data to various types of audiences. To manage their privacy, users can employ
data control approaches. Data control approaches offer users control on where
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and to whom their data is disclosed to avoid inappropriate access, tracking,
and surveillance. Data control approaches include two classes, namely, access
control and accountability. Access control offers means to control who can
access data, how, and for what purpose. Accountability offers the verification
of the correct enforcement of data control users have. Data control approaches
are realised in different ways in technical and legal frameworks.
Although PaC aims at facilitating privacy, in practice, it involves a certain
degree of surveillance. PaC approaches are realised differently in technical
and legal frameworks. In the two frameworks, giving total control to users
is challenging and may not be feasible [93]. In the technical framework, the
complexity of data control approaches requires involving functional entities—
other than users—to deploy these approaches. Such entities control users’
data and monitor their actions. With such control, functional entities have
surveillance powers. In the legal framework, similar entities are required to
monitor users to enforce laws and detect violations. We refer to the surveillance
that is required for the functioning of data control approaches as functional
surveillance. Functional surveillance is essential to ensure privacy management.
At the same time, there is no guarantee that functional surveillance may not be
used for surveillance of users. In such a case, functional surveillance can turn
the social software into a panopticon [53]. In a panopticon, it is not possible
to tell whether people are surveilled or not. Either way, people would behave
cautiously under the assumption that they are being surveilled. Similarly, social
software users have no means to tell whether functional surveillance is used to
surveil them or not. Thus, users may have to act under the assumption that they
are continuously under surveillance.
The interdependency of privacy and surveillance hinders the assessment of the
degree of control and privacy users can have. Functional surveillance in PaC
implies that there is an interdependency of privacy and surveillance. While
privacy aims at countering surveillance, it may utilise functional surveillance.
Functional surveillance can facilitate and hinder privacy. As a result, the control
required by functional entities may limit users’ control. Functional surveillance
affects the offerings of data control approaches and their effectiveness. The
main challenge to assessing the offerings of data control approaches is that
control is an abstract concept. Control cannot be quantified; however, it can
be assessed by the aspects it affects. In this chapter, we investigate the degree
of control, privacy and the related surveillance issues in PaC approaches. Our
contribution can be summarised as follows:
• A review of PaC in theory and in practice to understand the limitations
of PaC (Section 6.2)
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• A presentation of the main characteristics of data control approaches
based on which criteria is proposed to assess the degrees of control,
privacy and surveillance (Section 6.3)
• An evaluation of the technical and legal frameworks using the proposed
criteria (Section 6.4)
• A demonstration that transparency and reciprocity are the most essential
requirements towards addressing the interdependency of privacy and
surveillance (Section 6.5).
6.2 Privacy as Control
“Privacy as control” (PaC) is one of three research paradigms of privacy
management approaches in the technical and legal frameworks [49]. “Privacy
as confidentiality” and “privacy as practice” are the other two. Privacy
management approaches vary across paradigms in their approach, assumptions
and objectives. In this chapter, we only focus on the PaC paradigm and
data control approaches—as opposed to anonymity, feedback, and awareness
approaches that belong to the other two paradigms [49]. Our focus aims to
investigate the interdependency of privacy and surveillance rooted in data
control approaches in social software.
6.2.1 PaC in Theory
Theoretically, PaC concerns offering users as much control as possible to
control their data and disclosure contexts in social software. Users can disclose
their data in communication contexts within the software. These data can
be accessed and may be used inappropriately. To manage their privacy in
social software, users should be able to control their data, in terms of how it is
accessed and handled in contexts, as we argue in the previous chapters.
Controlling context means that a user should be able to control the various
ingredients in a context [91]. In social software, a context is the information
that identifies a situation within which a user can disclose a data item. For
example, in Facebook, a context is the information in a page within which a
user posts her graduation photo. The context is defined by the data, the poster
and the audience. The poster discloses a data item and selects the audience. The
audience is the set of users who can view an item of a specific poster. A data
subject is a user that the item relates to, referred to as a subject in this chapter.
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Generally, the poster discloses data for which she is the subject. However, it is
possible to post items about others; we refer to those subjects as participants.
Participants can also be members of the audience who contribute to the context
with their data, e.g., by posting comments. A user should be able to control
the original context, wherein the data is first disclosed, as well as control any
dissemination context [91].
6.2.2 PaC in Practice
In practice, PaC is realised by data control approaches to offer control to users
over their data. Data control approaches aim at facilitating the expression, the
enforcement, and the verification of users’ control over their data. Expressing
control over data requires verifying the correct observance of this control.
Access control and accountability approaches offer users various aspects of
control. Access control approaches enable users to control access to their data.
Accountability approaches verify the enforcement of users’ control and identify
misconduct.
Data control approaches offer a varying degree of data control, based on
the assumptions and objectives of each approach [93]. In many cases, these
approaches involve functional entities that perform particular functionalities,
e.g., an access control enforcement entity or an accountability and audit entity.
Functional entities are necessary in certain approaches to perform tasks that
users are unable to perform. Functional entities are required to have a certain
degree of data control to perform their tasks. With such control, functional
entities have access to users’ data and actions. This control, in turn, limits the
degree of control users can have, e.g., by not allowing users to hide their data
from functional entities. Moreover, the realisations of these approaches and
their offerings vary based on the underlying framework. Such variance means
that a consistently high degree of control is not possible in PaC in practice, as
we discuss next.
6.2.3 Limitations of PaC and Surveillance
The main issue of PaC is that it may not be practically possible to offer a high
degree of control to social software users [49]. In practice, users may be faced
with various limitations. Such limitations can be technical, legal, and ethical.
From a technical point of view, the degree of control depends on the capabilities
of the social software system, the design of the data control approach, and the
data it protects. Additionally, the degree of control depends on the usability of
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the approach. In general, users face difficulties in using PaC approaches [90].
However, in the context of this chapter, we do not focus on the usability issues
of PaC. From a legal point of view, the degree of control varies depending
on international boundaries, e.g., there is a significant difference between the
control offered by the EU Directive and US privacy legislation [86].
From an ethical point of view, assigning a high degree of control to users may
have consequences counter to privacy [93]. Users with a high degree of control
can conceal their malicious acts of violating others’ privacy, e.g., leaking data.
In such cases, assigning a high degree of control to users can run counter to
what is dictated by law. According to the law, when data may affect other users
or concerns criminal or illegal acts, a certain degree of supervision and the
limitation of users’ control are needed. Supervision of users’ actions can be
achieved by accountability approaches, for instance. Such approaches entail a
certain degree of surveillance as well.
Social software may be utilised for different forms of surveillance. Social
software are seen as a realisation of surveillance in modern society [50].
Many parties can apply surveillance such as parents, marketing, recruiting
companies or governments [12]. This form of surveillance is achievable through
monitoring the data users disclose. Another form of surveillance is functional
surveillance achievable through PaC. Functional surveillance is a fundamental
part of many data control approaches (Section 6.3). Functional surveillance
facilitate monitoring users disclosures, actions, trust and privacy management
patterns.
The main challenge is that there are currently no means to assess the degree
of control the users and other parties could have, and the involved degree of
functional surveillance. Both users and researchers need to understand the
offerings of data control approaches. The inability to assess the degree of
control users can have affects assessing the degree of privacy management that
can be achieved. To address this problem, an understanding of data control
approaches is needed. Based on such understanding, it is possible to assess—at
a high level—the control users can have and functional entities can have. In
the following, we provide an understanding of data control approaches and
propose criteria for evaluating the control offered to users, and the entailed
functional surveillance. We apply the criteria on the general aspects of data
control approaches at a high level. Such an application demonstrates how the
criteria can be used to assess any data control approach.
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6.3 Data Control Approaches
In the following, we discuss the realisations of data control approaches in the
technical and legal frameworks.
6.3.1 The Technical Framework
The technical framework realises data control approaches via technical
mechanisms to express, enforce and verify data control, as described in the
following.
Access Control
An access control mechanism enables users to define policies regarding how
their data can be accessed. The data control policies can be defined using
a specific set of features of the system to regulate and authorise access to
data [90]. For instance, a policy can state that only users who are of a certain
age can access a specific data item. Most of the mechanisms assign control
to the poster assuming that the poster is the subject. Fewer mechanisms may
assign control to posters and participants, e.g., the mechanism of Squicciarini
et al. [102]. For each access request of a data item, the relevant policy of the
controller is enforced. When the constraints of the policy are satisfied, access
is authorised. The enforcement of policies is executed by an enforcement
mechanism. The enforcement mechanism is a functional entity that controls
users’ data and policies.
An access control mechanism may involve one or more functional entities
depending on the architecture of social software. In centralised architectures, a
central authority is responsible for providing the social software services. The
central authority can be the enforcement functional entity. In decentralised
architectures, the data is distributed on multiple servers. These entities are the
functional entities. Another option is deploying the services on users’ own
machines, e.g., the work of Cutillo et al. [32]. In this case, the user’s machine
acts as a functional entity.
Accountability
Accountability mechanisms are based on auditing the system to identify
misconduct and anomalous actions [97]. These mechanisms perform auditing
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of system logs, policy enforcement transactions and users’ actions. By such
auditing, they judge the compliance with privacy rules [94]. When no violations
are detected, it is an indication of observance of the control users have
expressed.
The functioning of accountability mechanisms requires the involvement of
functional entities. The number of functional entities depends on the social
software architecture. In centralised architectures, the central authority is
the functional entity that deploys the mechanism. This entity tracks users’
actions. In decentralised architectures, the entities hosting the social software
are required to cooperate and exchange data. These entities have to record all
the information exchanged between users and then link them to data of other
entities [52].
6.3.2 The Legal Framework
The legal framework adopts PaC through data protection legislation to protect
individuals [2]. We focus on the legislation of the European Directive 95/46/EC
(EU Directive 1995), referred to as “The Directive” in this chapter. The
Directive is (in comparison to other data protection legislation) one of the
most privacy-friendly legal regulations [86].
6.3.3 Access control and Accountability
The Directive offers data protection via adopting accountability [8]—and
implicitly access control. The Directive states the rights and liabilities of
entities that can access and process data. By specifying who can access and
process data, The Directive also formulates access control regulations.
The Directive differs from the technical framework in the set of entities that
can have control over data. Instead of assigning control to users, The Directive
distinguishes two main entities: the data subject, hereafter referred to as subject,
and the data controller. The controller “determines the purposes and means" of
the processing (Article 2(d)), and is responsible for ensuring compliance with
The Directive. In contrast to the technical framework, The Directive considers
the social software provider or a third party to be the controller. According to
the personal use exemption (Article 3(2))—when data is accessed for “purely
personal or household activities"—subjects are not the data controller of their
own data. Subjects may not solely determine the purposes and means of the
processing of their data. However, subjects can be considered as controllers of
other subjects’ data, not their own [30].
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The Directive distinguishes between controlling and processing data. The
Directive defines a data processor role as the entity that can process and perform
specific operations on data on behalf of the controller. The processor is usually
not a subject. Although the data controller can solely determine how subjects’
data is processed, subjects have the right to be informed and give consent to
the control of the data controller (Article 7). The data controller is obliged
to inform subjects about its identity and purpose of processing in order to
obtain their consent (Articles 10–11). The data controller should maintain the
accuracy of data or else delete or rectify them. However, the data controller is
not subject to those constraints in specific exceptional cases (Articles 13 and
7(b–f)). The first exception (Article 13) applies when the processing of data is
necessary for the completion of tasks of legal authorities, such as the protection
of the security or economic interests of the state, criminal investigations, or
the protection of subjects, their rights and freedoms. The second exceptional
case (Article 7(b–f)) applies when the processing is required to comply with a
contract the subject is part of, fulfil a legal obligation, or protect the interest of
the subject or the controller.
The legal framework varies from the technical framework in the parties they
offer control to. The legal framework assigns the highest degree of control to
the service provider, who is also a functional entity. In a distributed architecture,
the number of service providers increases, and thus the number of functional
entities.
6.4 Evaluation Criteria for Compliance with
PaC
Measuring the degree of fulfilment of PaC is not possible in general [49].
However, it is possible to assess the degree of control offered by a data control
approach by investigating the aspects that can be controlled and the degree of
functional surveillance entailed. According to the identified context ingredients
(Section 6.2) and a previously proposed set of requirements for offering a high
degree of control and privacy [90], we propose the following criteria. Each of
the following criteria concerns a particular data control aspect.
Control over Data Which types of data items can a subject control? What
subjects have control over their data, posters or participants? And what
is the degree of control the subject has? Data items can be posted items,
actions produced while using the social software, or other inferable data.
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Identifiability of the Data Subject Is the subject identifiable in the original
context? Is the subject identifiable in any dissemination context where
her data is put?
Audience Control What is the degree of control a subject has over her
audience? And what is the degree of control the audience have over the
subject they are the audience of? Such control means that an audience
member can select the subject to view data from.
Control over Context What is the degree of control a subject has over the
original context within which her data is first disclosed? And what is
the degree of control over any dissemination context? The degree of
satisfaction of this criteria is dependent on the satisfaction of the above
criteria. As an example, when participants cannot control their data, this
criterion is not satisfied in relation to participants.
Degree of Functional Surveillance What is the degree of functional surveil-
lance applicable by a functional entity?
To use the criteria for evaluation, we discuss the related aspects and state the
approximate degree of satisfaction. The degree of control can be either, high,
moderate or low. If the evaluation results in a high degree of control and a
low degree of functional surveillance, we conclude that users can have a high
degree of control, and in principle a high degree of privacy. The evaluation
does not focus on a particular realisation, rather, it is performed at a high level
on the general aspects shared amongst realisations.
6.4.1 Evaluating the Technical Framework
The criteria are applied on the main characteristics of technical data control
mechanisms.
Evaluating Access Control
In the following, the satisfaction of the criteria is applied on the main
characteristics shared amongst various access control mechanisms, which we
surveyed earlier [90].
Control over Data Access: Most mechanisms offer posters control over their
posted data items. In relation to offering control to participants, only very few
mechanisms offer such control [90], e.g., voting-based access control [112].
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This criterion is satisfied to a high degree in terms of controlling the data users
disclose, and to a low degree in terms of controlling actions or inferable data.
It is satisfied to a high degree in terms of giving control to posters, and to a low
degree in terms of giving control to participants.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: Most mechanisms maintain posters’
identifiability in the original context. Identifiability is maintained when the
policies of the poster are enforced on the poster’s data. The identifiability is not
always possible in dissemination contexts, unless sticky policies are used [56].
The lack of participants’ control over their data makes them not identifiable.
This criterion is satisfied to a high degree in the original context, and to a low
degree in any dissemination context in relation to posters.
Audience Control: Access control mechanisms offer subjects control over their
audience. This control is mainly offered to posters. The control is applicable
within the social software boundaries. Posters’ control does not apply to
functional entities and what they may access [51]. It is not alway possible for
the audience to have control over subjects. An example is Facebook-like access
control, once a poster specifies the audience, the audience will have the poster’s
item in their newsfeed. The audience cannot specify the poster and what of her
data they would like to view. This criterion is satisfied to a moderate degree in
terms of giving control to posters over the audience, to a low degree in terms of
giving control to participants, but is not satisfied in terms of giving control to
the audience.
Control over Context: Most mechanisms offer a high degree of control over
the original context to posters, and a limited control over dissemination contexts,
as discussed in Chapter 4. Offering control over dissemination contexts to users
requires assigning a higher degree of control to functional entities over users’
data and the contexts [103]. This criterion is satisfied to a high degree in
terms of controlling the original context, and often a low degree in terms of
controlling dissemination contexts.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: the degree of functional surveillance
depends on the underlying architecture. In a centralised architecture, the
enforcing entity must have access to users’ posted data — unless the approach
incorporates encryption to hide the content of the posted data. Upon enforcing
a policy, the entity gains knowledge about who is denied or allowed to access a
particular data item. The enforcement entity could infer information about users’
trust patterns, amongst other information. In this architecture, the degree of
functional surveillance is high due to possible accessibility of users’ disclosed,
actions or inferable data.
In decentralised architectures, users’ data and actions are accessible by more
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than one functional entity. Even when these entities have access to a subset of
the information, they can still aggregate the information. The challenge in this
architecture is defining “trust" and “trusted entities". With the assumption that
the trusted entities act as trusted and do not aggregate users’ data, the functional
surveillance is lower than that encountered in the central architecture. If the
trusted entities aggregate users’ data, the degree of functional surveillance is
higher than that in the centralised architecture because more than one entity are
surveilling users. In the case of deploying the enforcement mechanism on the
user’s own machine, no external functional entities are required and the degree
of functional surveillance is low.
Access control mechanisms involve a relatively high degree of functional
surveillance. This functional surveillance affects the degree of the control
resulting in a moderate degree of control offered to users. The limited control
offered to users is dependent on the control offered to functional entities. The
more control functional entities have, e.g., over contexts inside and outside the
social software, the more control users can have.
Evaluating Accountability
In the following, the satisfaction of the criteria is applied on the main
characteristics shared amongst various accountability mechanisms.
Control over Data: Accountability mechanisms facilitate indirect verification
of subjects’ control over only their posted data. Since subjects cannot
define policies over actions, or inferable data (Section 6.4.1), accountability
mechanisms cannot verify control over such data. Since participants cannot
specify policies over their data, most accountability mechanisms can only verify
the observance of posters’ control. This criterion is satisfied to a high degree
in relation to posters and their posted data, and is not satisfied in relation to
actions or inferable data. It satisfied to a low degree in relation to participants.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: Accountability mechanisms are based
on the identifiability of subjects. To identify accountable entities and the
affected entities, every action and data is linked to its subject. However, the
identifiability is mainly possible to the poster. This criterion is satisfied to a high
degree in relation to posters, and to a lower degree in relation to participants.
Audience Control: Generally, these approaches check the handling of data by
other users but not the functional entities [51]. Thus, these mechanisms verify
the subject’s control over the audience within the software. Accountability
mechanisms do not check the audience control over their subjects when such
control is missing in the access control mechanism. This criterion is satisfied to
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a high degree in terms of subjects controlling the audience, and is not satisfied
in terms of the audience controlling subjects.
Control over Context: Accountability mechanisms can facilitate indirect
control over data even in contexts that subjects do not have control over via
access control mechanisms. When a data item is leaked into a new context,
accountability mechanisms can detect the leakage in this context and report it
to the subject concerned. The subject can take the appropriate action and thus
have a certain degree of control. This criterion is satisfied to a higher degree by
accountability mechanisms than by access control mechanisms.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: Accountability mechanisms are strongly
coupled with surveillance. The surveillance in these approaches takes the
form of monitoring users’ data and actions in order to identify misconduct.
The degree of functional surveillance is dependent on the architecture. In a
centralised architecture, the auditing entity has access to all users’ data. In
decentralised architectures, the functional entities have access to a subset of
the data. Also, functional entities might need to aggregate data to identify
misconduct, e.g., when a data item is leaked from one user to others, the
auditing entities should aggregate their data to trace how the data item has
moved from one user to another. In such cases, this architecture may entail a
higher degree of functional surveillance than that of the centralised architecture,
which is counter to objective of decentralised architecture.
Accountability mechanisms offer a moderate degree of control. At the same
time, they comprise a higher degree of functional surveillance. In access control,
users do not have control over who can access their actions and relational data.
Yet, such data is utilised by accountability mechanisms to verify the observance
of users’ control over their posted data. Accountability mechanisms involve a
high degree of functional surveillance because they utilise data users post as
well as behavioural data.
In summary the technical framework offers a high degree of control on internal
audiences and original contexts. At the same time, the framework involves
a high degree of functional surveillance. Thus, the degree of total privacy
achieved in this framework is moderate.
Evaluating CPS2
In this section, we will evaluate our conceptual framework for contextual
privacy management presented in the previous chapter 5 to understand its
offerings. In principle, CPS2 is aimed at giving a high degree of control without
burdening users. The framework requires the utilisation of artificial intelligence
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mechanisms to achieve ease-of-use and control. This approach offers control
over data interpretation and sensitivity. It indirectly offers control over other
ingredients, as discussed in the following. The framework can adopt an access
control or accountability model. In both cases, the satisfaction of the criteria is
the same.
Control over Data: Users have control over their posted data. The control is
offered for posters, and can be offered to the participants as well. This criterion
is satisfied to a relatively high degree in terms of posted data only.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: This criterion is satisfied to a high degree
through maintaining the appropriateness of data of the user across contexts.
Audience Control: This criterion is satisfied to a moderate degree in terms of
controlling the audience who might misappropriate data. It is not satisfied in
terms of the audience controlling their subjects.
Control of Context: This criterion is satisfied to a high degree in terms of
controlling context changes and data dissemination.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: The framework requires a high degree
of functional surveillance. The functional surveillance is required to monitor
context changes and users’ actions.
In total, the degree of control and privacy is moderate given the high degree
of functional surveillance. This degree demonstrates how aiming at achieving
ease-of-use of privacy management approaches can come at a price in terms of
possible surveillance.
6.4.2 Evaluating the Legal Framework
In the following, the criteria are applied on aspects of access control and
accountability regulations in The Directive.
Evaluating Access Control
The criteria are satisfied to variant degrees as discussed in the following.
Control over Data: Subjects have control over any identifying data whether
posted or processed by automatic means (Article 3(1)). The control is possible
for posters, and participants as long as the data identifies them. However, the
data controller solely specifies and enforces the terms of how the data can be
used, and, as a result, has a higher degree of control than the subject. Subjects’
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control is limited to the right to consent. This right allows the subject to either
accept or reject the processing terms of the data controller, as long as the
exceptions are not applicable (Article 7(b–f)). This criterion is satisfied to a
relatively high degree in terms of controlling different data types of different
subject types as long as exceptions do not apply. However the control users have
in this framework is not as granular as the control users have in the technical
framework, since users can specify their own detailed data control rules in the
technical framework.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: Identifiability in any context is required
by The Directive to allow subjects to access and receive information about their
data when it is to be processed (Articles 10–12). This criterion is satisfied to a
high degree.
Audience Control: The Directive states that subjects can specify their audience
within the social software. Also, subjects have a limited degree of control over
the data controller — by the right to consent — who controls external audiences,
and processors. The Directive does not offer control to audience members over
subjects. This criterion is satisfied to a high degree in terms of controlling
audience within the social software users, and to a moderate degree in relation
to controlling functional entities and external audiences. It is not satisfied in
terms of the audience controlling their subjects.
Control of Context: The Directive offers control to users over contexts by
being informed about the processing data (Articles 10–11). The control is
limited to whether the user would give consent or not. Subjects, however,
cannot limit the processing of data in a specific context if they have given their
consent or if the processing is necessary (Article 7). Such control applies to
contexts within the social software as well as any context beyond the boundaries
of social software. This criterion is satisfied to a moderate degree.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: The access control regulations involve a
high degree of functional surveillance. The data controller is the functional
entity responsible for the enforcement of the control offered to subjects. The
controller specifies the terms of data processing, and has access to all the data to
enforce the terms. Additionally, external functional entities can access the data
to conduct certain investigations. In such cases, the monitoring or surveillance
of subjects facilitates performing the investigation tasks. Such surveillance is
explicitly exempted from being reported to subjects (Article 13(f)). The degree
of functional surveillance is higher than the degree of functional surveillance in
the technical framework, as long as exceptions do not apply (Section 6.3.2).
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Evaluating Accountability
The satisfaction of the criteria varies as discussed in the following.
Control over Data: The regulations oblige the data controller to inform data
subjects of how their data are used. If the processing does not comply with
what the subject has consented to, the subject can complain. If the exception of
Article 13 applies, subjects may not be entitled to this right. This criterion is
satisfied to a high degree in terms verifying the observance of control over all
data types as long as exceptions do not apply.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: Identifiability is required by the
accountability regulations to facilitate identifying subjects who are accountable
for misconduct. This criterion is satisfied to a higher degree than the degree of
satisfaction in the technical framework.
Audience Control: The Directive allows subjects to verify how their data is
being processed by the controller or the processor, as long as exceptions are
not applicable. Thus, subjects can verify the observance of the control they
have over their data by functional entities and external audiences (Article 3(2)).
This criterion is satisfied to a high degree in terms of verifying the control over
functional entities and external audiences, but it is not satisfied in terms of the
control of the audience on subjects.
Control of Context: The Directive can verify the control over context by
verifying the processing terms users consented to, whether context is within or
outside the social software boundaries. This criterion is satisfied to a moderate
degree.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: to verify the observance of terms of
processing by the data controller and the processor, a high degree of functional
surveillance is required. Such functional surveillance is performed by external
functional entities and legal authorities that access all data available about
subjects, the data controller, and the data processors. As a result, the
accountability regulations entail a high degree of functional surveillance.
In summary, the legal framework involves a high degree of surveillance to
enforce rules and facilitate the control to users on external entities and contexts1.
Thus, the degree of privacy achieved in this framework is moderate.
The main difference between the technical and legal framework is the scope
of the offered control (Table 6.1). The technical framework offers control of
1The new Directive may involve a different degree of functional surveillance as it mainly focus
on data processing for criminal activities [61]
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varying granularity. Users can express fine- or coarse-grained control, according
to the technical mechanism used. In contrast, the legal framework offers static
and large-scale control. The regulations that offer control cannot be changed by
users, but they apply on a large scale—within and beyond the social software
boundaries. Another difference is that it is possible in the technical framework
to detect violations sooner than in the legal framework. In the legal framework,
detecting violations requires checking the compliance with the regulations
by external authorities. Such checking may not occur periodically, as is the
case in the technical framework. With regards to functional surveillance, the
main difference is the entities who perform the surveillance. In the technical
framework a the surveillance is mainly performed by technical mechanisms,
while in the legal framework, humans involvement is required for functional
surveillance.
In the Technical Framework In the Legal Framework
- Specified by the user - Specified by the data controller
- Applied on data disclosed by the
user
- Applied on data that identifies a
user regardless of who discloses it
- Applicable within the system the
data is disclosed in
- Applicable within and beyond the
boundaries of the system
- Affects the audience within the
system
- Affects the audience within and
outside the system
- Functional surveillance performed
by technical mechanisms
- Humans perform functional surveil-
lance
- Violations are detected in a timely
manner
- Detection time depends on how
often the regulations are checked
Table 6.1: A comparison between the control offered by the technical and legal
framework. The technical framework offers more fine-grained control that is
mostly limited to the system within which the data is disclosed, while the legal
framework offers control on a larger scale.
6.5 The Interdependency of Privacy and Surveil-
lance
The interdependency of privacy and surveillance is inherent in the design
of data control approaches. In the previous sections, we discussed how
functional surveillance is part of data control approaches. Giving users a high
degree of control over dissemination contexts, for instance, requires increasing
functional surveillance to detect disseminations of data in any context. The
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interdependency of privacy and surveillance is manifested in how functional
surveillance facilitates privacy, and how privacy aims at mitigating surveillance.
In the following, we propose recommendations that are essential when the
interdependency is present in an approach.
6.5.1 Recommendations
The variation in the degree of control, privacy and surveillance between PaC
approaches in the two frameworks suggest the need for a holistic PaC approach.
The variation emerges from the differences in the perspectives and the aspects
focused on by an approach. Addressing privacy issues and legal concerns at
the same time requires an approach that merges the offerings of the technical
and legal frameworks. Developing such an approach requires taking into
consideration the interdependency of privacy and surveillance, rather than
focusing on only privacy issues [33]. The first step towards developing a better
data control approach is adopting transparency and reciprocity.
Transparency is essential to address the dependence of PaC on surveillance.
Transparency means that the parties who are having their data processed
should know who is processing their data and, possibly, why. The functional
surveillance in data control approaches may turn the social software platforms
into a panopticon. In a panopticon setting, individuals should be aware that
they are being surveilled. If users are aware of surveillance they can choose
what data to disclose in such a platform [57]. Similarly, social software users
should be aware of the degree of surveillance in data control approaches [33].
In this case, users can experience being in surveillance spaces and develop
appropriate strategies [70] — assuming they are not faced with usability issues
of data control approaches.
Reciprocity must be adopted to support transparency. Reciprocity means that if
a surveillant entity can monitor users, then users should be able to monitor this
entity [29]. Once surveillance is transparent for users, the users should able to
observe the conduct of the surveilling entity. Reciprocity can be replaced by
feedback to users about how their data is handled. Feedback is a “privacy as
practice" approach [49]. With reciprocity, users may achieve privacy as practice
as well.
6.5.2 Transparency and Reciprocity in Practice
As an example of the benefit of transparency and reciprocity, consider the case
of Facebook use in Syria. Facebook and Youtube were blocked in Syria until
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after the uprising in Egypt. The uprising in Egypt coincided with calls on
Facebook for demonstrations in Syria. At that point, the ban was lifted as a
reward for the people who did not respond to the calls [77, 73]. This meant that
individuals did not need to use Tor anonymous communication networks [35].
Without Tor proxies, the identities and communication of individuals were to
be known to the ISP [51]. Such unintentional transparency and reciprocity
about the potential behaviour of the authorities made it clear for activists that
the motivation for the lift of the ban was probably to prevent anonymous
communication and to surveil individuals—given the history of the country.
Later reports suggested that surveillance was the reason for the ban being
lifted [84]. In this scenario, it is the knowledge about potential surveillance
that empowered individuals to carefully use social software and select what
to disclose, as McGrath predicted people to behave in such a transparency
about surveillance [70]. Such a change of behaviour is also observed in the
spike of web searches about surveillance after Snowden’s revelations [83]. The
spike indicates that users were interested in gaining more knowledge about how
surveillance can be applied, avoided, etc.
6.6 Related Work
Similar analyses of privacy management approaches have been conducted
earlier. In the technical framework, Danezis and Gürses provide a review of
privacy technologies and highlight the entanglement of privacy and surveillance
in technologies [33]. Their review covers a wide selection of technologies
developed between 2000 and 2010, but mainly focuses on anonymous
communication and identity management technologies. Their review argues
that total control of data is an illusion, and that privacy technologies can
be turned into surveillance tools. While their review focuses on the three
privacy paradigms—privacy as control, privacy as confidentiality and privacy
as practice—our work differs in focusing just on privacy as control (PaC).
Our work extends the analysis of PaC to the legal framework. Our work also
differs in conceptualising functional surveillance as one factor that facilitates
the use of technologies for surveillance. Another difference is our proposed
criteria that can be applied to any approach to assess the degree of control
and surveillance. The criteria can be applied on anonymous communication,
identity management approaches, or any other approach within PaC.
In another work, Gürses and Diaz focus on surveillance and social privacy
issues in social software [51]. These issues relate to the aspects discussed
in our work. Data control approaches facilitate social privacy management
to avoid violations and surveillance. The authors argue that surveillance and
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social privacy issues are entangled, and that privacy management approaches
should not address one of these issues and ignore the other. We also examine
data control approaches comprehensively and show that this entanglement is a
functional requirement for data control approaches. We argue that aiming to
give as much control as possible to users may not address this entanglement,
since functional surveillance is a fundamental aspect of data control approaches.
Our work also differs in that we consider data control approaches in the legal
framework, while Gürses and Diaz do not focus on data protection regulations.
The questions proposed by Gürses and Diaz for eliciting information useful to
developing a holistic privacy management approach can be integrated with our
proposed criteria. Such an integration provides detailed information towards
developing holistic approaches.
The concept of functional surveillance has been examined by other authors.
The work of Gurevich et al. conceptualises inverse privacy [47] that relates
to our conceptualisation of functional surveillance. Inverse privacy refers to
the concept of collecting information about users without their knowledge.
Inversely private data is data that the user is unaware of, yet, it is accessed by
entities unknown to the user in a way that can be inappropriate. In our work,
functional surveillance facilitates inverse privacy by facilitating the collection
of information about users’ actions and usage of data control approaches. Our
proposed criteria can be applied to assess the degree of inverse privacy.
6.7 Conclusion
In PaC, users cannot control their data without relying on the control of
functional entities. In the comparative analysis presented in this chapter, we
show the complementarity between access control and accountability. We
also show the variation in the realisations of PaC in the technical and the
legal frameworks. The realisations of data control approaches offer varying
degrees of control and functional surveillance. These offerings result in an
interdependency of privacy and surveillance. The analysis explicates the reasons
for this interdependency.
The application of the proposed criteria is promising for the assessment of the
degree of privacy and the degree of surveillance of specific approaches. Such
an assessment is fundamental and should not be skipped by researchers. The
criteria should be adopted to decrease the ambiguity about the degree of control
and privacy an approach can offer. It should be also adopted to make clear the
possible surveillance that may be caused by a particular data control approach.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
I think there is a tendency in
science to measure what is
measurable and to decide that what
you cannot measure must be
uninteresting.
Donald Norman
7.1 Introduction
This thesis provides a framework for analysing and managing contextual privacy
through measuring the interaction of data sensitivity and context. Commonly,
data sensitivity and the role of context in privacy management are not studied
in the field of privacy research. Different technical privacy management
approaches incorporate context differently based on assumptions related to
how data is disclosed and managed. This thesis analyses such assumptions.
The approach of the thesis is a multidimensional investigation of the relation of
privacy to context and data. The investigation is performed from an empirical
point of view, through large-scale data analyses (Chapters 2 & 3). It also
involves a conceptual examination of the role of context in communication
(Chapter 4). Based on our investigation, we highlight the effect of context on
data sensitivity. Accordingly, we propose a conceptual approach to manage
contextual privacy by managing the sensitivity or the interpretation of data
(Chapter 5). Additionally, the investigation of this thesis extends to how privacy
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is tackled in the technical and legal frameworks to explore the limitations of
privacy management approaches (Chapter 6).
Throughout the thesis, we explore contextual privacy as the interplay of context
and data sensitivity. We conduct big data analyses to investigate the effect
of context on users’ behaviour. The investigation involves a wide spectrum
of contexts and how they affect data of different topics. The analyses show
how users disclose their data and manage privacy in a context-based manner.
Using machine learning algorithms, we model users behaviour in relation to
context. The modelling demonstrates that context has a significant effect on
data sensitivity. The variation of sensitivity, based on context, affects data
disclosure and privacy management behaviour. The results of the analyses are
important to understand how contextual privacy can be managed effectively.
The investigative approach of the thesis is motivated by problems observed
in technical privacy management approaches. The focus of the thesis is on
the privacy as control paradigm through which users can control over their
data to manage their privacy. Most privacy problems emerge due to the lack
of control users have over their data. Other problems emerge from complexity
and usability issues. Moreover, the lack of context control may facilitate
data misappropriation privacy attacks, even by users who are authorised to
access data. To address these problems, we adopt an investigative approach to
understand and simplify contextual privacy management. We also model data
misappropriation attacks and analyse their relation to context and sensitivity.
We propose an approach to mitigate these attacks through the management of
data sensitivity and interpretation. We discuss various realisation approaches to
simplify context control using automatic inference mechanisms.
In total, the thesis provides answers to the research questions stated in Chapter 1,
as follows:
• How does context affect data and privacy?
By affecting the sensitivity of data, as well as its interpretation. The
empirical analyses (Chapters 2 & 3) demonstrates the effect of context
on data disclosure and management patterns.
• How to detect and protect data from misappropriation?
By maintaining the appropriate sensitivity and interpretation of data
(Chapter 4).
• How to achieve usability without limiting context-based control?
By offering sensitivity or interpretation management—instead of context
management (Chapter 5).
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• How to assist users in the burden of managing contextual privacy given
the large amount of data and audience in social software?
By utilising automatic inference mechanisms to assist users in context
management (Chapter 5).
• Is it possible to offer a high degree of control to achieve a high degree of
privacy, whether technically or legally?
It is not possible to offer a high degree of control to achieve a high degree
of privacy. In the technical and legal frameworks, the degree of control
and privacy users can have is often limited, and even coupled with a
certain degree of surveillance Chapter 6).
The thesis provides more detailed answers to these research questions, as we
summarise in the next section.
7.2 Summary of Findings
The thesis focuses on analysing parameters related to contextual privacy.
Context, data sensitivity, users’ subjectivity are essential parameters of
contextual privacy management. These parameters, however, are usually
challenging to measure. Challenges emerge from the lack of data that describe
such parameters. Challenges also emerge from the nature of certain parameters
that makes them not directly observable. For instance, subjectivity is not a
parameter that can have a value in datasets. Rather, measuring subjectivity,
requires having access to data from different users to measure the differences
emerging from subjectivity in their behaviour. We overcome such challenges
through analysing Bing dataset. The dataset describes how data is disclosed and
managed in different contexts, by different users over a period of six months.
The data is also characterised by the type of topic it relates to. Our empirical
investigation contributes a set of findings that are described in the following.
7.2.1 Sensitivity
Our investigation focuses on exploring data sensitivity and what affects it.
Sensitivity is a latent variable in our dataset. However, by observing how
data is disclosed and managed in different situations, we inferred information
about data sensitivity. This information relates to sensitivity and the following
aspects:
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Content
The findings show that there is an association between sensitivity and data
content. Through knowing the data content, it is possible to estimate the
sensitivity of data. Certain content topics are associated with high sensitivity,
even those that are not commonly viewed as sensitive, e.g., Celebrities.
However, sensitivity of topics can vary across contexts or users.
Time
Sensitivity of data varies based on time. Our findings show that users tend to
manage their sensitive data soon after disclosing it. They also show that data
sensitivity may change over time.
Context
Sensitivity may change based on the online or offline context surrounding the
data or the user. By knowing the context in which data is disclosed or managed,
it is possible to predict the sensitivity of data.
Subjectivity
Sensitivity can be assessed differently by different users. Topics that can be
sensitive to some users, may not be very sensitive for others. Topics that are
commonly considered sensitive may be sensitive to some users, but not all. For
instance, in a random sample of 75 users, Adult data is sensitive for only 43
users.
In summary, sensitivity is affected by all the above-mentioned aspects. It is
important to state that the effect of any these aspects cannot be considered in
isolation of the effect of the other aspects. The sensitivity of a data item is
affected at once by the content, context, time and the user handling this item.
7.2.2 Context
Given the importance of context in contextual privacy, our investigation focuses
on exploring the effect of context on sensitivity and how users handle their
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data. Our findings show how context affect data disclosure and management
(post-disclosure), as we describe in the following.
Effect of Context on Data Disclosure
The findings show that all contexts affect how data disclosed. Data disclosure
varies across the possible values of each individual context. This means that
data of the same topics is disclosed differently within different values of this
context. Thus, the context affects the sensitivity of data, according to which the
data is disclosed.
Effect of Context on Data Management
The context affects how data is managed after it is disclosed. We investigated
the cumulative effect of all the possible contexts in our dataset on sensitivity
and users’ behaviour. Our findings show that different contexts have a varying
effect on data sensitivity and users’ behaviour. For example, we found that
organisation type have a significant effect on data management, in particular,
Government, and Hospital types. We found that Facebook users are significantly
less keen on managing their sensitive data, in comparison to Windows Live
users. Also, we found that users accessing the internet using HTTP with no
proxy are more keen on managing their sensitive data, in comparison to users
using proxies. This may mean that using a proxy, users may believe they are
safe and there is no need to delete sensitive data.
7.2.3 Modelling Data Management Patterns
We investigated the possibility of modelling users’ behaviour with regards to
sensitivity and privacy management. The modelling describes how content and
context affect how users behave. By this modelling, it is possible to predict
how data of a particular topic can be managed in a particular context.
Our findings show that it is possible to model users’ behaviour. They show
that it is possible to model the sensitivity management pattern at a high level
that applies to all users. This pattern describes how data can be managed, in
our case, deleted. Given the content and context attributes of a data item, it is
possible to predict whether the item can be kept or deleted with a certain degree
of accuracy.
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Our findings show that it is also possible to model the pattern of sensitivity
management at the user level. This pattern is more specific than the high-level
pattern. For certain users, the user-specific pattern can vary significantly from
the high-level pattern. The accuracy of predicting data management actions
can be higher in the user-specific pattern, compared to the high-level pattern.
This means that there are common rules that define most of the individuals?
behavioural, but not completely. The difference between the high-level and user-
specific patterns should be taken into account in designing privacy management
approaches. Fo instance, without taking into consideration users’ subjectivity,
automatic privacy management approaches may not be as effective as they
could be.
Our findings also show that it is possible to model context using the information
about data content. Using information about disclosed data, it is possible to
predict in which context the user disclosed the data. This modelling can be used
to detect similarities between different content topics. Using these similarities,
it is possible to group topics together without affecting the accuracy of the
prediction of context.
7.2.4 Contextual Privacy
Our findings show that contextual privacy concerns the data management to
maintain the data owner’s communicated message. The conceptual investigation
of the role of context in communication shows the importance of context in
facilitating the correct delivery and interpretation of the communicated message.
Users communicate their messages through disclosing data. By controlling
context, users can avoid data misappropriation that affect the communicated
message. Given the complexity of controlling context, we investigate the
possibility to control ingredients other than context. Given the role of context
in affecting data sensitivity and interpretation, we propose controlling these
ingredients to manage contextual privacy. At the same time, we propose
facilitating the inference and management of context by the social software
platform using machine learning tools. Actions on data and context changes
can be allowed as long as the values of sensitivity or interpretation specified by
the user are maintained. We also propose using the sensitivity as a proxy for
the interpretation, and that contextual privacy can be managed by maintaining
the sensitivity of data.
Our findings show the high usability of the design of the CPS2 and its
relevance to legal privacy management approaches. The design of CPS2 is
assessed for usability. The assessment shows that the framework offers a high
degree of usability, in comparison to the well-known framework of Contextual
142
Integrity [75]. We demonstrate also how our framework provides technical
means to enforce what is dictated by the legal system, in particular the European
Directive 95/46/EC [38].
7.3 Implications of Findings and Future Work
Our findings have various implications on context and privacy management.
Firstly, our findings show the importance of examining data to infer the patterns
of users’ behaviour. The findings show how certain assumptions about what
can be sensitive and how users behave may not always hold. They show the
importance of selecting the dataset to investigate a particular hypothesis and
infer a particular pattern. In other words, our findings show the implications of
making different modelling and inference decisions. Moreover, our empirical
investigation methods can be applied in data management applications. Our
analyses methods can be applied to test similar hypotheses, and investigate
different aspects of data.
Secondly, CPS2 has implications for adaptive privacy management approaches.
Managing data and privacy in social software is challenging for average users
to perform effectively. Various approaches focus on facilitating methods to
provide feedback and awareness to users. Such methods facilitate adapting data
management and privacy decisions if needed. CPS2 can be utilised for user
feedback and awareness such as notifying users of context changes, privacy
attacks, etc. It can also assist users in taking actions based on a potential change
in the data sensitivity or context. The framework can offer various adaptive
privacy management functionality that can be addressed in the future work
discussed in the following.
7.3.1 Future Research
The work in this thesis is mainly exploratory and requires further future
work to impact users’ privacy management experience. This work requires
further research to explore how users perceive contextual privacy, and how our
framework can be realised, as we discuss in the following.
Firstly, to complement our investigative analyses there is a need to conduct
user studies to investigate sensitivity and privacy management patterns. It
is vital to verify the relevance of the inferred patterns to users. Although
the inferred patterns are based on actual data that describe users’ behaviour,
however, the patterns do not capture users’ motivations. The patterns are
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inferred with the assumption that users take actions motivated by managing
their sensitive data, and their privacy. With user studies, it would be possible to
verify this assumption. User studies may provide information that could affect
how patterns are inferred.
Secondly, other complementary research is validating our conceptualisation
of contextual privacy through user studies to test its effectiveness. Usually,
privacy management approaches are developed without prior user validation.
However, the novelty of our framework requires validating its relevance
to users. The validation concerns investigating the role of appropriateness
and interpretation in reasoning about privacy. The validation should
investigate how data can be labelled as appropriate or inappropriate in
different human-human communication contexts. The validation approach
could be similar to membership categorisation analysis in sociology. This
analysis investigates how people practice assigning members to categories to
understand how people behave in social situations [87]. The validation aims to
analyse the membership assignment pattern to these categories: ‘appropriate
dissemination’, ‘inappropriate dissemination’, ‘appropriate interpretation’,
‘inappropriate interpretation’, ‘privacy violation’. The validation could be
performed as a crowd-sourced study to facilitate the collection of a large
amount of data. The collected data can be further analysed to infer what context
changes affect the appropriateness of data, and what changes could affect the
sensitivity of data resulting in a violation. This information could be utilised
further to implement the framework in social software. The implemented
framework can be then tested with real users to manage their actual data.
Thirdly, the relation between privacy and surveillance need to be further
investigated. Besides adopting our proposed criteria to assess the degree
of privacy and surveillance, the inevitability of surveillance in privacy
management approaches requires further research to reduce or minimise
surveillance. It also requires investigating methods to quantify the degree
of privacy and surveillance of a particular approach. The investigation should
explore the appropriate way to present such information to users. Presenting
this information to users is not enough to inform them about the possible risks
if users are not aware how to interpret this information. The information should
convey what it means for a privacy mechanism to have a particular degree
of surveillance, and what the possible consequences are. Conducting such a
research may require an interdisciplinary approach between computer science,
HCI, media and communication studies and social sciences.
Fourthly, a relevant future research path is investigating the incorporation of
the CPS2 framework in social robots. Social robots are new technologies that
handle personal and sensitive data during communication with humans. Beside
144
social software, CPS2 can be adopted in social robots to control how sensitive
data can be disseminated by the robot. The framework is based on utilising
artificial intelligence mechanisms. Social robots platforms offer various
artificial intelligence mechanisms for context and interpretation inference
for communication. The social robot platform is an appropriate platform
to incorporate CPS2 and enhance robots reasoning about privacy. However,
such an incorporation requires investigating the notions of appropriate and
sensitive data in human-robot interaction. This investigation can be validated
in a similar approach to the human-human interaction setting discussed above.
Finally, the broad future research path of this thesis is developing a holistic
privacy management approach based on sensitivity, context, subjectivity, and
a particular attacker model. This thesis investigated how these parameters
affect contextual privacy management. Future research could investigate how
to incorporate these parameters in one approach. Such an approach could, for
instance, infer the sensitivity of data from a general pattern and then adapt
based on the learned subjectivity of individual users. Changes of context and
data misappropriation attacks could be detected by the approach, and the user
could be notified accordingly.
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Appendix A
The Effect of Context on
Disclosure Patterns
This appendix contains heat map plots that show the results of the post-hoc
analysis of the effect of context on disclosure patterns (Chapter 3).
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Figure A.1: The heat map of cxt.SearchService.
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Figure A.2: The heat map of cxt.MSNService.
149
Figure A.3: The heat map of cxt.Browser .
150
Figure A.4: The heat maps of cxt.DeviceClass and cxt.TouchDevice.
151
Figure A.5: The heat maps of cxt.Facebook and cxt.WindowsLive.
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Figure A.6: The heat maps of cxt.AnonymiserStatus and cxt.LineSpeed.
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Figure A.7: The heat map of cxt.ConnectionType.
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Figure A.8: The heat maps of cxt.ProxyLevel and cxt.ProxyType.
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Figure A.9: The heat map of cxt.Home.
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Figure A.10: The heat map of cxt.OrganisationType.
157
Figure A.11: The heat map of cxt.Weekday context variations on the disclosure
patterns. 158
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